China, explained.
A China Coast Guard vessel in February near Pag-asa Island, also known as Thitu Island (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images)
Joint exploration with China in the West Philippine Sea would reward bad behaviour and set a dangerous precedent.
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The perils of a Philippines–China energy deal in disputed watersThe perils of a Philippines–China energy deal in disputed waters
What they say about desperate times and desperate measures. With oil and gas disruptions in the Middle East, the Philippines is scrambling for options, last week declaring a state of energy emergency. And now what might have previously been unthinkable for the net energy importing country is now apparently under consideration – a joint energy exploration agreement with China in the West Philippine Sea.
In an interview with Bloomberg on 24 March, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said that his country was considering joint gas exploration with China, particularly in the western section of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Marcos said that the ongoing energy crisis could serve as an “impetus” for both Manila and Beijing to reach an agreement and resolve their protracted territorial dispute. Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma Theresa Lazaro also noted that joint exploration may be “forthcoming” since tensions between the two countries in the West Philippine Sea – what Manila calls its EEZ territory in the South China Sea – do not reflect the entirety of the bilateral relationship.
The precise details of what Marcos was alluding to has since been debated, whether he was pointing to a specific project or the idea of joint exploration in general terms.
The logic can hold appeal. Operationally, joint energy exploration mitigates financial costs and technical risks while accelerating production and development. Diplomatically, such activities can serve as vehicles for confidence-building and de-escalation, especially between countries with overlapping territorial claims.
However, such ventures do not just happen. They are the product of a long-term process of institutionalised cooperation that can only mature through trust. Without good faith, any form of joint energy collaboration in sensitive areas will be futile.
Beijing has not shown any initiative to improve its ties with Manila based on trust. China has consistently ignored the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitral Award in order to impose its own designs onto the lawful waters of the Philippines. Despite establishing hotlines to manage tensions at sea, Beijing has refused to answer when incidents occurred. The duplicity in China’s political statements and its actions at sea only adds to the complexities Manila faces in managing ties with its northern neighbour.
Rushing into any arrangement without achieving the bare minimum of trust-based relations is unlikely to succeed.
This is not the first time the idea of joint energy exploration between the two nations has been proposed. Under the previous Rodrigo Duterte administration, the Philippines and China were on the verge of a joint oil and gas exploration project in the West Philippine Sea. However, the plan was eventually terminated in 2022 after being found inconsistent with the Philippine constitution. China will not operate within a legal framework that recognises the Philippines’ sovereign rights.
Nothing has changed. The China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLA-N) have been engaging in escalatory activities across the Philippines’ EEZ. The most recent incident was reported on 27 March after a PLAN vessel nearly collided with a Philippine Navy ship near Pag-asa Island (Thitu Island).
Against this backdrop, Manila must be cautious in approaching any joint energy venture with China. It is unwise to frame this collaboration as a means to avert the current energy crisis. Such explorations take years to yield gains. Exaggerating its value to the Philippines’ short- to mid-term energy interests is counterproductive.
Manila must also be careful in how it conveys its interests in any such venture. China remains unbothered by the Philippines’ maritime security concerns, so pursuing any bilateral agreement at sea may only reward Beijing for its bad behaviour. This may in turn embolden China to increase its CCG and PLA-N presence in the name of securing its energy investments in Philippine waters – not to mention the regional ramifications of such a precedent.
There is nothing to suggest that China would comply with a Philippines’ legal framework for joint exploration within its EEZ. This is the central impediment to any successful joint endeavour. Only through adherence to UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award can China create the conditions for joint energy exploration in the area.
China has yet to fulfil such responsibilities. Rushing into any arrangement without achieving the bare minimum of trust-based relations is unlikely to succeed. If China is serious about engaging constructively with the Philippines at sea, it must first prove it is prepared to be a law-abiding and responsible neighbour.
About the author
Don McLain Gill
Don McLain Gill is a geopolitical analyst and lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University in Manila.
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