Enthusiasm for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement sometimes seems to vary in Australian government circles in proportion to commercial harmony with China.
And the 15-member now East Asian (without India) trade group has been overshadowed in recent months by newer developments. The Quad grouping has put supply chains at the top of its economic agenda, and the Biden administration’s “foreign policy for the middle class” approach elevates standards or services over conventional goods trade liberalisation.
Nevertheless, while the Federal Parliament’s treaty committee is still getting onto the RCEP ratification task, Japan last week joined China, Singapore and Thailand in completing that process. And, predictably, the Japanese government reportedly made the heroic claim that the agreement would boost the country’s GDP by 2.75%.
But despite perceptions that RCEP is a China-led regional trade initiative, the Australian government can draw some fresh enthusiasm for it from new modelling by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.
It identifies Australia as a relatively significant and fast beneficiary of the agreement in contrast to the benchmark Petri-Plummer modelling and the conventional wisdom that Australia does not gain much without India in. Australian (and New Zealand) GDP is forecast to rise 0.5% over 20 years due to the deal, which is both higher and more front-loaded timewise than for the other North and Southeast Asian sub-groups. The study says:
These relatively large gains partly reflect the significant reductions in tariffs on primary products exported by these economies. Large though these impacts are, the potential benefits to Australia and New Zealand could still be understated by these estimates.
And it still doesn’t include some sectors where Australia has comparative advantages, including finance, telecommunications and e-commerce.
These modelling figures are, of course, mere rounding errors in overall medium-term economic growth. But they are better than the Petri-Plummer modelling, which shows virtually nonexistent trade liberalisation benefits for Australia, something the government has conveniently ignored when talking up the RCEP.
They also undermine the China dominance narrative on RCEP – which prompted India’s exit – by reaffirming that from a trade liberalisation perspective, Japan, South Korea and others do better than China.
The MAS study argues that beyond the tariff liberalisation benefits, RCEP should also improve the operation of supply chains across the region through common rules of origin for trade.
However, its parallel attempt to quantify the impact of these sort of embedded changes in existing Southeast Asian–based trade agreements – including the ASEAN-Australia-NZ Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) – is less positive for Australia. This work shows that the ASEAN countries benefitted more from their regional trade agreements with China and South Korea than the competing agreements with Japan and Australia.
It is an interesting finding when these countries are in the midst of a battle for their hearts, minds and wallets from the rival superpowers. It remains to be seen how much a more positive economic relationship with China will flow through to their security choices,