Caucasus, explained.

President Donald Trump signs a trilateral joint declaration with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)

Why the US, not Russia, made peace in the former Soviet South Caucasus

So much for spheres of influence.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

11 August 20253 min read

Last Friday, 8 August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a landmark peace agreement at the White House, bringing an end to decades of conflict between their countries. The signing of the “Agreement on the Establishment of Peace” was brokered by US President Donald Trump.

A central element of the deal is the creation of a major transit corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, with the United States assisting in constructing such a transit corridor. The agreement states the route will be called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Trump expressed satisfaction with the name, adding – perhaps with uncharacteristic modesty – that he had not requested it.

This marks one of the most significant US peace-brokering interventions in the post-Soviet South Caucasus, a region long considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991 and remain members of the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The question is: Why was Trump, and not Vladimir Putin, able to deliver such a deal in what Moscow still considers its strategic “Near Abroad” region?

The answer appears to lie in Russia’s weakened position and its eroding credibility as a regional power. There are several reasons for this change.

Russian influence in its traditional sphere of influence – “the Near Abroad” – does not appear to be assured any longer.

First, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia soured over a series of incidents that undermined trust. One of the most damaging was the downing of an Azerbaijani plane by Russian air defence systems – an incident for which Moscow never formally took responsibility. In December 2024, 38 people died when an Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft crashed near the city of Aktau in Kazakhstan after diverting its route over the Caspian Sea from southern Russia. Azerbaijan blamed Russia for unintentionally downing the plane with its air defence systems. However, no clear direct responsibility was accepted by the Russian side, and in Azerbaijani political discourse, the incident remains a potent symbol of Russian disregard.

Additionally, reports of ethnic Azeri Russian citizens facing heavy-handed treatment by Russian security services have further deepened resentment. Earlier this year, Russian law enforcement conducted raids on the homes of Azerbaijani residents in Yekaterinburg, resulting in the deaths of two Azerbaijanis and injuries to several others. Amid these tensions, President Ilham Aliyev chose not to attend the Russian Victory Day Parade in Moscow in May.

Second, Armenia has lost faith in the reliability of Russia’s security guarantees. Despite being a member of both the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), mistrust has been growing in Yerevan for years. This reached a peak when Armenia received no military support from the CSTO during the 2020 and 2023 conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow argued that because the fighting “did not take place on Armenian territory” the CSTO had no obligation to intervene. Since then, Pashinyan has visibly distanced himself from Moscow and appears to view Armenia as effectively outside the military alliance.

Third, Trump’s personal ambitions played a role. His public statements repeatedly frame him as a man opposed to war and eager to “make peace,” even if that rhetoric does not consistently extend to all conflicts, most notably in the Middle East. The Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute offered him a relatively easier box to tick to make yet another case for a potential shot at the Nobel Peace Prize.

The TRIPP agreement is, therefore, not just a bilateral peace settlement. It is a geopolitical signal. It reflects a rare US diplomatic win in a region once dominated by Moscow. It is also a reminder that Russian influence in its traditional sphere of influence – “the Near Abroad” – does not appear to be assured any longer. Whether this peace holds will depend on how both sides navigate implementation.

About the author

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Dr Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva is a Lecturer at the ANU National Security College (NSC).

Topics

Caucasus Russia United States