Intelligence & security, explained.
Security practices degrade when officials with access to advanced secure systems choose to bypass them entirely (Andriy Onufriyenko/Getty Images)
Southeast Asia has seen cases before of when proximity to leadership trumps protocol.
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From SCIFs to Signal: How Signalgate sends a message of institutional disdainFrom SCIFs to Signal: How Signalgate sends a message of institutional disdain
Most commentary around “Signalgate” – which saw The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg added to a White House group chat by National Security Advisor Michael Waltz – has criticised the apparent amateurish negligence of the Trump administration.
After all, the “Houthi PC small group” included America’s highest security leadership: Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and DNI Tulsi Gabbard. They discussed upcoming airstrikes against targets in Yemen and shared sensitive HUMINT, or “human intelligence”. Some of these senior officials had decades of experience handling classified information, others mere months.
There’s little point dwelling on the irony that several Signalgate participants had previously condemned others for security lapses (remember Hillary Clinton and her emails). Or that their unfiltered mockery of “pathetic” “freeloading” European allies reveals a deeply held disdain rather than mere diplomatic posturing. The White House has sought to declare the case “closed” without any disciplinary action.
But Signalgate transcends ordinary security breaches by exposing the corrosion of America’s institutional safeguards in favour of personalised loyalty networks. For those familiar with societies where command structures revolve around personality cults or deferential authority rather than codified procedures and systematic governance, this cavalier handling of sensitive information follows a recognisable pattern.
What makes the Signal scandal remarkable is seeing a personality-driven security culture emerge in America’s traditionally institutionalised national security apparatus.
In 2015, Indonesia’s Trade Minister Thomas Lembong, a self-described “gadget head”, raised eyebrows during a Silicon Valley visit when nonchalantly boasting to his audience that he “ran his ministry” via WhatsApp. Similarly, in 2019, Malaysia’s then-Home Affairs Minister Muhyiddin Yassin disclosed his cabinet ministers maintained a WhatsApp group for internal communications when goaded by former prime minister Najib Razak’s mockery that they lacked coordination channels. While Malaysians viewed it as routine petty political theatre, Western security professionals would have recoiled at such casual conduct of cabinet-level business on commercial platforms.
Yet the officials in these examples acknowledged the existence of grey areas in their digital communications. They operated with a self-assured conviction that as long as discussions remained within their trusted circle, with an implicit understanding that certain topics stay off-limits, they were still adhering to the spirit of their equivalent an official secrets act, despite obvious flaws in operational security.
The most striking paradox is that a country’s developmental status proves entirely irrelevant when institutional discipline collapses. Malaysia and Indonesia are not technologically backward; in some areas of digital adoption, they are even more advanced than Western countries. Their officials’ use of WhatsApp indicates not technological limitations but different institutional priorities regarding information security. There’s an ingrained instinct for distinguishing between formal classified documents and informal discussions, preserving notional boundaries between what can and cannot be discussed digitally.
What makes the Signal scandal remarkable is seeing a personality-driven security culture emerge in America’s traditionally institutionalised national security apparatus. When senior officials offhandedly discuss military operations and sensitive intelligence via mobile devices rather than through secure facilities, it’s a sign that proximity to power has supplanted adherence to established protocols. The issue lies not in who made the decisions, but the slipshod process and the insecure medium.
This transformation explains why the White House security team flagrantly abandoned established protocols. In a personality-centred command structure, loyalty and access to leadership outweigh adherence to institutional norms. The unfiltered derision for European allies reflects a shift where personal alignment with leadership views matters more than upholding institutional principles of statecraft or maintaining strategic partnerships.
The parallels between the American and Southeast Asian cases point to a deeper cultural pattern, where governance models increasingly allow personality to eclipse institutions. Countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia operate within acknowledged limitations in the protection of information, often due to a culture of deference – you are only as secure as your leadership’s personal communications preference. But Signalgate demonstrates something far more troubling: how rapidly security practices degrade when officials with access to advanced secure systems choose to bypass them entirely. Compounded with the sacking of key US intelligence officials, it reflect the reshaping of a governance model where personal loyalty supersedes foundational principles.
This has profound implications for the Five Eyes intelligence partners. When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney characterised the incident as a “serious, serious issue” and suggested allies must “look out for ourselves,” he wasn’t simply criticising a technical breach but appeared to be acknowledging a fundamental shift in America’s security culture. Intelligence sharing depends on mutual trust in each partner’s adherence to established protocols. Trust erodes when personality-driven leadership overshadows formal security structures.
The technical dimension makes this cultural shift even more alarming. America’s national security establishment has invested billions in secure communications infrastructure – from hardened rooms known as SCIFs, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, to classified networks specifically designed to compartmentalise sensitive discussions. Yet Trump’s senior officials opt for commercial apps on personal devices, rendering these sophisticated systems irrelevant when leadership values personal cheerleaders over established security architecture.
Signalgate raises the question: what truly constitutes an intelligence scandal in the modern era? The revelation isn’t the breach itself, but America’s staggering institutional regression. Five Eyes partners aren’t merely witnessing amateur handling of secrets: they’re watching the deliberate dismantling of institutional guardrails in real-time.
About the author
Munira Mustaffa
Munira Mustaffa, the founder, Executive Director, and principal consultant of Chasseur Group, has more than a decade of extensive experience in private, public, and military security sectors.
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