The minilateral moment is passing

In diplomacy, 2026 was hailed as the year size doesn’t matter (Opens in new window), with “minilateralism” praised at the World Economic Forum as the future of international cooperation.

Frustrated by the slow pace and political deadlock that hampered large multilateral institutions – most notably the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation – smaller, more flexible coalitions have organised around specific objectives. The model promised speed, efficiency, and the ability to bring together a limited number (Opens in new window) of countries to address pressing challenges.

From the Quad to BRICS to IMEC, minilateralism appeared the fashion of the age.

But there are growing signs the model is under strain.

The first problem is one of overlap. Minilateralism has proliferated to such an extent that the international landscape is now crowded with coalitions, initiatives, and dialogue mechanisms trying to solve the same puzzle from different ends. As new coalitions continue to emerge, it becomes harder to determine what unique purpose each serves.

This problem is particularly acute for middle powers (Opens in new window). Much of the enthusiasm for minilateralism came from countries seeking alternatives to both great-power dominance and cumbersome multilateral processes. As memberships overlap and agendas converge, the burden of participation grows while the marginal benefits diminish. The result is a form of coalition fatigue. States find themselves attending more meetings, issuing more joint statements, and participating in more working groups without necessarily achieving proportionately greater outcomes.

The G20 is a bigger grouping, but was elevated to a leaders-level meeting with the hope of still being small enough to act efficiently. It is now hampered by the same multilateral bottlenecks it was supposed to bypass (Opens in new window).

Originally conceived as a focused mechanism for global economic coordination in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 has since evolved into a sprawling web of working groups, engagement tracks, and expansive agendas. Over time, its agenda has expanded far beyond macroeconomic governance to encompass issues ranging from climate finance and health security to digital governance and artificial intelligence. The result is a bloated organisation with the same bureaucratic inertia that once justified the search for smaller, more agile coalitions.

Unlike multilateral institutions, which derive legitimacy from broad participation, minilateral arrangements derive their effectiveness from a logic of exclusion. However, there has been a recent trend towards expansion (Opens in new window) in minilaterals such as the BRICS and the G20. Expanding membership can enhance legitimacy, broaden representation, and amplify the voice of underrepresented regions in global governance, but it also introduces greater diversity of interests, making consensus harder to achieve.

The challenges posed by expansion were evident at the recent BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Opens in new window) in New Delhi, which concluded without a joint statement owing to disagreements over the conflict in West Asia. The principal divide emerged between Iran and the UAE, with Abu Dhabi reportedly seeking stronger language criticising Tehran's actions, while Iran pushed for explicit condemnation of the United States and Israel. The absence of consensus saw India – as host – issue a chair's statement in place of a negotiated joint declaration. This demonstrates how more inclusion can translate into institutional paralysis, precisely the kind of problem minilateral forums were originally intended to avoid.

Another challenge to minilateralism stems from a renewed emphasis on bilateral engagement (Opens in new window). This is visible most prominently in the case of the United States and China in areas involving trade, technology, and economic security – with observers describing it as a resurgence of G2 politics (Opens in new window). This trend has real consequences for the future of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (Opens in new window). Many of the region's most prominent minilateral arrangements emerged as products of intensifying US–China competition. If that rivalry comes to be managed through direct bilateral engagement, the strategic logic of these minilateral forums could come into question.

The G2 moment is also a reminder that the framework of global cooperation is still determined at the bilateral level (Opens in new window) whether or not major powers are involved. For a typical minilateral involving four countries, there are six concurrent bilateral relationships operating simultaneously beneath the broader framework. Collectively, the health of these relationships determines the effectiveness of the grouping as a whole. As membership expands, the number of such bilateral channels multiplies exponentially, making meaningful cooperation tougher to achieve.

None of this suggests that minilateralism is disappearing. Smaller coalitions will remain valuable instruments for addressing specific challenges, coordinating policies among partners, and signalling political alignment. Governments will continue to create new platforms where they perceive gaps in existing institutions.

However, the enthusiasm that has surrounded such arrangements for nearly a decade needs to be reassessed. What may be emerging instead is a more selective and hierarchical diplomatic order: bilateralism for high politics, minilateralism for targeted coordination, and traditional multilateralism for legitimacy and norm-setting. The era when minilateralism was viewed as the most effective solution to global governance dysfunction may already be passing.