China, explained.
“A strong military”, the article asserts, “must first be politically strong” (Tingshu Wang via Getty Images)
The People’s Daily lays out the CCP’s four-part vision for the People’s Liberation Army by 2027, crediting Xi’s leadership in getting there.
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Building Xi’s “world-class” military with a “red soul”Building Xi’s “world-class” military with a “red soul”
To mark the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 99th anniversary last month, People’s Daily published (Opens in new window) a lengthy article: “Striding Forward Toward the Centenary Goal of Building the Military”. Rather than a simple commemorative piece, it sets out the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assessment of its achievements in military reform under Xi Jinping and the political, organisational, technological, and operational requirements for the PLA to become a “world-class (Opens in new window)” military by 2027.
The article offers insight into the Party’s thinking. People’s Daily, published (Opens in new window) by the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department, is a core component of the CCP’s gongkai, or public information system – the tier of material intended for open circulation, as distinct from the neibu, or internal system, where policy is actually debated. As political scientist Howard Wang (Opens in new window) has shown, material approved for gonkai publication like this is “highly authoritative of the party’s institutional position” and reflects the outcome of “debate, consensus-building, and resolution” behind the scenes.
The document seeks both to legitimise Xi’s central role in building a strong military and to reaffirm the CCP’s understanding of military modernisation. It presents modernisation as resting on four interconnected dimensions: political loyalty and ideological rectification; organisational reform and institutional transformation; technology, equipment, and personnel; and combat-oriented training and operational readiness. In doing so, it reinforces (Opens in new window) Xi’s broader objective of creating a PLA that is both politically “red” and professionally “expert”.
The article, unsurprisingly given the recent purges (Opens in new window) within the top ranks (Opens in new window) of the PLA, emphasises political loyalty as the foundation of military effectiveness. “A strong military”, it asserts, “must first be politically strong”.
Operational readiness and effectiveness is framed as the ultimate measure of successful military modernisation.
Political education and ideological and political rectification are portrayed as essential to this. Historical study reconnects personnel with the PLA’s “red roots” – its revolutionary origins, traditions, and institutional identity – while study of Party theory cultivates a “red soul”, or enduring loyalty to the Party. Rectification, the document adds, extends beyond education to correcting weaknesses in personnel management, organisation, conduct and discipline.
Past corruption within the PLA is attributed to the erosion of these qualities. By contrast, the “Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core” is credited with the “political courage” to revitalise the military by returning to them. A vignette – a PLA-Navy crew holding a political study session “deep at sea” on “Xi Jinping’s thought on strengthening the military” – illustrates the claim that the PLA has been “reborn through revolutionary forging”.
The article frames institutional reform as an ongoing process to prepare the PLA for future wars. Xi’s unprecedented reforms since 2015 – restructuring (Opens in new window) the Central Military Commission (CMC), establishing (Opens in new window) theatre commands, and creating (Opens in new window) new military services – are presented as adaptations to a “new global military revolution” and the “transforming” militaries of “major countries”. This restructuring, it contends, is coupled with a “changing of mindsets”, as the PLA adopts new operational concepts and embraces joint operations. A unit in the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), for example, is highlighted as a “force formed through reform” that has “integrated communications, transportation, engineering, chemical defence, repair, and health services into a brand-new support chain”.
Technological innovation is emphasised (Opens in new window) as a further condition for the transformation of the PLA into a “world-class” force. China’s rapid naval expansion (Opens in new window) – new carrier-based aircraft (J-35 (Opens in new window), J-15T (Opens in new window), and KJ-600 (Opens in new window)), guided missile destroyers (Type 055 (Opens in new window)) and amphibious assault ships (Type 075 (Opens in new window)) – is spotlighted as evidence of “leapfrog development”.
Read all about it (Greg Barker/AFP via Getty Images)
Acquisition of such capabilities is framed as only one part of military modernisation. Quoting Xi, the article stresses that “core technologies are not something you can take or buy” but rather must attain through “accelerating the pace of independent innovation”. It notes that the PLA has made considerable strides here, with much of the advanced military equipment on display during the military parade marking the 80th anniversary (Opens in new window) victory in the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” in September 2025, consisting (Opens in new window) of “almost entirely of domestically produced active main battle gear”.
Finally, operational readiness and effectiveness is framed as the ultimate measure of successful military modernisation. The document asserts that training reforms emphasise realistic combat scenarios, joint exercises, cross-domain operations, and integrated logistics, while noting the PLA’s operational achievements – such as dual aircraft carrier deployments in the Western Pacific, large-scale exercises around Taiwan, long-range bomber patrols, and enhanced naval operations in the South China Sea.
Notably, this theme even runs through the article’s discussion of political education and ideological. Here, it is noted that all measures of political education, ideological rectification, and “self-examination” must be assessed against the “benchmark” of whether they promote the “establishment of combat effectiveness standards”. “Being able to fight and win battles”, it approvingly quotes Xi, “is key to strengthening the military”.
The document functions as something of a political manifesto for the final phase of Xi’s military modernisation program. Its underlying message is that becoming a “world-class” military is not simply measured by new equipment or larger forces alone but by the Party’s ability to build a politically loyal, technologically advanced, jointly integrated, and combat-ready military.
About the authors
Michael Clarke
Dr Michael Clarke is Associate Professor of International Politics and Strategy, Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University, and Adjunct Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, UTS.
Jade Guan
Dr Jade Guan is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Deakin University in Australia, teaching at the Australian War College in Canberra.
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