India, explained.
“I will always be friends with Modi” - US President Donald Trump on his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi (White House Photo, MEA Photo Gallery)
New Delhi’s efforts to maintain equidistance from all powers increasingly faces pressure to choose a side.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
India-US relations demonstrate fickle foreign policies but sticky relationsIndia-US relations demonstrate fickle foreign policies but sticky relations
It has been a summer of discontent for India. Targeted with US tariffs, branded a “dead economy” by Donald Trump, blasted by other senior US officials as a “laundromat for the Kremlin” for its purchase of Russian oil.
This downturn in the India-US relationship has coincided with New Delhi’s renewed outreach to Beijing and Moscow, with foreign ministers exchanging pleasantries, preparations underway for a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to India later this year, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelling to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and talks with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
And yet, there is a tendency to read too much into these developments.
The decision for Modi to participate in the SCO summit, Putin’s upcoming visit to India, and the reset in the China-India relationship all predate the downturn in India-US relations. Moreover, talk is cheap in the world of Trump’s fickle social media-driven foreign policy: during his first term, he referred to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as “little rocket man” while sitting down with him for a summit meeting a few months later. Similarly, the outburst with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office earlier this year was followed by a reset in their relationship.
Too many institutional and people-to-people linkages exist for the India-US relationship to be easily unravelled.
A similar fickleness in Trump’s approach towards India can be seen with the recent social media exchange between both leaders indicating efforts to revive their bromance. Trump at the weekend noted that “I will always be friends with Modi” and referred to a “special relationship” between India and the United States, which prompted Modi to “deeply appreciate and fully reciprocate” Trump’s sentiments. Trump has since announced the resumption of trade negotiations with India and a call with Modi in the near future, while at the same time calling on the European Union to join the United States in applying further tariffs on India (and China) in order to apply pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine.
There has, however, been lasting damage to the broader atmospherics of the India-US relationship. The irrational exuberance in India about Modi and Trump maintaining a privileged partnership has faded. We won’t see another “Howdy Modi” or “Namaste Trump” rally in either country anytime soon.
But the India-US relationship remains sticky. Too many institutional and people-to-people linkages exist for it to be easily unravelled. Both countries began two-week joint army exercises in Alaska last week, reflecting the fact that India conducts more joint military exercises with the United States than any other country.
Modi might have ridden in Putin’s limo, but ten times as many Indians study in the United States than in Russia. Indian dependence on Russian military hardware is in steady decline – down from 72 per cent of its total arms imports in 2010-14 to 36 per cent in 2019-23.
Similarly, while China is a key trade partner for India and arguably its most important neighbour, the bad blood in the Sino-Indian relationship marked by a history of war and more recent skirmishes far outweighs the war of words in India-US ties.
This sticky relationship is also reflected in what has not happened: Modi attended the SCO Summit in Tianjin, but he did not join the military parade in Beijing a few days later. Being seen alongside the likes of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would have gone against New Delhi’s longstanding preference to be seen as non-Western, but not anti-Western.
On trade negotiations with the United States, India has chosen to engage while refusing to concede on politically sensitive areas, notably its agriculture and dairy sectors. New Delhi’s response to Trump’s tariffs has been to strengthen domestic demand (as noted by recent reforms to India’s Goods and Services Tax) and diversify exports amid ongoing free trade negotiations with the European Union and outreach to 40 key markets. It hasn’t retaliated to Trump’s tariffs and acerbic statements. Rather, Indian government officials have remained publicly optimistic about the prospects for a trade deal and on the overall outlook for the relationship.
Conventional wisdom would dictate that the recent episode has vindicated India’s strategic autonomy by reaffirming the need for New Delhi to maintain a diversified and independent foreign policy that is not beholden to any one country.
However, in its quest to maintain an equidistant foreign policy, has India developed an aloof foreign policy?
The decision by the Trump administration to attack India for its trade imbalance and purchase of Russian crude while not targeting other countries that maintain a larger trade surplus with the United States (e.g., China, Japan, South Korea) or countries that are also major buyers of Russian crude (China, Türkiye) is instructive. Part of this can be attributed to the bad blood in the Modi-Trump relationship triggered by Trump repeatedly claiming credit for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan following their brief conflict in May, which New Delhi has consistently denied.
It also reflects the fact that India lacks the strategic indispensability of other countries. India does not hold China’s leverage over global manufacturing supply-chains or the formal alliance relationship with the United States that Türkiye, Japan or South Korea have. In this context, India became an easy target.
Moreover, India is increasingly being forced to pick sides in a world of growing geopolitical polarisation and bifurcation. That pressure won’t soon let up. India is likely to be asked more and more to make choices or risk being left out in the geopolitical wilderness.
About the author
Chietigj Bajpaee
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee is senior research fellow for South Asia in the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House.
Topics
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
