China, explained.
A Japanese sailor waves from the Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Kumano, preparing to berth alongside Fleet Base East in Sydney, in May 2026 (Defence Imagery)
China, explained.
A Japanese sailor waves from the Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Kumano, preparing to berth alongside Fleet Base East in Sydney, in May 2026 (Defence Imagery)
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In Japan, Australia has a partner for the long haulIn Japan, Australia has a partner for the long haul
A Lowy Institute report published earlier this month confirmed (Opens in new window) that China now has the capacity to strike northern Australia with ballistic missiles. It was a stark reminder that Australia must bolster both its own but also the Indo-Pacific's regional deterrence.
At last month’s Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth praised America’s allies that have been stepping (Opens in new window) up: Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
Canberra and Tokyo’s growing engagement signals a shared recognition that preserving the regional status quo demands close collaboration.
It is these “model allies,” the “most capable, clear-eyed and ready to defend their national interests” that the Trump administration would prioritise, Hegseth remarked. (Opens in new window)
Australia has earned its place among this group. Canberra has committed (Opens in new window) an additional AU$14 billion in defence spending over the next four years, deepened its commitment to AUKUS, and remains an active Quad partner, a diplomatic partnership between the United States, Australia, India and Japan.
Now is not the time to let up.
At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan's Defence Minister Shinjirō Koizumi warned (Opens in new window) that the line between peacetime and wartime is blurring. He was not wrong. China's military, paramilitary and law-enforcement activity grows ever more persistent, while deepening global divisions risk weakening the deterrence architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
Australia, long a steadfast but understated partner in regional security, must now step forward as a leader of those seeking to uphold an Indo-Pacific order. That means continuing to invest seriously in its own defence while also rallying like-minded partners around a clear, united front against Chinese revisionism.
National defence spending alone will not blunt China's growing assertiveness. And while Washington's support remains indispensable, its "America First" doctrine, alongside the Trump administration’s tendency to be distracted by other endeavours, casts doubt over the durability of America’s Indo-Pacific commitment.
That is not to say that engagement with the United States or multilateral arrangements featuring Washington are redundant. The Quad is a case in point: since 2025, the group has re-emerged with renewed purpose, its previously sprawling agenda pared back to concentrate on security.
The strategic and values alignment between Tokyo and Canberra is a rarity.
Likewise, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan, Australia and the United States agreed to establish an information sharing system for air and missile defence known as TRISHIP. Designed to counter airborne threats across the region, the arrangement signals both continued US engagement and a shared strategic commitment among the three partners to keeping the skies secure.
Engagement with the United States, in all its forms, will remain critical.
But the current moment demands that regional powers like Australia take greater ownership of their own security, and that of the wider region. That means not just diversifying and building new partnerships but deepening those that already exist.
Japan is the obvious place to start. The strategic and values alignment between Tokyo and Canberra is a rarity.
Japan’s commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, first conceived by former Prime Minister Shinzō Abe a decade ago, has never wavered. Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has now upgraded (Opens in new window) that pledge, remarking that Tokyo would play a more “proactive” role than ever before in upholding sovereignty and diversity in the region.
Of course, Canberra already recognises the value of a strengthened relationship with Japan. The two nations have had a Reciprocal Access Agreement since 2023 and Australia's National Defence Strategy designated (Opens in new window) Japan an "indispensable partner" in achieving regional peace and prosperity. The rhetoric has been matched by action: Australia agreed to purchase 11 Upgraded Mogami-class frigates from Japan, and in May, the two countries deepened (Opens in new window) cooperation on energy and critical minerals.
Tokyo and Canberra have also enhanced security cooperation through participation in joint military exercises including Balikatan, Southern Jackaroo and Talisman Sabre. Going further, Australia announced (Opens in new window) this week that it had joined Japan, the United States, Canada and New Zealand in Exercise Valiant Shield.
Canberra and Tokyo’s growing engagement signals a shared recognition that preserving the regional status quo demands close collaboration with trusted partners who hold common values. But in recognising the relationship's strategic weight, Australia must continue to invest in it. And there remains meaningful room to do so.
Tokyo’s dismantling of its post-war restrictions on lethal weapons exports has opened its defence industry to allied partners for the first time. Australia can now procure Japanese fighter jets, warships, and advanced missiles. Canberra has already begun to leverage this opportunity through the Mogami frigate deal. Greater interoperability is an avenue they should continue to pursue.
About the author
Ashok Sharma
Dr Ashok Sharma is an Adjunct Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA).
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