A respite for the Sierra Madre, but Philippines-China tensions remain

The failure of the US Navy and the American maritime industry to keep pace with China has created a disparity in naval capabilities in East Asia, which has allowed China to dominate the South China Sea and prey on neighbouring coastal states. In the West Philippine Sea, the conditions are even more acute. Given the Philippines’ limited navy and coast guard vessels, the country is regularly confronted by encroaching Chinese maritime forces.

At the centre of this geopolitical tit-for-tat is the BRP Sierra Madre, an ex-Philippine Navy transport ship that was deliberately grounded in the late 1990s at Second Thomas Shoal, also known as Ayungin Shoal. This old vessel represents the Philippines’ resolve to fight for its sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone.

Six years of appeasement during the Duterte administration provided China the opportunity to gradually assert sea control in the surrounding waters, with navy, coast guard and militia vessels forming blockades or swarming Philippines resupply and coast guard vessels. But that changed with the Philippines “measured transparency” approach to put a spotlight on China’s aggressive behaviour.

This cat and mouse game reached a crescendo on 17 June when the Chinese coast guard employed “melee weapons” – tactics previously seen only in border clashes with India – and a Philippine Navy sailor was injured.

Fast forward to 27 July, the Philippine resupply vessel ML Lapu-Lapu entered Second Thomas Shoal, while three Chinese navy, four coast guard and two militia vessels sat on overwatch just within the horizon. Watched with bated breath, the supplies were offloaded to the Sierra Madre and the troops replaced without the usual harassment. This followed a series of talks between Manila and Beijing establishing informal protocols around the dispute, which surprisingly held.

The seeming success of the informal agreement, the details of which remain undisclosed, was a good start. Both parties now seek to baby-step their way towards deescalating tension in the West Philippine Sea. The National Security Council issued a statement on 28 July noting:

The Philippines agreed to the ‘provisional understanding’ with [China] over the resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal for the simple reason of deescalating tensions and preventing misunderstanding and miscalculations at sea. The understanding explicitly does not prejudice the national position of the Philippines.

Yet barely had the ink dried on this opaque provisional agreement when Beijing restarted the propaganda war. China claimed the resupply mission was allowed through because the Philippines had agreed to seek permission and accede to an onsite inspection of the supply vessel prior to entry to Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippine government denied such claims, but it also restrained itself from publicly castigating China’s duplicity as vigorously as before.

The focus now shifts to assessing how long this informal agreement will hold, along with the potential spoilers that might trigger another uptick in the level of tension at the shoal.

Much depends on China’s approach in the near term. The Philippines has shifted its strategy of “measured transparency” and this means that China can freely issue false narratives, seeking to link the discourse over the Second Thomas Shoal to other security issues it has against the Philippines – such as the conduct of the annual Balikatan exercises, the deployment of a Typhon missile battery, or the conduct of joint maritime patrols by the Philippines and international partners. With its potential to escalate tensions at any time, China can still attempt to compel the Marcos government to back down.

Given these continuing challenges to the Philippines’ sovereign rights, and China’s blatant disregard for international law, what are the options available to the Philippines government to ensure its position while skirting possible escalation?

• For one, its navy should organise surface action groups to conduct sustained patrols over its exclusive economic zone and in the Spratly Islands group to restore a naval presence.
• It could look at upgrading its navy base in Subic so that it can support the forward deployment of navies from the United States and other strategic partners. This might encourage international navies to transition from periodic joint patrols towards a more sustained and prolonged option.
• Taking a page from the Philippines’ deployment of a coast guard vessel at Sabina Shoal, a similar scheme can be repeated at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. This is not expected to dislodge the blockades by Chinese coast guard and militia vessels, but at least their presence will be actively challenged.
• Regardless of whether Beijing’s propaganda is designed for the Chinese domestic audience, the Philippines should issue a calibrated response to counter it, but perhaps not at the same scale and level of vitriol that came to be identified with the transparency initiative approach.

China seeks to create a situation that forces the Philippines into giving up a major security interest – the retention of the Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal – to avoid a threat of escalation of the conflict. President Ferdinand Marcos’ words should be enough to address this by again stating that “Filipinos do not yield”.