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Diplomacy, explained.
Of Foreign Minister Penny Wong's 51 visits to countries overseas since taking office, 80 per cent have been to Indo-Pacific countries (DFAT)
The real question about Australian foreign policy is whether it is too narrow, not too broad.
From global to regional: Australia’s focus narrowsFrom global to regional: Australia’s focus narrows
About the author
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
Writing in The Interpreter last week, Andrew Carr suggested that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should reorganise itself around the principle of solutions to problems, rather than using the traditional “national interests” approach.
This, argued Carr, would enable DFAT to prioritise and avoid being “pulled in too many directions, for too long, with too few resources”.
Yet four quick measures suggest that, contrary to this assumption, under the current government, Australia’s foreign affairs portfolio is already tightly focused on the Indo-Pacific. This is no surprise – after all, Foreign Minister Penny Wong herself has said her “focus will primarily be regions – so Southeast Asia and the Pacific”.
At a certain point, there’s a debate to be had about what Australia’s “right-size” global role should be.
In the 2023–24 aid budget, 74 per cent of Australia’s aid spend goes to the Indo-Pacific (PMSB Public Diplomacy team/DFAT)
Canberra’s overriding focus on the Pacific first, and wider Indo-Pacific second, is appropriate. Australia faces major challenges just to sustain its level of influence in a region that is becoming more contested and competitive. It’s hard to argue that Australia’s interests would be better served by an embassy in Astana than one in Funafuti. The current government’s approach is broadly in line with the “6+2+n” rule of thumb Peter Varghese outlined in 2014 – although it emphasises the Pacific and Southeast Asia beyond Indonesia more prominently.
Still, at a certain point, there’s a debate to be had about what Australia’s “right-size” global role should be. Australia is running for a seat on the UN Security Council for 2029–30. If the vote were to become contested (it currently isn’t) how many votes would Australia get in Latin America or Africa, when ambassadors have previously complained of being unable to secure a high level of access in Canberra?
More importantly, if we aspire to the idea of “good international citizenship”, as former foreign minister Gareth Evans advocates, we cannot neglect the idea of Australia having a serious global role that extends beyond its own immediate region.
Public disagreement about the small scale of assistance to Ukraine, which has diplomatic as well as defence dimensions, is just one example of a tension that will likely grow between global citizenship and the prioritisation of the local in Australian foreign policy. As my colleagues Ryan Neelam and Herve Lemahieu argued recently, in a complex world, Australia will need “peripheral vision” as well as strategic focus.
