Centre court for the Women's Singles Final match at Melbourne Park, Australia, 31 January (Erick W. Rasco/Sports Illustrated via Getty Images)
Restricting national symbols targets the wrong actors and risks being counterproductive.
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The problem with banning flags at international sporting eventsThe problem with banning flags at international sporting events
The thrilling women’s final at this year’s Australian Open offered a clear illustration of “flag politics” in contemporary sport. The match in Melbourne on Saturday night featured Aryna Sabalenka of Belarus and Elena Rybakina of Kazakhstan. Kazakh flags were visible throughout the crowd and in-stadium video shots often focused on them. Belarusian flags were absent –not because Belarusian fans were uninterested, but rather because tournament policy prohibits the display of Belarusian (and Russian) national symbols.
That policy has been widely reported and defended as part of international sport’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Belarus’s role in facilitating it. Under pressure from governments, sponsors, and public opinion, sporting institutions have moved to restrict symbols associated with the war. At a surface level, this can appear to be a reasonable form of moral signalling and political solidarity. The difficulty emerges once the logic behind selective flag bans is examined more closely.
If the underlying principle is that national flags should be excluded because states have engaged in military aggression or severe human rights abuses, the policy quickly runs into problems of scope and consistency. Many states represented at the Australian Open – indeed, most major powers – have violated the territorial integrity of other countries, conducted prolonged military interventions, or overseen serious abuses of civilian populations.
China’s repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang is an obvious example. So too are many of the United States’ post–Cold War military campaigns and Britain’s imperial history, which continues to shape global inequalities and political relationships today. Yet none of these cases have resulted in restrictions on flags or symbols at major sporting events. Belarus and Russia are singled out, not because they have committed the most egregious wrongs (though their actions in Ukraine are wrong), nor because their actions are current (see China), but rather because they are geopolitically salient and thus their actions are politically costly for sporting bodies to ignore.
This is not an argument for banning more flags. It is an argument that once institutions begin selectively regulating national symbols on moral grounds, the outcomes will likely be politically contingent. There is no stable or defensible line separating “acceptable” from “unacceptable” national identities that does not collapse under its own inconsistencies.
Elena Rybakina poses with her team after winning the Women's Singles Final (Mark Avellino/Anadolu via Getty Images)
More importantly, these policies misidentify who is being punished. In professional tennis, players are also representing themselves. National flags in stadiums are not endorsements of governments. They are expressions of identity, belonging, and personal attachment, especially for migrants and diasporic communities. Treating them as proxies for regime support wrongly ignores the distinction between citizens and the states that rule over them.
This matters most in authoritarian contexts. In Belarus and Russia, political leaders are not elected in any meaningful sense, opposition is constrained or criminalised, and public dissent carries significant personal risk. As reporting on Belarus’s political system has repeatedly shown, ordinary citizens have limited capacity to influence state behaviour through institutional channels. Restricting their symbolic expression abroad imposes costs on individuals who are neither responsible for nor empowered to change their governments’ actions.
From a liberal perspective, this resembles collective punishment. Responsibility is assigned on the basis of nationality rather than agency. That move is difficult to justify once the distinction between state power and individual autonomy is taken seriously.
Even setting aside questions of fairness, there are strategic reasons to be sceptical of symbolic exclusion. Policies that stigmatise national identity rather than state behaviour risk reinforcing nationalist narratives instead of weakening them. They may alienate precisely those individuals – diasporic communities, internationally mobile citizens, or politically ambivalent observers – who might otherwise be open to criticism of authoritarian regimes.
There is a meaningful distinction between sanctioning states and stigmatising people.
Rather than undermining regime legitimacy, such measures can feed grievance and sharpen “us versus them” dynamics. Symbolic exclusion often reinforced identities rather than loosening them, providing authoritarian leaders with additional material for claims that their country and citizens are being being mistreated.
Sport has historically functioned as a rare space of cross-national social contact, particularly for people from closed or semi-closed societies. Turning that space into a venue for moral sanctioning and defining morally “inferior” outgroups makes the social costs of any flag bans exceed their claimed benefits.
None of this suggests that sport should be apolitical or indifferent to war and repression. There is, however, a meaningful distinction between sanctioning states and stigmatising people. If sporting institutions wish to act – and it’s not unambiguously clear that they should – they should focus on restricting official state representation, such as government delegations and state sponsorship and hosting. This would be more appropriate and just than punishing fans and individuals whose only connection to a conflict is their nationality.
In a world where powerful states routinely violate the norms they claim to defend, moral seriousness requires consistency and restraint. The current practice of selective flag bans does not meet these criteria. It punishes the wrong actors, risks counterproductive political effects domestically and internally, and blurs the line between condemning regimes and mistreating people. For both practical and ethical reasons, sporting institutions should think carefully about selective bans before implementing them.
About the author
Charles Crabtree
Charles Crabtree is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.
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