China, explained.
China’s Foreign Ministry headquarters building with insert photos, left, Liu Jianchao, Head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, and Wang Yi, China's foreign minister (Mark Ralston, Wang Zhao, Omar Havana via Getty Images)
Xi wants assertive diplomacy under firm party control – but finding the right person to lead is proving difficult.
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Reports of Chinese diplomat’s detention reflect succession dilemma in Foreign MinistryReports of Chinese diplomat’s detention reflect succession dilemma in Foreign Ministry
Earlier this month, The Wall Street Journal reported that Liu Jianchao – a senior diplomat widely expected to become China’s next foreign minister – had been detained. While the report remains unconfirmed, it highlights the dilemma China faces in finding a successor for top diplomat Wang Yi.
Wang currently serves as both foreign minister and director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO). At 71, he’s well past the customary retirement age. If no comparably ranked replacement is appointed by the next Party Congress in 2027, China’s diplomatic corps could see its role diminished just when Beijing needs it more than ever.
Liu wasn’t expected to replace Wang outright, but rather to relieve him as foreign minister, allowing Wang to focus on the more powerful CFAO role. In China’s political system, the CFAO – an organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – outranks the Foreign Ministry, a state institution.
Having China’s top diplomat in the Politburo empowers him to help shape policy rather than merely follow orders.
Since Xi Jinping became China’s paramount leader, the foreign minister post has been seen as a steppingstone to the CFAO directorship. Wang served as foreign minister for a decade before being elevated to the CFAO in 2023. His predecessor Yang Jiechi followed a similar path. Both were members of the CCP’s ruling Central Committee while serving as foreign minister and were elevated to the Politburo – the elite group of China’s two dozen most senior officials – when put in charge of the CFAO.
While not a formal rule, this pattern supports Xi’s push for more assertive diplomacy under tighter party control. Having China’s top diplomat in the Politburo empowers him to help shape policy rather than merely follow orders. It integrates foreign affairs work into strategic decision-making and ensures foreign policy institutions – which were historically seen as weak and disjointed – operate in lockstep with the party’s priorities. As China’s global interests expand and its external environment grows increasingly precarious, amid tensions with Washington and its allies, the importance of these benefits will further increase.
When Qin Gang was appointed to the Central Committee in 2022 while serving as ambassador to the United States, it appeared that the pattern would continue. Analysts correctly predicted his elevation to foreign minister two months later, and many expected him to join the Politburo and succeed Wang at the CFAO in 2027. But Qin’s abrupt downfall just months later disrupted succession planning. Wang’s re-appointment as foreign minister underscored the lack of strong alternatives.
Qin Gang when Foreign Minister in May 2023 (Michele Tantussi/Getty Images)
Liu Jianchao appeared to be the most promising candidate. Though less accomplished than Wang or Yang, he holds a minister-level rank and has served as ambassador twice – albeit not to the United States or Japan as is typical of foreign ministers. As a full member of the Central Committee, he is senior enough to be appointed foreign minister and potentially be elevated to the Politburo and assume the CFAO role in 2027. His reported detention, however, throws that prospect into doubt.
Liu may yet re-emerge with his standing intact. It wouldn’t be the first time reports of a senior official’s downfall proved inaccurate. But if the reports are true, the leadership will need to consider less optimal alternatives.
One way or another, the CCP will get through its foreign affairs succession dilemma. But none of its options are ideal.
It may appoint another Central Committee member as foreign minister in the coming months, with an eye toward promotion to the CFAO and Politburo in 2027. The only other experienced diplomat in the Central Committee is Liu Haixing, a Xi ally who serves as executive deputy director of the party’s National Security Commission. However, Liu has never been an ambassador – a notable gap in experience.
Alternatively, someone outside the Central Committee could be appointed. Several seasoned diplomats have the requisite experience, but their lack of Central Committee membership would limit their influence as foreign minister. It would also throw into question their ability to join the Politburo in 2027, making them weak replacements for Wang in the CFAO.
There’s precedent for “helicoptering” someone into the Politburo from outside the Central Committee, as occurred with Cai Qi in 2017 and He Weidong in 2022. But both were Xi allies in roles that practically required Politburo status. None of these otherwise qualified candidates share that proximity with Xi, and while the leadership may desire to have a diplomat in the Politburo, placing one there ahead of more senior, better-connected officials would be politically challenging.
A third possibility is that Wang remains in both posts until 2027, then is replaced by two of the aforementioned diplomats. Once again, the prospect of a Politburo seat would be in question.
Finally, the leadership may opt to appoint a new foreign minister while keeping Wang in the CFAO and Politburo for one more five-year term. This would allow the party to groom his successor while maintaining continuity. Wang is one of China’s most accomplished diplomats and appears to relish his position of influence. But in 2032, he will turn 79, much older than the typical retirement age of 68. While CCP retirement norms are flexible, only Xi is expected to defy them for that long.
One way or another, the CCP will get through its foreign affairs succession dilemma. But none of its options are ideal, and the choice it makes will have consequences through 2032.
About the author
Michael Cunningham
Michael Cunningham is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for China Studies, National Taiwan University, where he focuses on China’s domestic politics and foreign policy.
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