China’s influence in Africa is no longer just economic

When Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te finally arrived in Eswatini earlier this month, the visit resembled a covert operation more than a routine diplomatic engagement. After Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar reportedly revoked overflight permissions for his aircraft, allegedly under pressure from China, Lai abandoned his original travel plans and instead flew aboard King Mswati III’s private aircraft. China later condemned Eswatini for hosting him, accusing the kingdom’s leaders of being “kept and fed” by Taiwan.

This incident highlighted something increasingly visible across Africa: China’s influence on the continent is no longer defined solely by infrastructure projects, mining investments, or trade deals. China’s growing leverage is now expressed through diplomatic pressure, political signalling, and the ability to shape what governments, organisations, and even international conferences can and cannot do.

Eswatini matters precisely because it remains Taiwan’s last diplomatic partner in Africa. Over the past decade, China has successfully persuaded several African states to sever ties with Taiwan, often alongside expanded economic engagement and infrastructure cooperation. Taiwan now has formal relations with only 12 countries worldwide.

China’s pressure campaign against Eswatini appears to extend beyond rhetoric. Earlier this month, China announced the expansion of its zero-tariff trade policy to every African country except Eswatini. The decision was economically marginal for China, but symbolically significant. It reinforced the message that access to Chinese markets and political goodwill remains tied to adherence to the country’s “One China” policy.

Yet the most revealing recent example of China’s growing influence in Africa may not have involved Eswatini at all.

Earlier this year, in April, the world’s largest digital rights conference, RightsCon, was abruptly postponed in Zambia amid allegations that Chinese pressure played a role in the decision. According to the event organisers, Zambian officials indicated that diplomats from China had objected to the participation of Taiwanese civil society representatives. Organisers were apparently told that Taiwanese participants would need to be excluded and certain topics moderated, if the conference hoped to proceed as planned.

The significance of Zambia’s RightsCon conference does not only point to the alleged interference, but exposes the evolving nature of Chinese influence in Africa. The conference was not a Taiwan-focused event, and its agenda included discussions on digital governance, surveillance, censorship, cyber security, and internet freedom, including conversations about China’s export of digital authoritarian practices and surveillance technologies.

If the allegations are true, China’s pressure was aimed not at formal state-to-state relations, but at influencing civic and political space within an African nation. The implication is that China’s leverage increasingly extends into questions of who gets access to international events, which ideas can be discussed, and which political representatives are allowed to attend.

It also marks a shift in how China’s role in Africa should be viewed. Much of the debate around the country’s influence on the continent has focused on debt, infrastructure dependency, resource extraction, and trade imbalances. Those concerns remain relevant. China continues to dominate trade relationships across large parts of Africa, and the imbalance remains substantial. Africa’s trade deficit with China reportedly rose to approximately US$102 billion last year.

But recent developments suggest China’s influence is becoming more political, normative, and security-oriented. China is not merely building roads, railways, or telecommunications infrastructure; it is also shaping diplomatic behaviour and political incentives in ways that affect how African states engage internationally. Beijing has steadily expanded its security footprint through military training, peacekeeping deployments, and maritime cooperation. China is now the second-largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and maintains its first overseas military logistics base in Africa, in Djibouti, underscoring that its ambitions on the continent extend beyond economics alone.

Simultaneously, Eswatini demonstrates that African states are not simply passive recipients of Chinese influence. Despite diplomatic pressure and economic incentives, the Southern African kingdom has continued to recognise Taiwan and publicly rejected China’s pressures. Following China’s criticism of the country for hosting Lai, Eswatini stated that its “sovereign decisions ought to be respected by all”.

That resistance matters. It suggests that even smaller states retain some agency within intensifying geopolitical competition between China and Taiwan. But it also underscores the rising costs of maintaining political positions that run counter to China’s preferences.