North Korea, explained.
South Korea's presidential candidates pose for a photograph ahead of the third presidential debate, 27 May 2025 (Kim Min-Hee/Getty Images)
The new president will need to balance Washington, Pyongyang and Moscow for any hope of peace on the Peninsula.
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Seoul’s new leader faces an uphill battle on inter-Korean relationsSeoul’s new leader faces an uphill battle on inter-Korean relations
The election of a new South Korean president on 3 June marks the opportunity for a fresh chapter in inter-Korean ties and security on the Korean Peninsula. Relations between North and South reached dangerous new lows under former president Yoon Suk-yeol – now impeached – who favoured a strategy heavily focused on military deterrence and trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.
This approach, paired with North Korea’s decision in December 2023 to abandon the decades-long goal of reunification with the South, resulted in the de facto collapse of inter-Korean relations for the remainder of Yoon’s time in office. With the United States preoccupied with Ukraine and Gaza, and North Korea focused on reaping as many benefits as possible from its burgeoning relations with Russia, ties between Seoul and Pyongyang reached a dangerous stalemate.
The next South Korean leader should take the initiative and coordinate closely with Washington on how best to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.
Frontrunner for the presidency Lee Jae-myung has pledged to restart dialogue with North Korea and restore communication channels between the two Koreas. Lee acknowledged the dangers in maintaining the current status quo, emphasising the need to resume negotiations with Pyongyang regarding its nuclear program. He also promised to revise and improve policies concerning North Korean defectors, separated families, and humanitarian aid to North Korea.
Lee also emphasised the importance of coordinating with the United States to promote dialogue with North Korea. Given the dire state of inter-Korean affairs that the next leader stands to inherit, his short-term focus will need to be on promoting US–North Korea dialogue by proactively nudging President Donald Trump in this direction.
Unlike Biden, Trump has a history of and desire for direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Similarly, North Korea’s main goal has been – and continues to be – to reach an agreement with the United States that includes security guarantees. With Trump already expressing his interest in resuming dialogue with Kim, the next South Korean leader should take the initiative and coordinate closely with Washington on how best to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.
US President Donald Trump has a history of and desire for direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The two leaders met on the south side of the demilitarized zone on 30 June 2019 (Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)
Diplomatic engagement between Washington and Pyongyang would create the necessary conditions for gradually rebuilding North–South Korean relations. Such progress would enable South Korea’s new leadership to advance additional inter-Korean initiatives, such as facilitating reunions of separated families and potentially restarting modest economic collaboration programs.
Besides working closely with the United States, the incoming South Korean leader will also have to stabilise Seoul’s ties with Moscow. Given the latter’s current status as North Korea’s closest ally, it is not in South Korea’s long-term interest to isolate Russia completely. Russia’s close access to North Korea’s highest-ranking political officials means Moscow is in a unique position to play the role of potential mediator.
This would especially be the case if Trump manages to strike a favourable deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the conflict in Ukraine. In this scenario, the US president might shift focus to other priorities – potentially North Korea – and seek Putin’s assistance in facilitating dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. If so, Seoul could find itself entirely marginalised unless it moves swiftly to establish sustained diplomatic channels with all parties, positioning itself as an independent mediating force.
A nuclear South Korea would have no place in any kind of negotiations aimed at the denuclearisation of North Korea.
With the election of a new leader in the South, Pyongyang will also be closely watching plans for the major US–South Korea joint military exercises scheduled for August. If the drills go ahead as usual, the window for opportunity to re-establish dialogue between the two Koreas or between North Korea and the United States will narrow significantly, possibly even close altogether. The incoming president therefore faces an extremely limited timeframe to coordinate with the United States on a strategic approach that would facilitate renewed diplomatic engagement with North Korea.
Kim Jong-un will also be paying attention to the tone used by the new leader in the South regarding nuclear weapons – not just in relation to denuclearisation of the North, but also to calls by major South Korean political figures for the country to build its own independent nuclear arsenal. With Trump calling for major powers to denuclearise, support from Seoul’s new leader on such an initiative, including assurances from South Korea that it would remain a non-nuclear power, would send a positive signal to both Washington and Pyongyang. A nuclear South Korea would have no place in any kind of negotiations aimed at the denuclearisation of North Korea.
The road back to diplomacy will be long and difficult, but it’s also the only path to reduce tensions and improve the long-term security situation on the peninsula. With the right set of priorities from the outset, South Korea’s new leader can repair the damage to inter-Korean relations from recent years and steer both nations towards greater stability.
About the author
Gabriela Bernal
Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
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