Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto delivers a speech in front of thousands of workers during the Labour Day rally in Jakarta on 1 May 2026 (Getty/Bay Ismoyo)

The sovereignty hedge: Indonesia’s $1 billion bet on the New Development Bank

Fran Witt,Ashley Siagian,Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

7 July 20264 min read

The architecture of international development finance is under strain. Confidence in the post-war Bretton Woods institutions has weakened across much of the developing world while geopolitical fragmentation and intensifying strategic competition have complicated access to traditional sources of capital. Against this backdrop, Indonesia’s decision (Opens in new window) to join the New Development Bank (NDB) in January 2026, accompanied by a US$1 billion capital commitment (Opens in new window) over seven years, deserves attention not merely as a financial transaction but as a strategic statement.

For Jakarta, the NDB is more than a new source of capital. It is a test of whether a sovereignty-centred model of development finance can deliver economic transformation.

The NDB operates on a different principle to the Bretton Woods institutions: countries must become shareholders by contributing capital before they can access financing. This membership-based model gives borrowing countries a greater stake in the institution’s governance while aligning access to capital with ownership. For Indonesia, the US$1 billion commitment is therefore not merely a fee for entry but an investment in securing long-term access to an alternative development-finance architecture.

Under President Dilma Rousseff, the NDB’s emerging 2027–2031 strategy (Opens in new window) reflects an ambitious attempt by the Global South to reshape development finance around technological transformation, economic sovereignty and low-carbon growth. The bank seeks to not only provide capital but reduce dependence on Western-dominated financial systems and expand strategic autonomy among emerging economies.

For Jakarta, the appeal is obvious. The withdrawal of American support (Opens in new window) from Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) reinforced concerns that reliance on Western financing frameworks leaves national priorities vulnerable to political cycles abroad. Membership in the NDB therefore represents a hedge against uncertainty in an increasingly multipolar world.

Energy transition lies at the centre of this recalibration. The NDB’s emphasis on local-currency (Opens in new window) financing could reduce exposure to exchange-rate volatility while supporting investment in renewable energy, grid modernisation, battery storage and critical minerals infrastructure. Its focus on artificial intelligence, tokenised finance and green technologies also aligns development finance with the realities of a new industrial era in which energy security, digital systems and climate resilience are increasingly interconnected.

Yet Jakarta’s decision also raises difficult questions. Unlike many multilateral lenders that attach policy conditionalities, the NDB emphasises “country systems” (Opens in new window), relying on domestic legal and procurement frameworks. For governments seeking greater control over industrial policy, this offers an attractive alternative. But sovereignty alone is not governance.

Indonesia’s experience illustrates the trade-offs. President Prabowo Subianto’s sovereign wealth vehicle, Danantara (Opens in new window), consolidates major state-owned enterprises under a single umbrella, creating a platform through which NDB financing can flow into strategic projects without burdening the state budget. Supporters see efficiency; critics see (Opens in new window) concentration of power. This “Prabowo paradox” reflects a broader tension: institutions designed to accelerate development may also weaken independent oversight. As Danantara manages tens of billions of dollars in investments, transparency and internationally recognised governance standards will become increasingly important.

Civil society organisations in Indonesia have already raised concerns over environmental safeguards, indigenous land rights and consultation processes surrounding certain projects.

The same tension is visible in Indonesia’s industrial strategy. Nickel downstreaming has become central to national development (Opens in new window) and is indispensable to global battery and electric vehicle supply chains. Yet much of the supporting infrastructure still relies (Opens in new window) on captive coal-fired power plants that contribute to deforestation and pollution. This presents a dilemma not only for Indonesia but also for the NDB. Financing carbon-intensive industries under the banner of green development risks undermining the bank’s climate credibility.

Currency diversification presents another contradiction. One of the NDB’s attractions is its ambition to reduce dependence on the US dollar through local-currency lending. Yet a substantial share of its operations remains denominated in Chinese renminbi. This raises an important question: is the emerging system genuinely multipolar or merely shifting from one dominant currency to another?

Governance poses an equally significant challenge. The NDB’s reliance on country systems assumes domestic safeguards are sufficiently robust to protect communities and ecosystems. Where those safeguards prove inadequate, the absence of a trusted independent accountability mechanism becomes problematic. Civil society organisations in Indonesia have already raised (Opens in new window) concerns over environmental safeguards, indigenous land rights and consultation processes surrounding certain projects. Without meaningful avenues for redress, the NDB risks reproducing some of the very shortcomings it was created to overcome.

These questions should occupy a central place in the NDB’s 2027–2031 strategy review. Will the bank prioritise speed and scale of lending or strengthen transparency and accountability alongside growth? Can sovereignty and accountability be advanced simultaneously rather than treated as competing objectives?

Indonesia’s membership makes these questions impossible to avoid. For Jakarta, the NDB is more than a new source of capital. It is a test of whether a sovereignty-centred model of development finance can deliver economic transformation while preserving environmental integrity and public legitimacy. For the NDB, Indonesia offers an opportunity to demonstrate that an institution created to challenge the established order can also improve upon it.

As the NDB charts its course, it is not simply competing with the Bretton Woods institutions. It is competing to define what development finance should look like in a fragmented, climate-constrained and increasingly multipolar century.

About the authors

Fran Witt

Fran Witt is a senior strategist in advocacy, campaigning and movement building with more than 15 years’ experience advancing climate, economic and social justice.

Ashley Siagian

Ashley Siagian is an independent researcher focused on climate financing, multilateral development bank operations, and equitable energy transitions.

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat Director of China-Indonesia Desk at Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) in Jakarta.

Topics

Aid & development Indonesia Economy