Southeast Asia, explained.
Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi speaks during a press conference at the G7 summit, in Evian, France (Fabrice Coffrini/AFP via Getty Images)
Southeast Asia won’t buy China’s neo-militarism narrative, but the chill will be felt regardless.
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Beijing is trying to turn Tokyo toxic in Southeast AsiaBeijing is trying to turn Tokyo toxic in Southeast Asia
Since November 2025, relations between Japan and China have undergone a rupture. China’s over-reaction to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement in parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a “life-threatening situation” for Japan has included restricting economic and cultural ties between the two countries. Beijing appears intent on isolating and stigmatising Japan as far as possible through a wide-ranging pressure campaign.
Takaichi has been undeterred by China’s pressure tactics, which actually benefited her in political terms by contributing to her government’s resounding election victory in February. But Beijing’s sustained diplomatic offensive has an important audience beyond Japan. As China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson put it in May (Opens in new window), “all Asia-Pacific countries need to stay clear-eyed and jointly reject Japanese neo-militarism to safeguard the order of peace on which all countries rely to live and thrive”.
There may be a parallel here with China’s attempts to coerce Australia between 2020 and 2022, which although largely unsuccessful in changing Canberra’s behaviour, had a diplomatic chilling effect on third countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Whereas Beijing previously sought to present Australia to the region as “anti-China” and a US proxy, it seeks to delegitimise Japan’s regional role on historical and moral grounds.
It is tempting to dismiss China’s efforts as futile. After all, surveys have consistently shown Japan to be the most trusted partner for Southeast Asia. According to 2024 Pew Research Centre (Opens in new window) public opinion polling, 81% of respondents in Thailand and the Philippines, 72% of Malaysians and 58% of Singaporeans see Japan as contributing positively to peace and stability. The 2026 ISEAS State of Southeast Asia Survey (Opens in new window) shows Japan is by far the most trusted external partner to the region’s elites. The latest Lowy Poll also illustrates (Opens in new window) the high regard that Australians hold for Japan to act responsibly in the world.
Wherever China has tried to enlist Southeast Asian countries to take its side against Japan, it has been disappointed.
While Japan has been a major provider of maritime security and counter-terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia for decades, Takaichi’s government has stepped up Official Security Assistance (OSA) and relaxed restrictions on defence exports (Opens in new window) to several ASEAN countries. Her energetic Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has shown much greater willingness than his predecessors to embrace a hard security role for Japan, while being careful to avoid inflammatory rhetoric. Japan recently sent combat troops from the Self-Defence Forces to the Philippines for the first time to participate in Exercise Balikatan, enabled by a bilateral Reciprocal Access Agreement, since complemented (Opens in new window) by an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan has provided OSA grants (Opens in new window) of defence equipment to the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, with potential transfers of used naval escort vessels in the offing.
This strong appetite to work with Japan in both economic and security domains make it unlikely that any country in Southeast Asia will buy China’s line that the prospect of resurgent militarism from Japan is a genuine threat. They are also able to see, as Koizumi pointed out at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (Opens in new window), that China “has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers, [whereas] Japan has neither”. Wherever China has tried to enlist Southeast Asian countries to take its side (Opens in new window) against Japan, it has been disappointed (Opens in new window).
A strong appetite to work with Japan make it unlikely that any country in Southeast Asia will buy China’s line that the prospect of resurgent militarism from Japan is a genuine threat (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia)
Even so, the consequences of China’s campaign could still exact a quiet cost. For Vietnam, which carefully seeks to balance interactions with foreign governments, Beijing’s attacks on Tokyo could raise the perceived cost of partnering with Japan, making it less likely to accept OSA. Others, such as Singapore, will continue to welcome the regional presence of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces and Coast Guard but may do so with less fanfare.
China also shows no signs of dialling back its vitriolic attacks on Japan, however unconvincing they may appear to others. Chairman Xi Jinping is reported to be personally invested in the campaign (Opens in new window), so there will be an expectation that demonstrable costs are imposed, even indirectly. Japan has since sent a minister (Opens in new window) to attend an APEC-related meeting in Shanghai.
Japan’s adoption of a more activist approach to security assistance in Southeast Asia, which it is carefully balancing (Opens in new window) with timely economic measures such as the US$10 billion POWERR Asia (Opens in new window) initiative to support energy resilience, remains appealing to most Southeast Asian countries. Uncertainty about the US also works in Japan’s favour, diplomatically. And although Tokyo’s fiscal resources are tightly stretched, Japanese assistance to the region remains steady and on a larger scale than other states – apart from China.
The region – including Australia – should reinforce Tokyo’s positive regional contribution during Japan’s turn in China’s revolving crosshairs.
About the authors
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
Euan Graham
Dr Euan Graham is an Expert Associate at the Australian National Security College and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
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