India, explained.
An era defined by multipolarity (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)
Indonesia, Australia, and India: Overcoming barriers to trilateral partnership
Three Indo-Pacific powers search for common ground amid US-China rivalry.
India, explained.
An era defined by multipolarity (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)
Three Indo-Pacific powers search for common ground amid US-China rivalry.
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Indonesia, Australia, and India: Overcoming barriers to trilateral partnershipIndonesia, Australia, and India: Overcoming barriers to trilateral partnership
As the Indo-Pacific shifts towards multipolarity, it is natural for Indonesia, Australia, and India – three influential middle powers – to draw closer. This is not about raw power, but shared potential to shape the region’s future, especially as confidence in China’s leadership and US commitment declines.
The three countries have explored trilateral cooperation in various forms. In 2024, they met at the senior officials’ level to scope areas of cooperation, and they have collaborated in multilateral settings like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Yet, implementation has lagged. Political will has not translated into follow-through, often stalling amid bureaucratic churn, shifting priorities, and vague strategic framing.
One hurdle is competing visions. Indonesia suggested expanding the trilateral format to include South Africa, eyeing new markets for its electric vehicle (EV) and rare earth industries. India pushed back, possibly because it was wary of diluting its “Act East” policy. That same policy contains elements of balancing against China – an approach that unsettles Jakarta, which is deeply tied to China through the EV supply chain and remains wary of alliances that might appear confrontational.
While India and Australia have separately expanded ties with Indonesia, both remain cautious of its reluctance to frame China as a strategic threat. As a result, trilateralism remains more aspiration than action, reflected in growing scepticism among Indonesian officials.
If trilateralism is to move beyond symbolism, it must be grounded in functional cooperation and common purpose.
Historically, Indonesia, Australia, and India have prioritised different strategic theatres – Indonesia in the South China Sea, Australia in the Pacific, and India in the Indian Ocean. But China’s maritime assertiveness and the rise of the Indo-Pacific concept are pulling these theatres together.
Under Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia is intensifying its efforts to cast itself as a bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This shift creates space for trilateral alignment. But habits persist: differing priorities and policy bandwidth continue to limit coordination.
Rather than launching new initiatives, a three-way partnership should build on functional bilateral arrangements already in place.
To turn convergence into coherence, the three powers must develop a shared understanding of what kind of region they want to shape – especially amid intensifying US–China rivalry and growing unpredictability from Washington. Domestic debates complicate this task. In Australia, opinion is split between deeper middle-power engagement and reliance on the United States. In Indonesia, frustration with US-led sanctions and regulatory moves, including tariffs, is growing. Jakarta’s EV ambitions have drawn it closer to China, while many elites remain wary of appearing too Western-leaning.
India and Indonesia continue to face challenges in finalising defence deals, including Indonesia’s potential purchase of the BrahMos missile system, due to financial constraints and sensitive geopolitical calculations.
A useful first step would be developing a shared strategic lexicon. Terms like “rules-based order” or “grey-zone coercion” resonate in Canberra and New Delhi but sound foreign or anti-China in Jakarta. Conversely, phrases like “win-win cooperation” may seem naïve in Australia.
A trilateral Track 1.5 dialogue – drawing scholars, mid-level officials, and practitioners – could help align these languages and expectations. Over time, such a forum could feed ideas into regional platforms like EAS, ARF, ADMM+, or IORA, grounding them in shared Indo-Pacific perspectives.
Rather than launching new initiatives, a three-way partnership should build on functional bilateral arrangements already in place.
Indonesia has worked trilaterally before – the Malacca Strait Patrols with Malaysia and Singapore remain a model for pragmatic, interest-driven cooperation. Indonesia’s recent accession under Prabowo to BRICS as a full member suggests growing comfort with flexible formats, especially those involving technology transfer or capacity-building.
A natural starting point would be to expand current India–Indonesia and Indonesia–Australia efforts to include all three countries. For instance, coordinated patrols (CORPAT) and Coast Guard exercises could evolve into trilateral operations focused on maritime areas like the waters off the Horn of Sumatra, around Sulawesi, or near West Timor – key shipping lanes with overlapping interests.
There is also growing potential in defence technology collaboration between India and Indonesia, which could be expanded to include Australia. Cooperation could span beyond Southeast Asia to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. One opportunity might be trilateral support for Indonesian naval medical capabilities, such as the Navy hospital ship KRI dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo.
To succeed, these efforts must be framed in ways that respect Indonesia’s principles – non-alignment, ASEAN centrality, and sovereignty – without being burdened by great-power agendas. Indonesia seeks initiatives that strengthen maritime capabilities, support its EV value chain diversification, and preserve strategic flexibility.
The most sensitive area for a trilateral partnership may be building shared understandings of maritime rules of engagement. Here, a trilateral without the United States offers something distinct: a forum to expand autonomy, regional leadership, and interoperability, rather than merely serving as a tool for hegemonic preservation or delegitimising a rising power.
This trilateral approach works as a platform, not a bloc, able to respond to emerging issues like conflict scenarios in the South China Sea, and to extend beyond defence into areas like economic resilience.
There is no need for another grand statement. But a trilateral partnership does need to be approached with patience and purpose. By laying the groundwork in building shared concepts and language for strategic cooperation, bringing together existing functional bilateral arrangements, and emphasising the expansion of autonomy to address emerging challenges, trilateralism can help shape the rules – and rhythms – of the Indo-Pacific.
About the author
Emirza Adi Syailendra
Emirza Syailendra is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Maritime Security Programme, S.
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