The Quad dividend for Australia and India

Penny Wong had a number that speaks to the momentum now driving Australia’s ties with India. After meeting with her Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar in New Delhi this week, Wong observed this was their 28th in-person meeting of her four years in the job.

“So we have spent a lot of time together, which reflects the importance of the partnership between our countries, as well as our personal friendship.”

Wong and Jaishankar met on the sidelines of the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting – the grouping of India, Australia, Japan and the United States that continues to draw headlines debating its relevance. Commentators have argued Beijing emerged from the recent Xi-Trump summit looking more confident, while the Quad has not convened at a leader’s level in almost two years. Tension has instead bubbled between New Delhi and Washington, over tariff disputes, visa regimes, purchases of Russian oil, and the coddling of Pakistan.

But it is worth remembering that the Quad’s agenda – critical minerals, supply chain resilience, infrastructure investment, maritime coordination and defence cooperation – was never an ambition for containment. It was about creating alternatives to China’s expanding influence.

China’s predictable criticism of “cliques” and “exclusionary” geopolitics is itself evidence that the grouping still gets under Beijing’s skin.

The real ask from India, Australia and Japan, at present, is policy coherence from the United States. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s four-day visit to India culminating with the Quad talks tried to offer that reassurance, explicitly acknowledging the weight India brings to burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific. Both sides appeared clear-eyed about their mutual necessity. Jaishankar’s “India First” framing during a joint press conference with Rubio – recognising convergences while stressing independent pursuit of national interests – was illustrative.

Against that backdrop, the Quad meeting in New Delhi was more substantive and focused than critics have allowed. The Quad appears to be learning from its earlier limitations – attempting to institutionalise forms of cooperation that can outlast individual leaders and electoral cycles. China’s predictable criticism of “cliques” and “exclusionary” geopolitics is itself evidence that the grouping still gets under Beijing’s skin.

Many of these threads and outcomes of the Quad meeting intersect directly with the India–Australia relationship.

The Quad Critical Minerals Framework, which explicitly covers mining, processing and recycling, is perhaps the most consequential development for Canberra and New Delhi. China’s suspension of rare earth and semiconductor mineral exports during the recent US-China tensions gave the framework fresh urgency. Australia and India had already signed critical minerals agreements, identified projects and convened investment forums. Yet the processing stage – where China dominates – has remained undeveloped. For the first time, the framework formally recognises all three stages of the supply chain and introduces private-sector coordination into the architecture. That makes it less declaratory and potentially more operational.

Infrastructure is another area where the Quad is beginning to move. It has been estimated that between 2000 and 2025, Chinese lenders and state-owned enterprises invested nearly $24 billion into 168 port projects across 90 countries, creating an extensive global maritime footprint. Against that backdrop, the Quad’s planned Fiji port upgrade – the grouping’s first joint infrastructure project – is notable despite its modest scale. For Australia, it provides multilateral backing to push back even if it cannot counter China’s growing infrastructure inroads in the Pacific. For India, it offers a credible avenue to expand its development role through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

Lowy Institute research has warned that surging external aid has exposed governance weaknesses in several Pacific states, aggravating economic fragility, corruption and limited administrative capacity. In that context, a successful Quad pilot project emphasising transparency, accountability and standardised infrastructure practices could offer the region an alternative that avoids forcing binary geopolitical choices.

Defence cooperation is another area where Quad initiatives overlap with the agenda for India-Australia ties. Defence planners often describe the 2020 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement between the two countries as the take-off point for deeper logistical coordination and faster regional responsiveness. The 2024 air-to-air refuelling arrangement further improved interoperability, extending the reach of both countries across the Indo-Pacific.

The proposed Quad Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Coordination mechanism – layering real-time operational information sharing onto the existing Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness framework – builds on these bilateral efforts. It also expands the role of India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) as the central coordinating node for regional maritime awareness. That falls neatly within the proposed Joint Roadmap for Maritime Security Collaboration announced during the India-Australia Defence Policy Talks earlier this year. Both Australia’s National Defence Strategy and India’s Maritime Doctrine emphasise bridging operational gaps across the Indian Ocean region.

The outcomes of the Quad meeting in New Delhi have opened new pathways for cooperation between Australia and India. Even symbolic but politically important gestures, such as the joint reference to the Bondi and Pahalgam terror attacks in the joint statement, speak to the growing strength of the relationship. This grunt work will define the agenda for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s planned visit to Australia in the coming months.