Japan, explained.

Sanae Takaichi seated before a meeting screen of other regional leaders

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments in November 2025 suggesting an attack on Taiwan could threaten the survival of Japan, drawing condemnation from Beijing (@JPN_PMO/X)

Defusing Japan and China’s unmanaged security dilemma

A hotline has existed between Tokyo and Beijing since 2023 and barely been used.

William Choong

3 August 20264 min read

Many Japanese officials tend to be self-effacing and averse to confrontation in the public sphere. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, however, Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi locked horns (Opens in new window) with Chinese delegates who had charged Japan with taking the path to “remilitarism”. He countered that it was China’s “external approach and military activities” which sparked serious concerns for Japan and the international community.

The public spat followed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments in November 2025 suggesting an attack on Taiwan could threaten the survival of Japan (Opens in new window), drawing condemnation from Beijing.

Japan’s defence white papers have continued to highlight the threat posed by China and its attempts to undermine the regional status quo by force. Tokyo frets about the sustained growth in China’s defence budget, Sino-Russian military drills around Japan, and the fact that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is tilting in Beijing’s favour.

From China’s viewpoint, Japan is developing offensive counter-strike capabilities, breaking its long-held 1% of GDP limit on defence spending. Japan has also loosened post-war strictures on the use of force and is seeking to revise Article 9 of the Constitution. In China’s view, this puts Japan on the path to remilitarisation.

Few Asian countries – if any – buy the Chinese argument that Japan’s actions are harmful. Some Southeast Asian countries see Japan’s beefier defence posture as a counterweight (Opens in new window) to China, especially against a reduction in US regional engagement. The consensus is that Japan’s moves to bolster its defence are emblematic (Opens in new window) of a tougher regional security environment.

A move in this direction would shore up relations between Asia's two biggest resident powers.

But the Sino-Japan security dilemma is dangerous. (Opens in new window) China and the US are caught in a similar dynamic, but both countries are cognisant of the risks attendant to escalation – hence the Biden administration’s call for “guardrails” and Trump and Xi’s agreement to build a relationship built on “constructive strategic stability”. But no similar mechanisms exist between Japan and China.

The growing number of close encounters between their armed forces illustrates the risk of escalation. In the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Chinese vessels intruded (Opens in new window) in the islands’ contiguous zones for 357 days in 2025. This near-daily occurrence is a record high, compared to 355 days in 2024 and 352 in 2023. Similarly, JASDF scrambles (Opens in new window) against Chinese aircraft flying into Japan’s airspace have stayed at high levels, at 366 in 2025 and 464 in 2024. They hit a historical high of 851 in 2016.

A China Coast Guard ship is spotted near the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea in 2024 (Kyodo News via Getty Images)

China and Japan can take steps to manage the risk of escalation. Both countries began operating (Opens in new window) a maritime and aerial communication mechanism in 2018, with a military hotline established in March 2023. The hotline has not been used except by then-defence minister Yasukazu Hamada in May 2023 simply to ensure it operated (Opens in new window). As a trust building measure, the hotline should be used more regularly.

The two countries should also restart a defence ministerial dialogue to exchange security concerns and engage in candid communication. In May 2023, the defence ministers from China and Japan met at the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, but not since. Speaking at the Dialogue in June, Koizumi said that Japan would “keep the door open” for dialogue to foster stability.

A further big step forward would be for both sides to agree that there is indeed a dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. The Japanese seethe at such a suggestion, refusing to acknowledge any validity in China’s claim. But accepting the fact that a dispute is a dispute might give the Chinese a face-saving opportunity to scale down their aerial and maritime intrusions into Japanese-held territory around the islands. Such a deal was brokered (Opens in new window) by Zhou Enlai and Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s.

There is a Catch-22 here: history. China will not let go of the issue because it deems that a series of Japanese apologies and expressions of remorse over actions in the lead up and during Second World War are not sincere and complete. For its part, Japan complains of apology fatigue.

In May, Takaichi laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Australian War Memorial. State-run Chinese media lambasted (Opens in new window) the act, saying she sought to appease the West. But in private, Chinese interlocutors have said that a similar act by the Japanese premier in China would go a long way to repair ties.

This is not mere maudlin sentiment, but strategic calculation: a move in this direction would shore up relations between Asia’s two biggest resident powers at a time when US regional engagement is flagging.

About the author

William Choong

William Choong is Principal Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and Managing Editor of Fulcrum, the Institute’s commentary website focused on Southeast Asia and its wider environment.

Topics

Japan China Defence & security Diplomacy