China, explained.
DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile launch vehicles displayed in a military parade at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, on 3 September 2015. (Greg Baker/Getty)
There are three reasons why China’s missile test is a serious challenge to New Zealand’s interests.
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China's missile tests New Zealand's principlesChina's missile tests New Zealand's principles
Last Wednesday, China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a dummy warhead that according to French Polynesia President Moetai Brotherson, landed "not far" from the exclusive economic zone of the South Pacific territory.
The test underlines the divergence between the increasingly close economic ties between Beijing and Wellington and the serious differences that exist on nuclear issues.
Beijing portrayed the missile launch as business as usual; the Chinese defence ministry reported that the launch was part of a “routine arrangement in our annual training plan” and the missile “fell into expected sea areas”. Washington put some positive spin on the test. The United States confirmed that it received "some advanced notification", which was "a step in the right direction" that would help prevent "misperception or miscalculation".
New Zealand took a different view. Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters said the missile launch was “an unwelcome and concerning development”.
There are three reasons why China’s missile test is a serious challenge to New Zealand’s interests.
First, the test represents a militarisation of New Zealand’s South Pacific home region and contradicts the spirit of its non-nuclear principles. The Treaty of Rarotonga, which New Zealand and 12 other regional countries (including Australia) signed in 1985, established a nuclear-free zone that prohibits nuclear testing in the South Pacific region.
New Zealand’s principles on the non-use and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are also at stake. These principles reflect the taboo on nuclear weapons that precipitated a full-blown crisis in US-New Zealand relations in the mid-1980s. From 1985-87, New Zealand's Labour government challenged the US policy of neither confirming nor denying that its naval vessels were operating with nuclear weapons aboard in New Zealand waters. This set in motion a process that ended in the termination of the US-New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance in 1987.
The ICBM that China tested this week is expressly designed to be fitted with nuclear warheads, so it violates the spirit of this taboo.
China’s test pits New Zealand’s normative values against its material interests in particularly stark terms. And since China is New Zealand’s top trade partner, there is unlikely to be an immediate solution to this challenge.
New Zealand’s principles on the non-use and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are at stake.
The second reason the test represents a challenge to New Zealand relates to the structural limits it reveals in the China-New Zealand relationship.
The test underlines the divergence between the increasingly close economic ties between Beijing and Wellington and the serious differences that exist on nuclear issues, a pillar of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.
Victoria University Emeritus Professor Robert Rabel has made the compelling argument that “if independence for New Zealand means being able to disagree with ‘traditional partners’ but does not also mean freely choosing to align with them at times to pursue mutual interests, then it means little.”
By the same logic, if independence means being able to have robust trade with China but does not mean that Beijing respects Wellington’s principles opposing nuclear activity in its home region, then it is far from the sort of relationship that New Zealand has with traditional partners such as Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.
The final reason China's test challenges New Zealand’s interests lies in its contribution to a destabilising foreign policy environment that is the focus of various government statements and reports released in 2023.
In an August 2023 speech, Defence Minister Andrew Little pointed out that “New Zealand does not exist in a benign strategic environment.” This missile test confirms Little’s point. It also highlights the foresight and significance of the statement made in New Zealand’s first-ever National Security Strategy that China’s activities in the Pacific could “fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the region”.
China’s officials like to remind New Zealand that the relationship cannot be taken for granted. This test suggests that they need to take their own advice to heart.
About the author
Nicholas Khoo
Nicholas Khoo is Associate Professor of International Politics, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand and Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Christchurch, New Zealand.
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