Beijing’s green mirage: How China drives environmental destruction abroad while claiming climate leadership at home

There is no denying that China is aggressively branding itself as the world’s environmental champion. From the massive “Three-North Shelterbelt“ reforestation to the world’s biggest solar photovoltaic power farms on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, China is offering an impressive package of large-scale domestic afforestation, clean energy development, and ambitious net-zero ambitions.

But just beyond its shores, another – and far darker – story is unfolding. China’s outsized global environmental footprint is casting a lengthy shadow over its green reputation, one that has the potential to unravel hard-won global progress in biodiversity conservation and climate targets.

While China touts its ecological civilisation – a new system of development that stresses the harmonious coexistence of humanity and nature – at home, its voracious appetite for imported soy, beef, palm oil, and tropical timber has caused damage across some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. According to a recent Forest Trends report, China’s tropical deforestation footprint, linked to imports of high-risk agricultural and timber commodities, accounted for as much as five per cent of carbon emissions from tropical and subtropical deforestation during 2013–22.

The environmental consequences of these imports don’t stop at deforestation. They also carry a massive carbon price tag. China’s imported deforestation, led by trade with Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia, is responsible for as much as 200 million metric tons of CO2 per year. That’s equivalent to 20–30 per cent of China’s domestic agricultural emissions. Worse still, these embedded emissions are invisible in its nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, creating a glaring climate credibility gap.

China’s role in driving deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon Basin is increasingly alarming. The region loses about 133 square kilometres of forest each year, equivalent to over 400 football fields daily, primarily due to agricultural expansion for beef and soybean production. These commodities feed global markets, with China being a dominant consumer. In 2022, 96 per cent of China’s soy imports originated from soy-producing regions linked to deforestation, compared to only 55 per cent for the European Union. This stark contrast highlights China’s disproportionately large impact on Amazon deforestation. Although Brazil has recently made strides in curbing forest loss through policy reforms, stronger enforcement, and indigenous land protections, this progress is undermined by China’s rising demand. It threatens to reverse environmental progress in Brazil.

Indonesia offers a stark, immediate example of ecological damage tied directly to China’s regional trade ambitions. While China boasts investments in clean energy and infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative, it is simultaneously driving forest destruction via its voracious demand for palm oil, pulpwood, and mining materials. A Traise Earth analysis found palm oil deforestation on Sumatra surged 3.7 times between 2020 and 2022, a spike fuelled in part by soaring Chinese demand and domestic consumption. The study also revealed China has overtaken the EU and India as Indonesia’s top palm oil buyer, snatching a growing share of exports. Yet despite corporate promises and sustainability initiatives, enforcement is patchy at best, traceability remains murky, and accountability is all too often absent.

This points to a deeper governance challenge, one that transcends trade balances and national boundaries. The Global Biodiversity Framework and the Paris Agreement are only as robust as their weakest links, and transboundary supply chains are among them. By excluding embedded emissions and biodiversity footprints from their global commitments, nations such as China effectively outsource environmental degradation while taking credit for national progress. It’s a loophole substantial enough to undermine the integrity of global environmental governance, and one that allows for the pretence of leadership while the environmental debt is run up somewhere else.

Moreover, the China strategy’s moral hazard sets a chilling precedent. If a country with the rich capacities and strong political influence of China can pursue a two-track environmental policy – green at home, grey abroad – why shouldn’t others follow suit? In an already stressed world, this dishonesty has the potential to lock us in a vicious cycle of hollow commitments and permanent ecological tipping points. It is greenwashing at a national level.

To bridge the gap, China must extend its “ecological civilisation” beyond its borders. This means enhancing transparency of commodity imports and integrating consumption-based accounting into its climate pledges. This also means setting an example in multilateral environments by calling for tougher global norms on embedded emissions and biodiversity impacts. As the world’s biggest buyer for the majority of forest-risk commodities, China holds unmatched leverage to reorient global markets, but only if it chooses to do so responsibly. The test of environmental leadership for the current age is not tied to national appearances, but to global outcomes.