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North Korea, explained.

The risk of using a conclusion as proof is not confined to the world of intelligence (Олег Мороз/Unsplash)
I spy an invisible cat. Two, in fact.
About the author
Daniel Flitton
Daniel Flitton is one of Australia’s most experienced foreign affairs journalists and is Managing Editor of the Lowy Institute’s international magazine, The Interpreter.
New starters to the work of intelligence analysis are warned about the danger from “invisible cats”.
The circular logic was brilliantly captured by the author C.S Lewis. “If there were an invisible cat in that chair, the chair would look empty,” he reasoned. “But the chair does look empty; therefore there is an invisible cat in it.”
Most infamously, this trap caught intelligence analysts studying Iraq’s WMD program. The absence of evidence was taken as proof it was so well hidden.
This risk is not confined to the world of intelligence. In fact, two examples of invisible cats have been purring in public in recent days.
The first is a saucy story, involving claims that North Korean troops are binging on adult movies. Tabloid media love the idea – although the reporting was kicked off by a “usually reliable source” cited by FT’s Gideon Rachman.
The risk of using a conclusion as validation is not confined to the world of intelligence.
The logic goes that the troops deployed to Russia from the Hermit Kingdom to bolster the invasion of Ukraine have for the first time unfettered access to the internet. And that the lure of screentime has left them red-eyed.
There is no further evidence, mind. The Pentagon disavowed any knowledge of North Korean browsing habits. Surely a few of Pyongyang’s soldiers might also have found their way to Insta or Telegram, posting a selfie. That this hasn’t happened seems to be assumed as proof that their attention is elsewhere.

Can you see it? (Henry & Co/Unsplash)
The second invisible cat involves a less trifling issue. Alexander Downer, Australia’s former foreign minister, is one who believes it to be real.
This story relates to claims that Israel’s recent strike on Iran targeted a secret nuclear facility. But the evidence offered in support runs in circle.
On social media this week, Downer said his “sources verify this,” endorsing claims by another’s post that spelled out these points.
My sources verify this. I totally agree with this post https://t.co/BiSOQuiWwG
— Alexander Downer (@AlexanderDowner) November 18, 2024
But it’s more than just an internet rumour. The twist given to the tale stems from reporting in Axios on 15 November, which draws on unnamed official and former official sources from the US and Israel, that Israel “destroyed an active top secret nuclear weapons research facility”. Only now, no less a source than Benjamin Netanyahu told the Israeli parliament this week that the target was “not a secret” and was a published site.
Netanyahu gave few details, but the Axios report referred to Parchin, roughly 30 kilometres from Tehran, which includes a site known as Taleghan 2. This was indeed reported to be part of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, and was said to have been mothballed in 2004. Israel has for years claimed otherwise.
So, in targeting the site, this seems to have been taken to be evidence that Iran has indeed been keeping nuclear secrets.
The logic is bound to be repeated.