A large group of children waving PNG and China flags

Schoolchildren along the New Boulevard Road in Port Moresby during the visit by China's Xi Jinping ahead of the 2018 APEC Summit (Mast Irham/AFP via Getty Images)

Pacific nations reassure Beijing, Canberra’s treaties aren’t exclusive

A security treaty with Canberra was never going to end Pacific hedging with Beijing, and PNG is only the latest proof.

Connor Graham

24 July 20264 min read

With Papua New Guinea ordering (Opens in new window) Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby to close, a presence dating back to 1990 will end. Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko framed it (Opens in new window) as routine adherence to PNG’s one-China policy, timed to the 50th anniversary of PNG–China diplomatic relations. China’s foreign ministry “highly commended (Opens in new window)” the move, before reaffirming the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between China and PNG. Taiwan called the decision unilateral, stating (Opens in new window) it came without consultation or warning, and an unnamed spokesperson for the US State Department referred (Opens in new window) to it as “yet another example of Beijing’s intimidation campaign”.

The sudden closure comes just days after the Pukpuk Treaty (Opens in new window), Australia and PNG’s bilateral alliance, came into legal effect (Opens in new window). Within a week of signing its most important security agreement with Australia, PNG has signalled to Beijing that the door with China remains open, echoing a pattern set by other Pacific nations as they too signed with Canberra.

PNG’s actions are the latest evidence of what Foreign Minister Penny Wong likes to call the “permanent contest (Opens in new window)” for influence in the Pacific, even with recent diplomatic successes from Australia.

Taipei has announced it will review (Opens in new window) its trade with PNG following the closure announcement, a review which will centre on liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from PNG to Taiwan. Such disruption has the potential to cost PNG more than Taiwan – at least on paper. For PNG, LNG makes up an estimated 40% of total exports, amounting to US$5.36 billion in 2024. Around a third of PNG’s LNG exports go to Taiwan, comprising only approximately 6% (Opens in new window) of Taiwan’s LNG imports, a shortfall that may be readily absorbed by suppliers who already provide the bulk of Taiwan’s LNG (Australia, Qatar and the United States). But PNG appears to have deemed strengthening its relationship with Beijing to be more critical than damaging relations with Taipei.

But a security treaty is not an exclusivity clause on the relationship – and Pacific nations have made it clear they do not intend to treat it as one.

China’s trade with PNG exceeded K17 billion (US$4.4 billion) in 2024, with a surplus of more than K7 billion (US$1.9 billion) in PNG’s favour – according to China’s ambassador (Opens in new window) to PNG, Yang Xiaoguang. In April this year, Prime Minister James Marape spent three days in Guangzhou (Opens in new window) discussing mining and energy deals that, if they transpire, could exceed the value of PNG–Taiwan trade in the long run. A free trade agreement between PNG and China is also under consideration. PNG has reason to maintain Beijing’s goodwill.

PNG is not alone. Nauru also moved to reassure Beijing after signing a major deal with Australia. The December 2024 Nauru-Australia Treaty (Opens in new window) gave Canberra an effective veto power over Nauru’s dealings with other countries in security, banking and telecommunications in exchange for A$100 million in budget support and A$40 million for policing over five years. Eight months later, Nauru’s foreign minister signed an investment proposal (Opens in new window) worth approximately A$1 billion with a Chinese state-linked company (China-CRRDC), announced by media release before any consultation with Australian officials. Little is known about the company involved, and Canberra flagged the deal as potentially contravening (Opens in new window) the terms of the Nauru-Australia Treaty. Nauru’s government has also ordered (Opens in new window) “all personnel representing the Government and State-owned Enterprises of the Republic of Nauru in-country and abroad” to observe the one-China principle, in clear reaffirmation of alignment to Beijing.

In Vanuatu, the original Nakamal Agreement with Australia, for which signing was planned for September 2025 (Opens in new window), was renegotiated over concerns it would hand Australia a veto power restricting Vanuatu’s engagement with a third party. A watered-down version (Opens in new window) – which includes a provision for consultation, rather than full veto rights – was only signed during Prime Minister Jotham Napat’s visit to Canberra in June this year. But, throughout the renegotiation process, Vanuatu also engaged with Beijing to work on their own comprehensive agreement known as Namele (Opens in new window). Vanuatu appears keen to ensure that commitment to Australia is not seen in Beijing as a rejection of China.

Earlier this month, Australia signed a landmark alliance with Fiji (Veitacini (Opens in new window)) alongside a comprehensive agreement (Vuvale (Opens in new window)), capping off what I described in The Interpreter as a “hot streak (Opens in new window)” of Pacific diplomacy for the Albanese government. Like Pukpuk, the Nauru-Australia Treaty and the Nakamal Agreement, Australia and Fiji have made substantive commitments and together the deals have firmed up Australia’s position as the security partner of choice for the region. But a security treaty is not an exclusivity clause on the relationship – and Pacific nations have made it clear they do not intend to treat it as one.

The “permanent contest” for influence in the Pacific does not stop. For Australia, maintaining its position as the region’s partner of choice will require the same active engagement, respect for Pacific priorities and sustained statecraft it took to secure the agreements in the first place.

About the author

Connor Graham

Connor Graham is a Research Fellow in the Pacific Islands Program at the Lowy Institute.

Topics

Pacific Islands Papua New Guinea Taiwan China