Antarctic diplomacy’s “back to basics” test

On Monday, 11 May 2026, diplomats, scientists, and policymakers from across the world will gather in Hiroshima, Japan, for what shapes as a crucial meeting on Antarctica. The official outcomes report typically takes at least a month to be released, but the result will be a test of the remarkable experiment in cooperative international governance that has endured on the frozen continent for more than six decades.

This will be the 48th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), convened under one of the most enduring international law achievements of the post-Second World war period: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. This treaty demilitarises a region covering approximately 10% of the Earth’s surface, setting it aside to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes including scientific cooperation. Together with the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection, it contributes to what is known as the Antarctic Treaty System.

The meeting will be held, however, against a deeply troubled international backdrop. Politicians speak openly of an unravelling of the rules-based international order. International law is itself under acute strain, facing growing questions – sometimes from unexpected quarters – about its relevance or authority when powerful states act in open defiance of its norms.

In this context, one of the most distinctive features of Antarctic diplomacy deserves attention. The ATCM has historically been regarded as “exceptional” – a forum where participating states work deliberately to insulate Antarctic cooperation from the tensions of broader international politics. The most celebrated example remains the early 1980s, when the United Kingdom and Argentina – then engaged in armed conflict over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas – nevertheless maintained their engagement with the Antarctic Treaty process. The treaty has survived serious conflicts between states before, and the norm of keeping wider geopolitics at the door has proven remarkably durable.

When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959, it was forged in the depths of Cold War nuclear tension – cooperation achieved precisely when it seemed most improbable.

Yet recent years have seen some erosion of that tradition. Russia’s 2022 illegal war of aggression against Ukraine prompted strong statements of criticism from Ukraine and many other states, including Australia within ATCM proceedings – an unusual incursion of geopolitical tensions into a forum that has long prided itself on consensus and restraint. The boundary between Antarctic diplomacy and wider issues is becoming harder to maintain. Nonetheless, the fact that such issues can be raised at Treaty Meetings demonstrates the strength and robustness of the System.

Against this backdrop, Japan has emerged as a responsive and constructive host, and its framing of the upcoming meeting is both deliberate and timely. Its core message of “back to basics” – an invitation to participating states to refocus on the foundational principles of the Antarctic Treaty system: peaceful use of the region, scientific cooperation, and environmental protection – reflects diplomatic skill and a clear-eyed recognition of the pressures the System faces.

Several notable matters are likely to come before the parties. Consultative Party status – the designation conferring a formal decision-making role within the treaty meetings – may be sought by Canada, Belarus, Türkiye, and Colombia, raising difficult questions about consensus in the current political climate. The emperor penguin listing may be raised again; at past meetings, one or two states have been willing to block efforts to list the species as specially protected under the Environmental Protocol, a failure observers attribute less to scientific disagreement than to wider opposition to marine spatial protection in Antarctica.

A further discussion is likely around Antarctic tourism, which now exceeds 100,000 visitors per season and has grown substantially over the past decade. While final regulatory decisions on managing its environmental impacts are unlikely this year, ATCM 48 represents an real opportunity to advance that work. Finally, the United States conducted inspections of Antarctic research stations during the last austral summer – the Treaty’s primary compliance and verification mechanism – and will report its findings to the meeting, a signal of continued US engagement with the Antarctic Treaty System that deserves acknowledgement.

It would be unrealistic to expect major breakthroughs at ATCM 48, particularly on politically complex questions such as protecting the region from the impacts of climate change. That is not the right measure of success. When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959, it was forged in the depths of Cold War nuclear tension – cooperation achieved precisely when it seemed most improbable. Today, the most valuable contribution the ATCM can offer the international system is more modest but no less important: a credible demonstration that competent, good-faith multilateralism remains possible.

For Australia – an original Consultative Party, operator of three Antarctic research stations, and one of the treaty’s most consistent champions – that will be an important outcome. A meeting that returns to basics, holds the line on non-militarisation and environmental protection, and models cooperative governance during a particularly challenging period in international affairs may prove more consequential than these modest ambitions suggest.