China, explained.
New Delhi engages with Taiwan as a sovereign nation, much to Beijing's dismay (Getty Images)
Record trade and closer ties with Taipei mark New Delhi’s shift from caution to assertiveness.
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Leveraging Taiwan: India’s strategic counterbalance to ChinaLeveraging Taiwan: India’s strategic counterbalance to China
In 2024, for the first time ever, bilateral trade between India and Taiwan exceeded US$10 billion. And in the past six months alone, governments and businesses in the two countries have agreed on multipledeals that bring their semiconductor, tech, artificial intelligence, and industrial sectors even closer together, along with supply chains.
These new trade partnerships support Taiwan's “New Southbound Policy” and India’s “Act East” and “Make in India” policies, with Taiwan alone investing US$4.5 billion in India since February 2024.
While the surge in Taiwanese investment in Indian companies is grounded in the economic dimension of the relationship, there is another dynamic taking place. Like most countries, New Delhi does not officially recognise Taipei. Yet its compliance with the “One China principle” – the condition set by Beijing that nations must diplomatically acknowledge there is only one Chinese government and must not establish official contacts with Taiwan – has become more nuanced. Without officially recognising Taipei, New Delhi does engage with Taiwan as a sovereign nation, much to Beijing's dismay.
The India–Taiwan relationship has been on a slow-burner.
In 1995, under Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao, India established the India–Taipei Association (ITA), which is India’s unofficial embassy in Taipei, to promote interactions between the two sides and to facilitate business, tourism and cultural exchanges. It was part of India’s “Look East Policy”, launched in 1991, to strengthen ties with East Asian nations. In the same year, Taiwan established the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in New Delhi, which is its de facto embassy.
With growing Chinese hostility, Indian meekness is beginning to give way to assertive expressions and policies that display its strategic autonomy.
Under the “Act East Policy”, New Delhi has shed its inhibitions about firming up the India–Taiwan relationship, balancing Beijing’s sense of insecurity with the pragmatism of seeking economic and trade relations with Taiwan. However, while China’s reaction to the establishment of the ITA and TECC was muted, given their low profile, Beijing’s position has hardened over the years. For example, in 2017, when a team of female parliamentarians from Taiwan visited India, allegedly at the invitation of the Indian government, a commentary in the Chinese daily tabloid Global Times warned, “by challenging China over the Taiwan question, India is playing with fire”. Beijing lodged an official protest over the visit. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) tried to play down the incident: “There is nothing new or unusual about such visits and political meanings should not be read into them.”
With growing Chinese hostility that has led to incidents such as the border confrontations of 2020–21, Indian meekness is beginning to give way to assertive expressions and policies that display its strategic autonomy. In October 2020, responding to “guidelines” issued by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi to the Indian media not to violate New Delhi’s “One China principle” ahead of Taiwan’s national day, a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson shot back, “There is a free media in India that reports on issues as it sees fit.” In June 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after being re-elected, responded to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s congratulatory message on X, posting “I look forward to closer ties as we work towards mutually beneficial economic and technological partnership.” Beijing protested, saying “there is no such thing as ‘president’ of the Taiwan region”. New Delhi brushed aside the comment and proceeded to establish another TECC in Mumbai in October 2024, coinciding with Taiwan’s National Day celebrations, although no Indian officials or parliamentarians attended the opening ceremony. Beijing, nevertheless, lodged a diplomatic protest.
China’s determined attempts to extract an Indian confirmation of the “One China principle” led to another round of exchanges in August 2025, with Beijing asserting that Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar confirmed Taiwan to be part of China during his meeting with counterpart Wang Yi in New Delhi. The MEA later clarified that India’s position on Taiwan remains unchanged.
There is considerable support among India’s strategic community for leveraging Taiwan vis-à-vis China, especially in response to issues such as Beijing’s territorial claims over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. While New Delhi may not yet have breached any formal diplomatic red lines with Beijing, its enthusiastic embrace of Taiwan, and its newly minted economic partnerships, certainly demonstrate a greater willingness to push the boundaries.
About the author
Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
Dr Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is the founder and president of Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), a senior research fellow at University of Massachusetts Amherst, and visiting faculty at the Naval War College, Goa, India.
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