BRICS, explained.
An artist puts the final touches on paintings of BRICS member countries' leaders in Amritsar ahead of the BRICS Summit on 12-13 September in New Delhi (Narinder Nanu/AFP via Getty Images)
Don’t mistake India’s balancing act as a retreat.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
What the West should make of Xi’s return to Delhi for the BRICSWhat the West should make of Xi’s return to Delhi for the BRICS
China’s President Xi Jinping is now confirmed (Opens in new window) to arrive in New Delhi this weekend for the first time in seven years, reportedly (Opens in new window) accompanied by a delegation of around 400 officials. The will-he/won’t-he question of whether Xi would ultimately attend the talks drove local media into a frenzy, but attention will also turn to the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the BRICS summit hosted by India, and to the many bilateral meetings, including with Iran, on the sidelines. Images of Xi, Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi together in the national capital are likely to spark commentary that India is drifting away from the West, amid US President Donald Trump’s tariff pressure and growing uncertainty about US policy.
Such a reading gets India’s strategy almost exactly backwards.
The story this weekend is not the photograph of Xi, Putin and Modi. It is whether India can continue holding the line.
The more important question is whether India can maintain the position it has spent two decades constructing. New Delhi wants BRICS to represent the interests of the Global South, not define itself against the West. It wants greater influence over institutions it sees as unrepresentative, not membership of a bloc shaped by Beijing.
As Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has put it (Opens in new window), India is “non-Western, not anti-Western”. It sees itself as a reformist rather than a revisionist power. India wants a larger voice in global governance, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and greater influence over financial and technological rulemaking. It seeks to change aspects of the international order, not overturn a system on which much of its own rise depends.
India’s turn as BRICS chair reflects that approach (Opens in new window). This year’s discussions on food security, emerging technologies and trade have focused more on strengthening existing institutions than replacing them. At a time when US tariff policies have heightened economic volatility, BRICS trade ministers have called for the multilateral trading order to be preserved and revitalised.
BRICS is also where India’s balancing act faces its toughest test. It remains contested terrain. The expansion of the grouping, resisted by both India and Brazil, has made consensus harder. Beneath the larger membership lies a familiar divide: India and Brazil largely see BRICS as an economic platform, while China and Russia see it as a geopolitical one.
India, as chair, has tried to keep those two tracks separate. The strain was visible in May, when BRICS foreign ministers failed to agree on a joint declaration. A government tilting towards an ideological bloc would have attempted to impose a common line. India did the opposite, issuing a chair’s statement (Opens in new window) that acknowledged disagreements and moved on.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China in 2025, and this year will be Xi's first visit to India in seven years (MEAphotogallery/Flickr)
Debates over de-dollarisation are equally instructive. India has no interest in leading a financial revolt against the US dollar. It opposes a BRICS currency and instead backs practical measures such as local-currency settlement and easier cross-border payments. New Delhi’s objective is resilience and flexibility, not an alternative financial order.
The challenge for India this weekend is preserving that middle ground. US tariff pressure, uncertainty over sanctions, and setbacks to projects such as Chabahar in Iran have heightened the need for risk management via alternatives.
But alternatives are not substitutes.
Strategic autonomy is real. India often disagrees with Washington and wants parts of the international order reformed. Yet it also understands that its rise depends on relationships the West is uniquely placed to provide.
The United States remains India’s largest market and a critical source of capital, technology and investment. Neither China nor Russia can replace that. India’s challenge is turning potential into power. In semiconductors, advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence, that requires technology, investment and trusted partners. Most of India’s chosen partnerships sit firmly in the Western camp.
Seen through that lens, Xi’s expected visit is less realignment, more a practice of diversification.
The thaw between India and China should not be mistaken for reconciliation. The boundary dispute remains unresolved, the trade deficit remains large, and India’s dependence on Chinese supply chains is increasingly viewed as a vulnerability.
Recent high-level talks on the border have produced language suggesting progress but no breakthroughs. The two sides have built mechanisms to manage tensions, yet the Line of Actual Control remains a heavily militarised frontier defined by caution and deterrence.
Meanwhile, the rest of India’s diplomacy points in a very different direction. The Quad continues to streamline agendas. Defence and technology cooperation with the United States is expanding despite political headwinds. Trade and defence cooperation with Britain, the European Union, Australia and other partners has accelerated. Where India has diversified, it has found partners overwhelmingly with the West and its allies.
Indian strategists often argue that India’s hedge is against American volatility, not against America itself.
The distinction matters. A BRICS that remains a coalition seeking greater voice for non-Western states may be an irritant but something the West could live with. A BRICS organised around Chinese preferences would be something else entirely. India remains the most important country capable of preventing that outcome.
Which is why the story this weekend is not the photograph of Xi, Putin and Modi. It is whether India can continue holding the line.
About the author
Shruti Pandalai
Shruti Pandalai is the inaugural India Chair at the Lowy Institute.
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
