Migration & refugees, explained.
Sydney Airport, International Terminal (David Syphers/Unsplash)
Canberra’s new migration rules aim to project control – but the price is being paid by universities and Australia’s ties with Indonesia.
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Australia’s migration dilemma: short-term pressures, long-term costsAustralia’s migration dilemma: short-term pressures, long-term costs
Australia’s newly releasedIntergenerational Report 2026 (Opens in new window) projects that deaths will outnumber births by the 2060s. It also recognises that migration contributes to population growth, slows the ageing bracket, and strengthens the economy through skills, innovation and international connections.
That long-term assessment sits uneasily beside the government’slatest migration reforms (Opens in new window). The measures seek to repair genuine weaknesses in the system. They also arrive amid mounting political pressure to demonstrate tighter control over migration.
The challenge is therefore not whether migration should be managed, but whether short-term restrictions remain consistent with Australia’s longer-term need for skills, talent and international connections.
The reforms contain a notable concession to Southeast Asia. Students from countries in the region will receive special visa conditions allowing them to bring their families, even as secondary applicants are restricted across most student visas. This calibration deserves recognition.
The exemptions, however, do not entirely offset the broader political message surrounding the reforms. Announced under the banner of ending “rorts”, measures affecting international students form part of a wider response to visa overstayers, rogue migration agents and other threats to the integrity of the migration system.
The government insists that the measures were not devised in response to One Nation’s recent rise. Whatever the origin, they allow Labor to demonstrate control over migration before demands for more drastic restrictions gain further ground. International mobility is now being addressed through political language shaped by calls for tighter borders.
One reason Australia–Indonesia relations have endured periods of tension is that they rest not only on official diplomacy, but also on relationships built in classrooms, campuses and research communities.
Migration has been a recurring fault line in Australian politics since before Federation. Precisely because the issue is so enduring, Australia should possess the institutional memory to manage it throughcareful planning (Opens in new window), rather than requiring institutions to absorb repeated policy shocks.
Caught in the middle are Australia’s universities.
International education generated $53.6 billion (Opens in new window) in export income in the year to June 2025, making it Australia’s fourth-largest export. Universities also sustain research capacity, educate future leaders and maintain institutional relationships across the Indo-Pacific. They sit where Australia’s migration, economic and foreign policies converge.
Universities cannot adjust their commitments each time the domestic political mood changes. They recruit staff, develop programs, construct facilities and build international partnerships based on decisions made years in advance. Sector leaders have warned that repeated policy changes create aboom-and-bust cycle (Opens in new window), making Australia less predictable and less attractive to global talent.
At the heart of the dilemma is a mismatch of time horizons. Governments can alter visa settings in response to immediate administrative and electoral pressures. Universities build research capacity, reputation and regional relationships over decades. A restriction can be announced within an electoral cycle; the uncertainty it creates may persist much longer.
This is where former prime minister Kevin Rudd’s warning about“the complacent country” (Opens in new window) becomes especially relevant. Complacency is not only a failure to build new strategic capacity. It can also take the form of casually weakening institutions that already sustain it.
Labor MP Tim Watts identified a related problem when warning aboutAustralia’s declining Asia capability (Opens in new window). Australia’s ability to engage its region depends not only on diplomatic statements or defence capabilities, but also on institutions that generate knowledge and maintain relationships across borders.
Universities are not arms of government, yet they form part of the infrastructure through which Australia practises higher education statecraft. Amid growing competition for talent, knowledge and influence in the Indo-Pacific, their regional networks should be deliberately cultivated rather than simply assumed.
A “Gig on the Green” event in Jakarta with Australian alumni (Australian Embassy Jakarta/Flickr)
Viewed from Indonesia, this matters. For more than seven decades (Opens in new window), education has provided unusual continuity to a bilateral relationship often marked by political fluctuation.
Beginning with the Colombo Plan in the 1950s, generations of Indonesian students have formed professional and personal connections with Australia across government, universities, business and civil society. One reason Australia–Indonesia relations have endured periods of tension is that they rest not only on official diplomacy, but also on relationships built in classrooms, campuses and research communities.
Formal exemptions are only part of the signal Australia sends. Indonesian students and institutions also observe repeated policy adjustments and the wider political language surrounding international students. A formally open door can still appear less predictable when the settings around it continually change.
Theconcern expressed by universities (Opens in new window) is not simply resistance to tighter regulation. It reflects uncertainty over whether short-term migration management is being adequately weighed against Australia’s research capacity, international competitiveness and longer-term regional interests.
Universities have responsibilities, too. They must strengthen admissions integrity, reduce excessive dependence on particular markets and explain more clearly how international education benefits Australian society. Careful adaptation requires a reasonably predictable policy environment.
The latest reforms may prove to be a measured response to genuine problems. Whether they remain measured will depend on transparent monitoring, sustained consultation with universities and a willingness to adjust settings when unintended consequences emerge.
Australia’s own long-term projections make clear that migration, skills and international connections will remain central to its future. A country seeking to overcome complacency should take care not to weaken the institutions that cultivate those skills and connections while responding to the politics of the moment.
About the author
Hangga Fathana
Hangga Fathana is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Universitas Islam Indonesia, with more than 15 years of experience teaching Australian politics and foreign policy.
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