China, explained.
From non-alignment to multi-alignment. Under Modi, India is diversifying its foreign policy options (Mikhail Svetlov/Getty)
New Delhi’s foreign policy remains anchored in diversification, not American expectations of a special partnership.
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The bigger story behind Modi’s China trip – and it’s not India’s tensions with TrumpThe bigger story behind Modi’s China trip – and it’s not India’s tensions with Trump
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to travel to China at the weekend to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. In the United States, this revived India-China dialogue – it will be the first visit by Modi to China in seven years – is often misconstrued as a consequence of recent US-India tensions. But there is a far more complex dynamic at play.
India has grown closer to the United States over the past 15 years, but its foreign policy elite views this shift not as a move to anchor the country in the US orbit but rather as a means to diversify its options.
Indian diplomats certainly have a bitter impression of US President Donald Trump’s threats to impose higher tariffs on imports from India as a punishment for India’s procurement of Russian oil. Trump’s apparent coziness with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir, has also drawn India’s ire. This gives texture to the idea that Trump’s pressure on the Modi government is precipitating an India-China rapprochement that will ultimately produce a big win for Beijing – particularly given the wedge driven between India and China after border clashes in recent years.
In reality, India never fully sided with the United States against China. The latest tension with Washington only convinces those in Delhi who have long advocated for preserving its non-aligned foreign policy.
India sees its partnership with the United States as a pillar of its trade and security strategy. Relations have greatly improved since 2008, when the Bush administration signed a civil nuclear agreement that paved the way for broader cooperation. This includes the revived “Quad” grouping since 2017.
Moreover, Trump’s political brand appeals to Narendra Modi’s constituency. America First rhetoric has received warm support from BJP activists who see echoes of their own nationalist platform. Modi’s visit to Washington in February, soon after Trump’s second inauguration, was hailed as a success.
At the same time, India has never been the “natural ally” that American policymakers hoped it would be. In 2018, India and the first Trump administration concluded a major agreement. The Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was meant to increase US defence trade with India. But its promises are unfulfilled. Russia remains the primary arms supplier (36 per cent) for the Indian military, followed by France (33 per cent) and Israel (13 per cent).
Preventing overreliance on a single great power, such as the United States, is a way to protect the country’s strategic autonomy.
This breakdown of India’s defence partners shows the structural obstacles to the partnership. India has grown closer to the United States over the past 15 years, but its foreign policy elite views this shift not as a move to anchor the country in the US orbit but rather as a means to diversify its options. India’s old mantra of “non-alignment” has been replaced by the idea of “multi-alignment”.
Preventing overreliance on a single great power, such as the United States, is a way to protect the country’s strategic autonomy. This drives the Indian reluctance to break ties with Russia even after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It also explains the nuances evident between Indian and American views of the Indo-Pacific.
Modi made clear this in his 2018 keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He declared: “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members … by no means do we consider it as directed against any country”. This was explicitly directed against the desire of American decision-makers to apply a tougher approach to China.
This is why India has sometimes favoured its partnership with a European middle power like France instead of the United States. Paris and Delhi share similarities in their search for strategic autonomy. French views of the Indo-Pacific are less targeted at China. Military cooperation with France’s industry does not induce the same level of dependence as with the American one.
India’s relations with China should be considered in that same light. The ongoing diplomatic consultations are driven by the desire to de-escalate the border dispute, which threatened to boil over in 2020-21. But lowering the tensions does not mean settling the dispute, which remains a distant goal. The more realistic objective is to push the issue into the background to protect trade relations between the two countries. In 2025, China remained India’s second-largest trading partner.
But the border issues aside, other security concerns put limitations on Indian engagement with China. Beijing’s enduring military cooperation with Islamabad is one problem. During the conflict in May this year, Pakistan reportedly used Chinese-made fighter jets, missiles, and drones against India, enabling Islamabad to shoot down Indian aircraft. China’s maritime presence throughout the Indian Ocean region also worries India. The establishment of a PLA military base in Djibouti, alongside Chinese participation in port infrastructure projects in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, exacerbates fears in India of encirclement.
So, the consequences of an India-China thaw should not be overstated. It would undoubtedly be a positive sign if diplomats of both countries can negotiate a way to de-escalate their military standoff in the Himalayas. But this is not a significant shift in the US-China-India triangle, which was always more volatile than strategists in Washington appeared to anticipate.
About the author
Jean-Loup Samaan
Jean-Loup Samaan is Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore after previous experience in policy positions (French Ministry of Defence and NATO).
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