Indonesia, explained.
Indonesian National Armed Forces marines and Australian Army troops after an amphibious landing at Banongan Beach, East Java, during Exercise Keris Woomera 2024 (Andrew Green/Defence Images)
For Australia, walking the talk will be critical to a sustainable strategic relationship that benefits both nations.
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Indonesia and Australia: Defence cooperation under PrabowoIndonesia and Australia: Defence cooperation under Prabowo
Australia and Indonesia signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) last year, reinforcing the existing Lombok Treaty while signalling a commitment to deeper practical cooperation. However, concerns within Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence initially hindered engagement, stemming from historical grievances, differing strategic views, and perceived Australian support for separatist movements.
Some Indonesian defence officials remain wary of deeper cooperation with Australia due to unresolved tensions from past events, particularly the 1999 East Timor crisis. Retired generals in President Prabowo Subianto’s inner circle recall how Australia, through the UN Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), positioned the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as the antagonist. This experience fostered doubts about Australia’s reliability as a partner, with fears that common interests might not always align.
Australia is now Indonesia’s second-most important defence partner after the United States, ranking highly in joint exercises and military education exchanges.
Moreover, Indonesia’s defence establishment sees incidents such as the 2017 mockery of Pancasila as “Pancagila” and the perceived support from Australian nationals for Papuan separatists as clear evidence of insensitivity. The DCA itself, pending parliamentary ratification, raises concerns over provisions allowing military operations from each other’s territories, which some interpret as part of Australia’s forward defence strategy, potentially positioning Indonesia as a battleground.
While Australia sees the DCA as a strategic breakthrough, Indonesia views it as a formal update to the 2012 Defence Cooperation Arrangement with limited strategic gains. Australian media’s portrayal of the agreement as a defence pact further heightened Indonesian scepticism, as Indonesia traditionally avoids such binding alliances. Nonetheless, Indonesia acknowledges the pragmatic value of cooperation, particularly in regional stability and maritime security. Australia is now Indonesia’s second-most important defence partner after the United States, ranking highly in joint exercises and military education exchanges.
Despite these mixed perceptions, the author’s engagements with key Indonesian defence stakeholders reveal four specific areas where the DCA with Australia can foster meaningful collaboration, aligning with shared strategic interests — particularly under Prabowo’s tenure.
Indonesia is particularly eager to establish regional rules of engagement in the maritime domain during times of crisis, recognising the importance of clear protocols to prevent escalation and miscalculation. The DCA should serve not merely as a formal agreement but as a foundation for deeper coordination between the two countries in establishing maritime rules, fostering confidence-building measures, and enhancing strategic trust among regional actors. To achieve this, both nations must broaden their engagement through Track Two and Track Three diplomacy, facilitating sustained dialogue among policymakers and academics. These efforts will reinforce mutual commitment to regional stability while ensuring that diplomatic and strategic frameworks evolve in response to emerging challenges.
Indonesia’s maritime strategy prioritises securing vital waterways, such as the Lombok Strait, to safeguard its sovereignty and regional stability. Given Australia and Indonesia’s shared interest in maritime security, their 2017 Declaration on Maritime Cooperation provides a basis for expanding joint naval initiatives. Enhanced maritime coordination would ensure stronger control over key transit routes and deter external encroachments.
Indonesia faces persistent challenges such as illegal fishing, human trafficking, and smuggling, which threaten both national security and economic sustainability. While cooperation exists between Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) and Australian Border Force (ABF), the DCA strengthens these efforts by institutionalising intelligence-sharing, joint patrols, and coordinated operations. New initiatives, such as a regional maritime security information hub, could further enhance collaborative efforts in tackling these threats.
The DCA also promotes industrial cooperation, offering Indonesia access to Australia’s expertise in shipbuilding and defence technology. Joint ventures in naval modernisation, particularly in combat management systems and unmanned vehicles, could help integrate Indonesia’s domestic defence industry into global supply chains.
Indonesia’s state-owned PT PAL has already supplied naval vessels to countries such as the UAE and the Philippines. Australia could benefit from procuring Indonesia’s 60-metre patrol ships, which have proven effective in Indonesian waters. Furthermore, Prabowo’s National Strategic Program 2025 prioritises the development of Indonesia’s amphibious aircraft, the N-219, already purchased by several countries, including China. Australian support for this project — either through procurement or technological collaboration—would symbolise a strong commitment to deepening bilateral defence ties.
Indonesia aims to leverage the DCA with Australia to strengthen its maritime strategy, focusing on naval modernisation, shipbuilding, and regional security. The agreement aligns with Indonesia’s broader strategic objectives, including peace and stability in the region, securing critical chokepoints, combating non-traditional threats, and expanding its naval reach.
However, Australia must address longstanding Indonesian concerns, particularly among top military officials and the civilian community, to foster a truly reciprocal partnership. Beyond shared interests, building trust through transparent dialogue and tangible collaboration is essential for transforming the DCA from a formal agreement into a sustainable strategic relationship that benefits both nations.
This article is part of a series of commentaries sharing findings from the project on Indonesia’s Evolving Maritime Strategy, jointly led by Emirza Adi Syailendra and Evelyn Goh at the Australian National University. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
About the author
Edna C. Pattisina
Edna C.
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