Europe, explained.
Welcoming Kosovo Security Forces Commander Bashkim Jashari with an official ceremony at the General Staff Building in Ankara, Turkiye in April (Ahmet Serdar Eser/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Türkiye shows that availability is becoming a form of influence for middle powers in the Western Balkans.
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EU processes move in years. Kosovo also needs partners who move in monthsEU processes move in years. Kosovo also needs partners who move in months
The Western Balkans are often viewed through the prism of unfinished enlargement and frozen disputes, yet the region is increasingly shaped by middle-power activism. As institutions move slowly and the European Union’s focus fluctuates, regional actors with political agility are stepping into spaces where larger powers hesitate. Kosovo illustrates this shift: a small state navigating uncertainty by widening the circle of partners that can deliver visible, immediate support.
By way of example, Kosovo’s president Vjosa Osmani this month described Türkiye as a “strategic partner and close friend” during a meeting with the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, TIKA. Taken in isolation, the phrase sounds like standard diplomatic courtesy. Placed alongside Ankara’s development projects, its operational role in Kosovo Force (KFOR) – the NATO-led peacekeeping mission operating in Kosovo since 1999 – and its increasingly confident regional diplomacy, the statement signals something more durable: Türkiye has become one of Kosovo’s most consistent partners. This is not a change in Kosovo’s identity or long-term aspirations but a pragmatic adjustment to evolving conditions.
Kosovo’s strategic horizon remains tied to the European Union. Public support for EU membership is high and progress is regularly assessed through the European Commission’s enlargement reports on Kosovo, such as the 2025 report. Yet the accession process faces structural obstacles: non-recognition by several member states, shifting priorities inside the Union and decision-making architecture that moves more slowly than local expectations. NATO membership, Kosovo’s other formal objective, remains blocked for the same reasons. When a country’s long-term path depends on variables it cannot influence, diversification becomes a method of risk management.
Over the past decade, EU enlargement has oscillated between rhetorical commitment and practical hesitation, while crises in Ukraine and the Middle East have absorbed political energy in Brussels. In parallel, the Western Balkans have seen recurrent instability in northern Kosovo, complex politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and intermittent tensions in North Macedonia. In such a context, a partner able to respond quickly and at relatively low cost acquires disproportionate significance.
Kosovo marked the 17th anniversary of Independence earlier this year (Nuray Yuksel/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Türkiye’s engagement in Kosovo operates along several layers. First comes soft power: visible school renovations, cultural restorations and community infrastructure carried out through TIKA’s programmes. Individually, these initiatives are modest. Taken together, they signal continuity and low-bureaucracy presence. In an environment where EU-funded initiatives often advance at an administrative tempo measured in years rather than months, this kind of immediacy has strategic value.
Second, security. Türkiye is among the most active contributors to KFOR, which underpins Kosovo’s stability. Turkish units have maintained a steady presence during episodes of tension in the Serb-majority north, reinforcing Ankara’s credibility as a security actor. For a state whose stability depends on external guarantees, partners who are physically present on the ground matter more than those who are only rhetorically supportive from a distance.
Third, diplomatic agility. Türkiye has expanded its involvement across the Western Balkans, engaging in issues ranging from government crises in North Macedonia to institutional disputes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This activism does not displace the influence of the EU or the United States, but it introduces an additional channel in a region where consensus among larger actors can be slow to emerge. Ankara does not demand exclusive alignment; instead, it offers flexible engagement on a case-by-case basis.
Kosovo is not shifting camps but operating in a crowded geopolitical environment with pragmatic adjustments.
This middle-power dynamic is not unique to Türkiye. Gulf states have increased targeted investments in finance, real estate and religious infrastructure. China, while more cautious than a decade ago, maintains symbolic but strategic visibility. Individual EU members, such as Hungary or Croatia, also pursue their own regional priorities. Analyses by organisations such as the Carnegie Endowment have underscored how these overlapping forms of influence are reshaping expectations in the Balkans: Western structures remain central, but they no longer monopolise attention or access.
For Kosovo, the result is a more complex but also more usable environment. The country is not searching for substitutes to the EU or NATO; its long-term ambitions remain firmly Euro-Atlantic. What is changing is the way it manages the interval between aspiration and outcome.
Day-to-day governance, economic development and security all require partners who can move at the speed of events. Türkiye’s combination of operational presence, political availability and cultural familiarity fits that requirement more effectively than distant promises, even when those promises come from larger actors.
The implications extend beyond Kosovo. For Serbia, Türkiye’s increased visibility in Pristina complicates a diplomatic balancing act that already includes ties with Russia, the EU and China. For the European Union, the risk is less that it will be replaced, and more that it will be perceived as structurally slow. Influence cannot rely solely on long-term frameworks if other actors provide tangible benefits in real time. The Western Balkans have become a testing ground for how middle powers shape outcomes when larger powers are divided or preoccupied.
Kosovo is not shifting camps but operating in a crowded geopolitical environment with pragmatic adjustments. Türkiye is present, responsive and willing to act. If the European Union wishes to retain strategic weight in the Western Balkans, it will need to align not only its objectives but its tempo with realities on the ground. In this region, availability is becoming a form of policy.
About the author
Elona Zhana
Elona Zhana is a Brussels-based lecturer in public finance and administrative sciences, writer, and analyst specialising in governance, European integration and the Western Balkans.
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