India, explained.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a reception in Mumbai, India, 20 October 2026 (Freddie Everett/Official State Department photo)
Structural ties endure, but Trump’s flip-flopping on energy policy has done lasting damage to Washington’s relationship with New Delhi.
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Rubio’s visits are not enough to reset India–US relations Rubio’s visits are not enough to reset India–US relations
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to India last week triggered two opposing narratives: one that the India–US relationship remains in chronic decline, and another that it continues to move from strength to strength. As with most things, the reality is somewhere in the middle.
The naysayers point to Rubio visiting Mumbai and Jamnagar but not New Delhi. This overlooks the fact that many other foreign leaders have bypassed the Indian capital: Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the southern state of Tamil Nadu (Opens in new window) in 2019, as part of their informal summit diplomacy; UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Mumbai (Opens in new window) last October after India and the UK signed a free trade agreement; and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited India’s IT hubs Ahmedabad and Bengaluru (Opens in new window) in January.
As argued in earlier analysis (Opens in new window), the India–US relationship remains “sticky”. Despite the war of words between New Delhi and Washington over the last year – fuelled by tariffs, sanctions, and tightening visa rules – structural engagement remains strong. Bilateral trade in goods and services grew to around US$240 billion in 2025. India continues to conduct more joint military exercises with the US than any other country. Technology cooperation remains robust, with the launch of a joint satellite (Opens in new window) in 2025, and US tech companies pledging massive AI investments (Opens in new window) in India.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in Mumbai, India, 20 October 2026 (Freddie Everett/Official State Department photo)
Rubio’s latest visit sought to double down on this economic engagement. The trip to Jamnagar – home to the world’s largest refinery, owned by Reliance Industries – came amid continued oil price pressures triggered by the US–Israel war with Iran. Rubio’s visit was rooted in India becoming the second-largest buyer of Venezuelan heavy crude – most of which is processed in Jamnagar – after the US captured NicolásMaduro in January. It also followed Trump’s March announcement (Opens in new window) that Reliance will invest in a major refinery in Brownsville, Texas.
And yet, those who buy into the Trump administration’s rhetoric – from Rubio claiming (Opens in new window) that India is a “refining superpower” to Trump calling Narendra Modi “one of my greatest friends (Opens in new window)” and US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor referring to Kashmir as an “important part (Opens in new window)” of India during his visit to the disputed territory in August – miss the point that there has been lasting damage to the India–US relationship. Talk is cheap, particularly under the Trump administration’s fickle foreign policy.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in energy policy, where the US flip-flopping on India’s purchase of Russian crude has been nothing short of staggering. India initially came under heavy scrutiny following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, before Western countries came around to understanding India’s strategic compulsions as a price-sensitive developing country that was playing a stabilising role (Opens in new window) in global energy markets. New Delhi assumed things would only get better under Trump, given his proclivity to engage Moscow, but instead his administration slapped 50% tariffs on India and threatened secondary sanctions. White House trade adviser Peter Navarro infamously labelled India a “laundromat for the Kremlin (Opens in new window)”.
In February 2026, the US reduced tariffs on India as the framework for a US–India interim trade deal (Opens in new window) was reached in exchange for New Delhi suspending Russian oil purchases. But this was partially reversed when the US allowed India to buy Russian oil stranded at sea following disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz triggered by the US–Israel attack on Iran in the same month. Then, in September, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (Opens in new window), authorised tariffs up to 100% on the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas, including India. But with the US now buying Russian diesel itself, Trump waived those penalties in October, with Rubio indicating a 60-day review to follow.
Two key pillars of the India–US relationship have weakened under Trump: the countries’ shared democratic values and India’s role as a counterbalance to China.
The fundamental problem with the Trump administration’s approach to India is that it prioritises short-term interests (in this case quelling inflationary pressures ahead of the upcoming US midterm elections) over long-term strategic considerations. Two key pillars of the India–US relationship have weakened under Trump: the countries’ shared democratic values and India’s role as a counterbalance to China. The values debate is non-existent in Trump’s might-is-right, hemispheric worldview, and the “China factor” has lost salience, as each country is independently seeking to reset relations with Beijing. Earlier this year, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said the US would not repeat the “mistake (Opens in new window)” it had made with China by allowing India to emerge as an economic competitor to the US. This was a far cry from the stance of previous US administrations, which helped to facilitate India’s rise.
Looking ahead, a long-delayed bilateral trade agreement and a Quad leaders’ summit are key watchpoints for a structural shift in the bilateral relationship. Both face obstacles: India’s finance minister says trade talks have hit a “plateau” (Opens in new window), and no Quad leaders’ summit has taken place in over two years. Nonetheless, recent claims that a deal is near (Opens in new window) and plans for a Quad leaders’ summit in Manila (Opens in new window) in November are cause for some hope.
Rubio’s visits to India’s financial and energy capitals help to strengthen India’s strategic indispensability to the US. However, a lasting reset in the bilateral relationship needs to go beyond episodic achievements. Rather than platitudes or dealmaking, the strategic rationale of the India–US relationship needs to be rediscovered and revived.
About the author
Chietigj Bajpaee
Dr Chietigj Bajpaee is senior research fellow for South Asia in the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House.
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