South Korea, explained.
The Ukrainian-made “Sting” and “Salut” interceptor drone (Nikoletta Stoyanova/Getty Images)
A closer relationship with Kyiv would offer Seoul both military and
economic benefits, including battle-tested drone technology.
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Mutual benefits in a Ukraine– South Korea partnershipMutual benefits in a Ukraine– South Korea partnership
The Republic of Korea, like few other nations, knows the importance of trusted allies and partners. Allied support was critical to the Miracle on the Han River – the period of rapid economic growth after the Korean War. And yet, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Seoul’s backing of Kyiv has remained limited to humanitarian and non-lethal aid, even as its US and EU allies have pressed for greater support. The Korean government has largely treated the war in Ukraine as a distant concern. But whether Seoul chooses to engage or not, the reverberations of the conflict are already reshaping the region.
On South Korea’s doorstep, the North Korea–Russia partnership has expanded far beyond economic cooperation into a fully-fledged military alliance. Korean People’s Army troops have participated in combat operations in Russia and received extensive training in the conduct of twenty-first-century warfare. Kim Jong-un’s strategic posture has grown more bold, with Russia actively transferring drone, nuclear submarine propulsion, and ballistic missile technology to Pyongyang.
Faced with these converging pressures, Seoul has deepened its engagement with strategic partners such as the US, the EU, and Japan. Yet, such alliances limit South Korea’s autonomy and do little to bolster its independent defence manufacturing and innovation base. Crucially, with modern warfare increasingly emphasising cost-effectiveness, asymmetry, and scale, these partnerships do not provide an opportunity for battle-tested innovation.
In such circumstances, the possibility of a stronger partnership with Kyiv presents an opportunity for both countries. Kyiv has more to offer Seoul now: its drone interceptors and, most crucially, its playbook on innovation and adaptability. Seoul, in return, can offer Ukraine its production capabilities, invest in Ukraine’s defence sector, and reap benefits from the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.
Applying Ukraine’s lessons to its defence and technological base, South Korea could embolden its regional strategic posture, increase its independence, and prepare for asymmetric confrontations.
Mutual localisation provides both Seoul and Kyiv with an opportunity to leverage each other’s military strengths against their respective regional threats.
Undoubtedly, arms exports are a sensitive topic for Seoul. South Korean legislation restricts exports to an active conflict zone, and its defence industry is focused on meeting internal demand, so direct military transfers to Kyiv are unlikely. However, the legislation does not limit joint ventures and technological sharing.
With shortened development-to-production cycles and rapid innovation, Ukraine has emerged as a drone superpower offering ready-made solutions. The interest shown by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – reflected in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visits – suggests that countries managing asymmetric threats are increasingly looking for cost-effective alternatives to conventional military procurement.
Seoul could pursue this kind of cooperation with Ukraine, either directly procuring or domestically producing Kyiv’s battle-tested drone systems. Such a partnership would strengthen South Korea’s defence-industrial base and accelerate technological innovation.
In addition to strengthening its air defences with short-range interceptors, licensed production or localisation of Ukrainian drones would also reduce South Korea’s reliance on costly missile interceptors in the face of asymmetric North Korean provocations in the region.
South Korea’s K2 tanks on parade at Seoul Air Base (Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images)
In return, Seoul could offer Kyiv licensed production or localisation of its own defence export products. Germany’s Rheinmetall and KNDS are already operating facilities in the country, while Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems have announced plans of entering the country.
South Korean manufacturers, which already have a vast presence in Europe, could similarly leverage infrastructure and supply lines in Poland for a smoother and faster spillover to Ukraine. Notably, South Korean Hyundai Rotem has localised production of K2 tanks, while Hanwha WB Advanced System, together with Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, have entered a joint venture with Polish manufacturers aimed at producing HOMAR-K multiple rocket launchers and missiles. Seoul could consider moving some of this production to Ukraine.
Unlike direct defence exports, mutual localisation provides both Seoul and Kyiv with an opportunity to leverage each other’s military strengths against their respective regional threats.
The case for deeper engagement is also economic. Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated at $588 billion, according to a joint assessment by the World Bank, the European Commission, and the United Nations. By investing in post-war Ukraine South Korea has an opportunity to deploy its infrastructure expertise and be an early mover in what will be one of the largest reconstruction efforts in modern history.
Kyiv stands to gain from direct investment, high-quality work, and the reputational and political value of partnerships with allied nations. For Seoul, meanwhile, the arrangement would bring its world-class projects closer to Europe. Combining South Korean manufacturing capabilities with Ukraine’s drone technologies, drone warfare playbook, and multi-layered, redundant, and resilient anti-air systems could be the first step in bringing battle-tested solutions well suited to the threats faced in the region.
The conditions for a deeper Kyiv–Seoul relationship have rarely been more favourable. As Kyiv is becoming more involved in global drone exports, this is a moment that Seoul can ill afford to ignore.
About the author
Anton Ponomarenko
Anton Ponomarenko is a 2024 Sylff Fellow at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research and a 2026 Kim Koo Fellow at The Korea Society.
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