The Bangkok Accord of 1 June 1966, which ended Confrontation, called for Jakarta to recognise Malaysia’s boundaries and for Kuala Lumpur to give Sabah and Sarawak an opportunity to decide through elections whether to remain in Malaysia. Sabah’s support for continued membership was re-affirmed in April 1967 elections. All 35 Legislative Assembly seats were won by pro-Malaysia parties. Observer teams from Indonesia, Japan, India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Thailand confirmed the elections were conducted fairly, although the Philippines declined to send observers.
Yet just a few months before the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – of which Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines were founding members – the British Embassy in Kuala Lumpur reported claims that the Philippines was actively encouraging secessionist sentiment within Sabah’s local government. The matter was not completely dropped after ASEAN’s inauguration, as the Philippines sought a Malaysian agreement to refer the claim to the International Court of Justice.
Bilateral talks proved disastrous. Diplomatic relations were suspended in October 1968 when Manila passed legislation referring to Sabah as Philippine territory. Indonesia and Thailand, concerned about regional cooperation, tried unsuccessfully to bring the parties together.
Malaysia tried to draw Britain, Australia and New Zealand into stronger defence commitments by calling the situation a Philippine threat to the region. At Washington’s suggestion, the Commonwealth allies tried to persuade the Malaysians to stop their activities in the southern Philippines. The Americans were opposed to the Philippine claim but did not want to take part themselves because they wanted to avoid a direct showdown with Manila.
At the second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta on 6–7 August 1968, while representatives of the member states expressed support for regional cooperation, the Sabah dispute continued to simmer behind the scenes. Hopes were pinned on ASEAN members playing a role in restraining the dispute. However, the Indonesians did not want to be drawn into the Sabah dispute, even as mediators, and insisted it be kept off the agenda at the meeting. The British Embassy in Jakarta believed this position was not just because Indonesia was hosting the ministerial meeting, but also because the Philippines held a dormant claim to an adjacent area of Indonesian Kalimantan.
At the end of 1969, Marcos Sr. decided to put the matter aside without formally renouncing the claim and sought to normalise relations with Malaysia. Contributing to this decision was the absence of Sabah as an issue in the November 1969 presidential elections, which Marcos won convincingly.
What makes the current situation significant is that Indonesia’s border negotiations, like the Philippine claim, reveal how Sabah’s territorial status remains contested. There has been no formal dispute over the Sabah-Kalimantan border since 1915, yet decades later survey teams are still confirming boundary markers – part of what Anwar explained as the 47-year negotiation process over border demarcation.
These latest developments highlight the enduring problems relating to colonial-era boundary agreements and the tensions between historical claims and legal frameworks. Sabah’s borders remain contested terrain where history, law and politics continue to intersect uncomfortably.