South Korea, explained.
Trump’s “America First” approach and scepticism about US military commitments overseas could lead to greater pressure on South Korea to take responsibility for its own defence (Jarrett Smith/US Air Force)
Known as “OPCON”, the transfer of operational leadership has long posed a dilemma that has only deepened with Donald Trump’s presidency.
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Command and sovereignty: Who controls South Korea’s military in wartime?Command and sovereignty: Who controls South Korea’s military in wartime?
The month of March consistently marks a period of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, as North Korea escalates military provocations in direct response to the annual US-South Korea joint military exercises. While Pyongyang has long characterised such drills as rehearsals for invasion, they serve dual purposes for Seoul.
Beyond maintaining essential defensive readiness against North Korean threats, these exercises play a crucial role in achieving a major South Korean strategic objective: reclaiming wartime operational control, or OPCON as it is commonly known, of its own military forces from the United States.
The issue made headlines once again this month when Elbridge Colby, Donald Trump’s nominee for Undersecretary of Defence for policy at the Pentagon, said he “supports efforts to bolster South Korea’s role in the alliance” when asked about OPCON transfer – hinting at the possibility of the Trump administration being open to moving in this direction.
The transfer of military OPCON has been a major issue for decades, with a US commander in control of South Korean forces since American involvement in the Korean War in 1950. Peacetime OPCON was transferred back to Seoul in 1994, but the commander of US Forces Korea – who also serves as the commander of the Combined Forces Command – currently retains wartime OPCON.
The issue also goes beyond the Korean Peninsula.
The transfer of wartime OPCON to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for many South Koreans, symbolising full national sovereignty and military independence. To many, it represents the evolution of the US-Republic of Korea alliance from a patron-client relationship to a more equal partnership. Previously scheduled for 2012 and then 2015, the final decision has been repeatedly delayed for various reasons, including questions surrounding South Korea’s readiness to assume this responsibility.
Most recently, South Korea’s former president Moon Jae-in had pushed strongly for the prompt transfer of wartime OPCON back to Seoul, without success. In particular, the cancellation of various US-ROK joint drills as a result of both diplomacy with Pyongyang and then the Covid-19 pandemic made it difficult for South Korean military capacity to be adequately tested.
While Moon’s successor, President Yoon Suk-yeol, did not make OPCON transfer a major priority, and Yoon’s future clouded after his abortive martial law declaration, things could change with Donald Trump back in the White House.
Trump’s “America First” approach and scepticism about US military commitments overseas could lead to greater pressure on South Korea to take responsibility for its own defence. Trump has repeatedly complained about the cost of maintaining US troops in South Korea and could view OPCON transfer as a way to reduce American commitments while still maintaining the alliance. His administration had even agreed to an early transfer of OPCON back in 2017.
Moreover, should Trump pursue renewed diplomacy with North Korea in his second term, OPCON transfer could accelerate significantly. This would serve as a meaningful gesture of goodwill to Pyongyang, which has long criticised America’s deep involvement in South Korean military affairs. Moreover, any substantial US-North Korea agreement – particularly an end-of-war declaration or peace treaty – would fundamentally undermine the rationale for continued US military presence on the peninsula and control of South Korean forces during wartime.
South Korean guards at the DMZ (Adrian Cadiz/US Defence Department)
Multiple roadblocks remain regarding the potential OPCON transfer. A major one is South Korea’s ongoing political turmoil. Yoon’s declaration of martial law last December and his use of military assets for personal political gain called into question not only South Korea’s readiness for the transfer but its trustworthiness as an ally.
Besides this, recent incidents have also raised questions about South Korea’s military readiness. Notably, on 6 March, South Korean fighter jets accidentally dropped bombs near Seoul during joint drill preparations, injuring civilians and causing property damage. As a result, the incident has led to close scrutiny over the military’s competency and safety protocols.
Moreover, the OPCON transfer is far from a universally desired goal in South Korea. Those opposing the transfer fear that it could result in a withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula and even lead to a weakening of the US-ROK alliance and America’s commitment to South Korea’s security. Such fears have only increased in the wake of Trump’s re-election, with multiple officials in Washington calling for Seoul to take on more responsibility for its own defence, with some going as far as considering the idea of South Korea going nuclear.
However, preserving the current arrangement carries significant drawbacks. Postponing the OPCON transfer further complicates already challenging prospects for renewed dialogue between the United States and North Korea, as well as inter-Korean relations. Additionally, the persistent perception that Washington regards Seoul as a junior partner rather than an equal ally may continue to erode alliance solidarity and mutual trust.
The issue also goes beyond the Korean Peninsula. To China, a South Korean military with full sovereign control might be more receptive to Chinese security interests and less integrated with US regional strategies. The US hold over OPCON strengthens America’s security framework in Northeast Asia, which constrains China’s regional power. As competition between China and the United States grows more intense, the OPCON issue is likely to become increasingly intertwined with larger regional power struggles.
Considering this increasingly complex geopolitical environment and North Korea’s continuously growing military threat, Seoul and Washington will need to maintain transparent communication about OPCON transfer conditions and timelines and develop a clear roadmap that establishes milestones for the eventual transfer, regardless of which administration holds power in either country.
About the author
Gabriela Bernal
Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
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