China shouldn’t squander its chance at Shangri-La

As the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue kicks off in Singapore on Friday, observers will be on the lookout for Admiral Dong Jun, China’s defence minister. The seniority of China’s representative at Shangri-La has become a litmus test for judging regional tension.

China typically sees the dialogue as a US-led confab and is not comfortable with the provocative questions raised about China’s defence posture. But Beijing did start sending delegations to the dialogue in 2007. Its defence minister has since turned up five times: in 2011, 2019, and consecutively from 2022 to 2024.

Dong was absent last year, reportedly due to China’s reluctance to engage with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, who was in Singapore for the talks. If Dong is absent this year, with Hegseth again in town, the reasons seem obvious.

For one thing, China has truly arrived as a major power in the region, so it does not really need to send its defence minister to brave a fusillade of questions and try to “score” brownie points.

According to the Lowy Asia Power Index, US power in Asia continues to fall. In a recent study by two dons at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Southeast Asian countries -- as measured by indicators such as high-level visits and common membership in multilateral groupings – have begun to lean closer to China. The 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey notes that US standing across various dimensions – perceptions of US economic and political-strategic influence, US leadership in free trade and the rules-based order – have each fallen.

Trump’s recent visit to Beijing earlier in May, and his bid to reset bilateral relations after a damaging 2025, underscores Beijing’s growing confidence as a peer competitor.

That Beijing trip also robbed the Shangri-La Dialogue of one of its key fixtures – the chance for Sino-US political and defence interactions. The Trump-Xi summit saw agreement on broad areas, and while two defence chiefs could always find something to discuss, they will also be wary not to upstage their bosses.

Trump secured agreements from Beijing for the purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft, US$17 billion in annual Chinese purchases of US agricultural products through to 2028, and the restoration of market access for US beef and poultry. The two leaders also ventured into territory that could be awkward for Dong and Hegseth. Trump said that US arms sales to Taiwan could be used as a “negotiating chip” with China – suggesting that Beijing would have some a veto over such decisions. Trump even noted that his relationship with Xi could herald a “G2” power-sharing arrangement.

Hegseth and Dong did sit next to each other and engaged in conversation at a state banquet during Trump’s Beijing visit. The Chinese readout noted that the two sides would use military-to-military ties to “manage differences, enhance trust and clarify misunderstandings”. Such discussions are beneficial for regional stability and could be pursued further at the dialogue.

But China also might not feel the need to send Dong to the dialogue because it wants to emphasise its own Xiangshan Forum. Long seen as the poorer cousin to Shangri-La, with the latter having a higher level of ministerial representation and a higher quality of debate, Xiangshan has caught up in both dimensions in recent years. Seven defence ministers from Southeast Asia attended Xiangshan last year, and there were also fierce debates about Japan’s wartime role and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Yet, as Singapore’s former defence minister Ng Eng Hen has noted, discussions at Xiangshan are more “scripted”. Shangri-La offers the chance for more forthright debate and exchange of views. At the 2023 dialogue, for example, Philippine Coast Guard commodore Jay Tarriela confronted Chinese defence minister Li Shangfu for China’s actions in the South China Sea. It might have seemed uncomfortable for China in the moment to face what Ng called a “tyranny of questions” from the floor, but better the parties are talking.

In 2024, Dong met Hegseth’s predecessor Lloyd Austin and discussed advancing military-to-military communications. Sino-US military interactions had fallen to a historic low in 2022 and are now on a slow path to recovery.

But if China fails to send its defence minister to the dialogue this year, it means that Beijing will not have a sufficiently senior leader to discuss two issues pertinent to the region: Taiwan and the Strait of Hormuz. At a time when perceptions of US leadership are falling, Beijing could soothe some jangled nerves in the region by reassuring delegates that it would use force against the island only as a last resort and that the resumption of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz would be critical to global growth.

China has nothing to fear from talks – and just as importantly, the region could gain.