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Putin no show is playing Russian roulette with Trump
The Kremlin leader is not the master chess player that his propaganda portrays him as. He’s made many strategic errors in this war, and this may be his biggest.
Over the past two days, diplomats and observers of the war in Ukraine have waited on word whether Russia’s president would follow through with his commitment last week to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart in Turkey.
Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky, keen to keep the Americans onside and set in motion a peace process with Vladimir Putin, flew to Istanbul in anticipation of talks.
We have now received what appears to be definitive advice from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that neither Putin nor Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will attend the talks. Instead, a scratch team of low-level Russian bureaucrats will be sent to Turkey.
For Putin, this may be yet another carefully calculated move to show that he controls the levers of this war and – as the person who began this war in 2014 – only he can end it.
He is playing a high-risk game, however. The Russian president has calculated so far that Donald Trump, unwilling to escalate the conflict, will continue to tolerate Putin’s insults and brutal behaviour against Ukraine.
But Putin’s decision might also be seen by Trump and others in his administration as a deliberate insult. It could (if we squint our eyes enough) finally force Trump to take action against the Russians. This might comprise additional sanctions, and potentially, an increase in the amount of US weaponry that Trump permits Ukraine to purchase.
Regardless, Putin is not the master chess player that his propaganda network portrays him as. He has made many strategic errors in this war, and this might be his largest yet.
“Putin’s war was never about territory. Putin’s objective has always been, and remains, the complete subjugation of Ukraine.”
The no-show in Istanbul certainly offers a bonanza to the Ukrainian strategic messaging campaign about Putin and his lack of seriousness in engaging in the peace process.
This has been obvious to anyone who reviews the evidence of Russia’s continued targeting of Ukrainian civilians in drone attacks (particularly its repulsive Kherson drone safari), ongoing ground offensives and campaign of sabotage throughout Europe. But for many in America and beyond, weary of a war for which they have not had to make any exertions, Russian propaganda about Ukraine’s lack of willingness to engage in the peace process has provided a fig leaf for disengaging from Ukraine support.
This fig leaf has now been torn away.
Perhaps worse for Putin, he now looks even smaller and more cowardly than he has throughout the war. After offering the talks, he has not demonstrated the courage to get on a plane and travel to a neighbouring country to face Zelensky directly.
These issues aside, what does the trajectory of the war, and peace negotiations, look like from here?
For America, this is a fork-in-the-road moment in their posture towards negotiations. While ostensibly treating each side equally, the reality until this point is that the American government since January this year has treated the Russian aggressors more favourably than Ukraine.
Trump has recognised a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. He has not been able to bring himself to criticise Putin, while frequently engaging in slander against Zelensky. Now, given Putin’s repeated repudiations of America’s peace entreaties, might Trump decide on a harder line with Putin to force him to the negotiating table? Or might they walk away entirely?
For Europe, the sanctions package to suffocate Russia’s economy that had been on hold pending the arrival of Putin in Istanbul appears to be back on the table. The Russian leader’s behaviour will reinforce the European nations’ decisions to continue to increase defence spending, with the latest development of a commitment to take military and other national defence spending to 5 per cent.
France has also indicated it is willing to share its nuclear weapons with other nations, similar to the NATO program in which the US shares such weaponry with six NATO members. Meeting these aspirations will be important for Europe if it is to build its support for Ukraine to replace shortfalls in America aid, as well as to replenish and expand its munitions stockpiles and military forces.
Given Ukraine’s predicament, uncertainty about American engagement, and multiple assessments about Russia’s potential for future aggression, the leaders of European nations have no choice but to expand their military forces and their aid for Kyiv.
From Ukraine’s perspective, Putin’s no-show doesn’t really change anything. He is conforming to their low expectations of him. Ukrainian ground forces will continue defending against the Russian eastern offensive, killing huge numbers of Russian soldiers – now approaching 1 million casualties – in return for giving up small parcels of land. They will continue defending their skies against the nightly onslaughts – now at a rate of more than 1000 drones and missiles fired against Ukrainians each week. And they will continue to work with their European and American partners to receive intelligence, as well as military, economic, and diplomatic aid.
The Ukrainians understand that Russian success in this war is not measured in square metres of territory seized nor in the number of Russian soldiers killed.
Putin’s war was never about territory. Putin’s objective has always been, and remains, the complete subjugation of Ukraine, the extinguishment of its dreams of EU and NATO membership, and the destruction of the unique, independent and democratic culture it nurtures.
As long as Ukraine can deny this to Putin, Russia cannot win this war. And therein lie the seeds of Ukraine’s hopes for the future, regardless of whether Putin has the courage to face Zelensky.
About the author
Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan is a Senior Fellow for Military Studies in the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program.