Indonesia, explained.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth hosts Indonesia’s Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin at the Pentagon, Washington DC. 13 April 2026 (Eric Brann/DVIDS)
Indonesia’s “independent and active” doctrine is being tested by signs of drift.
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Jakarta risks flying blindJakarta risks flying blind
Indonesia has this week signed a Major Defence Cooperation Partnership with the United States, fuelling a debate about the future of the country’s long-held “independent and active” doctrine for foreign and defence policy. Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin met with US Secretary of War Pete Hegselth in Washington, signing a deal that covers three major themes to enhance US-Indonesia defence relations: military organisation and capacity building; training and professional military education; and exercises and operational cooperation.
These developments may suggest Jakarta is moving closer to Washington’s orbit. But that reading may not hold.
Indonesia emphasises autonomy, flexibility and engagement without formal alignment. For decades, this approach has allowed Jakarta to navigate shifting geopolitical currents. At the same time, Indonesia has avoided any formal alliance commitments, wary of being drawn into great power conflicts that could undermine its long-standing non-aligned posture.
On the same day the Indonesian Defence Minister was in Washington signing the new defence agreement with the Americans, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was in Russia.
Yet in an era defined by intensifying rivalry among the United States, China, and Russia, Indonesia’s balancing act is facing renewed scrutiny. What once appeared to be pragmatic statecraft now raises a more uncomfortable question: is Indonesia executing a sophisticated hedging strategy, or drifting without a clear strategic compass?
Indonesia recently signed up to a new defence deal with Australia. But Indonesia’s engagement with Russia adds another layer of complexity. Despite mounting international pressure following Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Jakarta maintains close ties with Moscow, the Indonesian and Russian navies conducted joint drills in recent weeks following regular defence dialogues.
Taken together, these engagements suggest a strategy rooted in diversification: maintaining multiple partnerships to avoid overdependence on any single power. In theory, such an approach allows Indonesia to extract benefits from competing actors while preserving freedom of action.
Prabowo Subianto meeting with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin on 13 April 2026 (@prabowo/X)
Yet, strategic autonomy must be underpinned by a coherent framework that guides decision-making and communicates intent. Indonesia appears to be drifting.
A notable development in defence cooperation with the United States emerged in recent reports that Indonesia may grant US military aircraft “blanket overflight access” through its airspace. This shift could test Jakarta’s longstanding non-aligned stance, as it would allow American aircraft to transit Indonesian airspace for emergency operations and crisis response missions upon notification, rather than requiring approval on a case-by-case basis. Recent media reports suggest the Indonesian government is not itself fully aligned. The Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry reportedly expressed its concerns to the Defence Ministry regarding the proposal as it may undermine Indonesia’s long-cherished non-aligned stance given that American military aircraft could conduct surveillance and reconnaissance using Indonesian waters and territory – and could affect Jakarta-Beijing relations.
Interestingly, on the same day the Indonesian Defence Minister was in Washington signing the new defence agreement with the Americans, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was in Russia. Prabowo met with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss the security of oil supply, especially given that the conflict in the Middle East may affect energy supply to Indonesian household.
In the past, playing all sides has enabled Jakarta to navigate a complex geopolitical landscape with relative success. The challenge ahead is to ensure that this approach remains a conscious choice rather than an accidental outcome.
The risk for Indonesia is that if engagements with external powers are not rooted in any sound policy analysis, hedging can quickly be recast as strategic ambiguity without purpose. In an era of sharpening geopolitical rivalries, Indonesia’s ability to clearly define, communicate, and defend the underlying logic of its foreign policy will prove decisive for its global standing.
About the author
Rahman Yaacob
Dr Abdul Rahman Yaacob was a Research Fellow in the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute.
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