North Korea’s battlefield dividend

In Russia, Victory Day celebrations are not just commemorative. The military parade, held at the heart of Red Square, is a window for the outside world. As much as it is an opportunity for Western observers and policymakers to have a glimpse at the Kremlin’s weapons systems, it is simultaneously a carefully curated political show of the Kremlin’s closest allies and supporters.

This year’s parade on the weekend had no equipment present and risked cancellation due to the threat of Ukrainian drones.

Scaled down and less muscular, the parade nonetheless had one distinctive feature. For the first time, North Korean People’s Army troops marched alongside Russian soldiers and veterans.

Brandishing silver-adorned weapons, North Korean troops and generals who fought in Kursk intended to send a message not only to Ukraine and its allies but also to Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo – that the alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow will last and expand. North Korean troop activities continue in Kursk Oblast and in Russia, with Pyongyang ensuring the benefits from its cooperation with Moscow spill over into the Asia-Pacific.

Kim now not only counts on Russia, but can request considerable favours in return.

Despite Kim Jong-un not being in attendance, the participation of North Korean troops at the parade embodied his triumph in relations with Russia.

Kim’s pragmatism, camouflaged as willingness to lend Russia a hand with materiel and personnel, has reaped disproportionate benefits monetarily, technologically, and politically. Kim now not only counts on Russia, but can request considerable favours in return.

In addition to an estimated US$14.4 billion in pure military deals, the cooperation has also expedited the pace of Pyongyang’s armament through cutting-edge technological transfers, including those in loitering munition and drone technology, ballistic and anti-air systems, its naval program, and potentially, its nuclear sector.

Pyongyang has also been able to receive samples of captured Western technology, as well as test and upgrade its ballistic missile systems in Ukraine. Its relationship with Moscow has given Pyongyang an opportunity to dissect and directly assess its military technology against that of its adversaries.

Meanwhile, Moscow, within the relationship, has appeared to only grow more reliant on its ally and North Korea’s manufacturing capabilities.

Russia’s Defence Minister Andrey Belousov recently travelled to Pyongyang, announcing a long-term Russia–North Korea military cooperation plan spanning 2027–31, and described ties between the countries as “unprecedentedly high”. Belousov has also awarded North Korean troops and officers the Order of Courage, highlighting their “bravery and determination” in their contribution to the “shared success” of the Kursk operations.

The display at the parade and broader logic of the relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow carries implications for Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.

The risk for East Asia lies in the fact that North Korea will shape cooperation with Russia to enable its own defence posture. Moscow has shown no restraint either, as its propagandists consider Pyongyang its true and battle-tested, if not the only real ally. Moscow has already shown signs of deeper involvement in North Korea’s nuclear and naval sectors, as well as possibility of co-integration of asymmetric systems such as loitering and long-range drones into operationally interoperable platforms.

Wider cooperation that incorporates technological transfers from Russia’s other partners, such as Iran and China, is also possible.

For the US and its Asia-Pacific allies, the parade was an illustration that any diplomatic approach to North Korea now runs through Moscow, too.