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Can ASEAN agree on a playbook for Indo-Pacific security?
In June 2026, the Lowy Institute convened a two-day workshop, “Coordinating in crises: Indo-Pacific security”, bringing together participants from Southeast Asia, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to examine the security challenges confronting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its partners. The workshop aimed to clarify differing regional threat perceptions, identify weaknesses in existing crisis-response architecture, and generate practical recommendations to strengthen ASEAN’s readiness across a broad range of security challenges.
ASEAN’s centrality and agency face mounting pressures from several directions at once: the unresolved crisis in Myanmar, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, major power rivalry, threats to freedom of navigation and commerce, and vulnerabilities in global supply chains. A cross-Strait crisis involving Taiwan would be especially consequential, given the roughly one million ASEAN nationals living there and the immediate impact it would have on the security of neighbouring states such as the Philippines and Japan.
While ASEAN already boasts a plethora of relevant institutional bodies — including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance, the Emergency Response and Assessment Team, and the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group — fragmented coordination and uneven trust among member states, each shaped by distinct national interests and threat assessments, undermine the organisation’s ability to respond effectively when a crisis hits.
This report’s recommendations focus on improving preparedness before crises arise, establishing pre-agreed response frameworks, broadening the mandate and capacity of existing institutions, reinforcing maritime legal and coordination mechanisms, and shifting ASEAN’s self-conception towards practical crisis management rather than the pursuit of strategic unanimity. Ultimately, this report argues that preserving ASEAN centrality in an increasingly fractured global order depends on the bloc’s capacity to speak with one voice when it matters most.
At a two-day Track 2 dialogue convened by the Lowy Institute in June 2026, participants from across Southeast Asia, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States exchanged views on security challenges facing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional partners. The goal of the workshop, titled “Coordinating in crises: Indo-Pacific security”, was to deepen mutual understanding of regional threat perceptions and interests, identify gaps in existing regional crisis response mechanisms and security architecture, and offer practical policy solutions to enhance ASEAN’s preparedness to respond to a wide spectrum of security challenges.
ASEAN faces a range of pressing security challenges, including a Taiwan contingency such as a blockade or invasion by China, a potential conflict in the South China Sea, the possible closure of the Strait of Malacca, the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, cybersecurity threats and the persistence of cyber scam operations in Myanmar and Cambodia, as well as disruption to subsea cables and other critical underwater infrastructure.
ASEAN already has an array of institutional mechanisms to respond to regional crises, including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management, the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team, and the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group. However, these existing institutional bodies are constrained by a lack of resources and centralised coordination as well as a lack of legal and political backing that would give them the power to act decisively and to enforce their mandates in a crisis. While ASEAN’s architecture (including summits, agreements, and committees) is well developed, its plumbing (i.e., the channels through which information and communication flow) requires more work.
Participants at the “Coordinating in crises: Indo-Pacific security” workshop identified a number of security concerns and potential crises that could disrupt regional peace and stability. Their assessments varied in type and degree across the Indo-Pacific, but six common themes came to the fore:
Around one million ASEAN citizens live in Taiwan, making any conflict involving the island a grave humanitarian crisis for Southeast Asia. Such a scenario could involve either open hostilities or less clear-cut, “grey zone” measures. China’s efforts to enforce sovereignty claims over Taiwan could lead to military action or a blockade, thereby seriously disrupting regional air and sea lines of communication. Furthermore, any such contingency would compel Southeast Asian countries to evacuate large numbers of ASEAN nationals residing, studying, and working in Taiwan, raising the risk that hostilities spill over into the neighbouring waters and airspace of the South China Sea.
These non-combatant evacuation operations would be a massive logistical challenge, requiring an estimated 10,000 ferries to move that population out of Taiwan. The first stop would likely be the Philippines or Japan, posing humanitarian and security complications for both. As US allies, they would almost certainly be implicated in military operations were Washington to intervene. That would place both at direct risk of retaliatory strikes from China, exposing evacuating ASEAN citizens to further danger.
Because no ASEAN country has official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, member states generally maintain only trade and economic representative offices on the island. ASEAN has no representative office or ASEAN Committee in Third Countries (ACTC) centre in Taiwan. Informal coordination channels exist among ASEAN representatives on the island, but formalising ASEAN crisis structures there would risk provoking Beijing. Some participants therefore suggested that ASEAN states would be compelled to “negotiate” directly with China to facilitate evacuations in a blockade or invasion scenario. It is unclear, however, whether such negotiations would proceed bilaterally, or collectively through ASEAN. Member states might feel pressure to strike bilateral deals with Beijing, but doing so would undermine ASEAN centrality. Handling these sensitive discussions through a single ASEAN channel would better protect it.
A Taiwan conflict would likely be prolonged and involve non-conventional “grey zone” tactics: cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation, disruption of critical infrastructure such as subsea cables, and legal and diplomatic pressure. It could also expand into the South China Sea, including contested features such as Itu Aba — known to Taiwan as Taiping Island — which lies roughly halfway between Vietnam and the Philippines, and has been under Taiwan’s control since 1956 despite a competing Philippine claim.
The Philippines is particularly vulnerable to a conflict in Taiwan given its geographic proximity. The Province of Batanes (about 112 kilometres from Taiwan) and the Bashi Channel (the primary waterway between Taiwan and the Philippines’ northernmost islands) are of unique strategic importance. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have regularly operated within 30 nautical miles of Philippine territory, and the risks around Batanes are growing as Chinese pressure on Taiwan mounts. Beijing would likely target military sites in the Philippines to deny the United States their use, while deploying economic and political coercion and disinformation to undermine Manila’s ability to respond decisively.
Participants highlighted China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, which has elevated the risk of conflict between claimant states and could prompt a military response from the United States if its ally the Philippines were attacked. China has increased its coast guard and maritime militia operations in other claimants’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and has frequently sought to disrupt military exercises there by shadowing US and allied defence forces.
Since 2025, China’s intent has become clearer. That year, Chinese coast guard vessels targeted Filipino fishermen with water cannons for the first time near Sabina Shoal, and Beijing announced new plans for a maritime nature centre at Scarborough Shoal, roughly 220 kilometres west of the Philippine island of Luzon. As a result, one participant argued that the term “grey zone” was inadequate to describe China’s behaviour, which Philippine analysts now refer to as “ICAD” (illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive).
Beijing has also increased its use of political warfare and disinformation to coerce claimants such as the Philippines and Japan, which Chinese officials and state media accuse of militarising the Pacific. Chinese spokespersons routinely cast the Philippines as a “troublemaker” and the source of tensions in the South China Sea, gaslighting it for resisting Chinese encroachment in its EEZ and defending its personnel from Chinese aggression. This messaging was evident at the May 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where Chinese representatives characterised Japan’s stepped-up security assistance in Southeast Asia as aggressive and militaristic. Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr responded by defending Japan’s role and contrasting it with China’s destabilising actions.
The shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz following the US–Israel war with Iran and ensuing disruptions to the global economy have demonstrated how rapidly commercial shipping and energy supplies can be impacted by reliance on vulnerable chokepoints. While the Strait of Malacca is less vulnerable to militarisation or disruption than the Strait of Hormuz, a blockade of the strait remains a key concern for maritime Southeast Asian countries. More than 94,000 ships pass through the Strait of Malacca each year, accounting for nearly a quarter of global seaborne trade and 45 per cent of all seaborne oil, as well as 80 per cent of China’s total energy supplies.
Existing mechanisms such as the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) — a multilateral pact that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — help keep the strait open and prevent non-state actors and piracy from threatening the free flow of trade. Further, all four countries are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By contrast, the United States signed the agreement in 1982 but never ratified it, while China signed UNCLOS in 1982 and formally ratified it in 1996, but generally does not abide by its provisions.
Maritime insecurity can have global economic consequences even without full-scale war. The mere threat of a sea lane closure can heighten tensions, drive up insurance premiums, and move global commodity prices. When Indonesia’s Finance Minister this year suggested a toll on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca, regional policymakers and analysts pushed back sharply, noting that all parties benefit from the free flow of trade.
Persistent conflict in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the need for contingency planning against similar disruptions in the South China Sea and surrounding maritime chokepoints. Early coordination among governments is essential, well before a crisis begins.
Tensions along the Thailand–Cambodia border have been high since clashes began in May 2025 and have resulted in nearly 50 civilian deaths and the displacement of more than 500,000 people. The border dispute remains unresolved despite ASEAN’s involvement. During Malaysia’s chairing of ASEAN in 2025, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet signed a ceasefire agreement on the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. However, there was a brief resurgence of violence, followed by another ceasefire in December 2025. After more mortar and landmine incidents between January and March 2026, Thailand unilaterally withdrew from the 2001 joint memorandum of understanding (MOU) on maritime border demarcation. As a result, Cambodia initiated compulsory conciliation via UNCLOS.
Cambodia’s military is weak relative to Thailand’s, and Bangkok does not regard it as a major military threat. However, political leaders on both sides have succumbed to nationalism and allowed their militaries to dictate political responses. At the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr held a closed-door meeting with Prime Ministers Anutin Charnvirakul and Hun Manet, urging them to settle their dispute peacefully through dialogue. Little came of it, and mistrust remains high.
Thailand’s decision to withdraw from the 2001 MOU and unilaterally suspend bilateral cooperation mechanisms has further strained relations. There have been calls for an ASEAN–UN observer mission to help monitor the situation, but the United Nations has avoided direct involvement in the dispute, which it views as a regional issue, not a global one. Participants noted that without clear enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, conflict is likely to continue.
Participants identified large-scale cyber disruptions affecting transport and communications as a major concern for regional security. Southeast Asian cyber defence capabilities remain limited and vary country to country. Singapore and Malaysia are generally regarded as among the most secure countries in ASEAN with regards to cyber defence, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have considerably less cybersecurity defence capabilities.
Indonesia experiences the most cyberattacks of any ASEAN country. Its national cyber agency reported more than 3.6 billion suspected malicious online traffic anomalies in the first half of 2025 alone. Southeast Asian countries rarely name hostile cyber actors publicly, but Singapore recently attributed a cyberattack to a suspected state-sponsored actor. Even so, its language was muted and it declined to identify the state in which the threat originated. These developments underscore a reticence typical of the region even as the threat grows.
A related concern is the ongoing threat of cyber scam operators in Cambodia and Myanmar. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that Myanmar-based operators net US$15 billion annually, and that scams cost Asia between $18 billion and $37 billion in 2023 alone. Most of that revenue is untraceable and goes into cryptocurrency, which is then laundered through Chinese-run casinos along the Thailand–Myanmar and Myanmar–Cambodia borders. The industry has also fuelled other illicit economies, including human trafficking, sex work, forced labour, and drugs. Myanmar’s opium output hit a ten-year high in 2025, more than double Afghanistan’s, which it once trailed. Myanmar is now the world’s largest producer of methamphetamine.
Southeast Asia is one of the busiest corridors for subsea cables, the physical arteries of the global economy’s digital ecosystem. Despite this strategic importance, countries in the region do not routinely share information on submarine movements and other activity at sea, leaving critical infrastructure exposed. The cables running through the narrow strait between Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam are regarded as one of the region’s most important communication nodes. More than a quarter of subsea cables in the Indo-Pacific land in Singapore, making it particularly vulnerable to attack or manipulation. Disruption could significantly hamper communications between East Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
ASEAN lacks the crisis response architecture for undersea emergencies. A submarine accident would require regional rescue capabilities that the grouping does not have, and an oil spill or a ship’s anchor severing a cable would similarly strain existing arrangements. Closing this gap, in cooperation, monitoring, and joint preparedness, is essential if the region is to remain secure, connected, prosperous, and resilient.
Differing threat perceptions between ASEAN states are the biggest challenge to enhancing crisis coordination. The willingness of ASEAN states to cooperate remains patchy, and interstate rivalries prevent deeper trust and collaboration (for instance, between Cambodia and Vietnam). ASEAN members prioritise different national security concerns based on their geography, politics, and strategic interests. This makes unified regional responses difficult and slows consensus.
| Country | Primary national threat perceptions |
|---|---|
| Australia | China’s increasing and assertive power projection on its periphery, cyber threats, disruptions to maritime trade routes in the South China Sea |
| Cambodia | Territorial border disputes, internal instability/political dissent, cyber scam networks, transnational crime |
| Indonesia | Major power rivalry, South China Sea instability, cyber threats, climate crises |
| Malaysia | Major power rivalry, South China Sea instability, cyber threats, regional instability |
| Philippines | Chinese territorial assertiveness in the West Philippine Sea, natural disasters, maritime energy insecurity, archipelagic vulnerability |
| Singapore | Water dependency, critical supply chain disruption, vital shipping waterways and airspace insecurity, balancing major power relations |
| Vietnam | Challenges to sovereignty in the East Sea, foreign political interference, cyber threats, balancing major power relations |
Participants also noted that the expanding role of the military in some ASEAN states contributes to mistrust, underscoring the need for leadership development and institutional capacity-building. Member states also hold differing views of China, which would produce divergent policy responses in a crisis.
In a Taiwan blockade scenario, several Southeast Asian participants noted that their leaders would be reluctant to publicly attribute responsibility to China. With the exception of the Philippines, most participants suggested their governments would negotiate directly with Beijing to evacuate their citizens from Taiwan, recognising that evacuation routes would likely depend on Beijing’s cooperation. The Philippines is acutely exposed: northern Luzon lies minutes from Taiwan by air, and Beijing could effectively hold Philippine citizens hostage.
ASEAN was founded on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Despite its origins in the Cold War as an anti-Communist bloc, its stated objectives focused on economic growth and development. It sought to avoid over-securitisation, and in recent decades has focused on deepening regional integration and common understanding. Following the Cold War, ASEAN succeeded in bringing the remaining regional states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam into the tent. Its newest member, Timor-Leste, officially joined in October 2025. In recent years, the norm of non-interference has come under increasing pressure, particularly given the protracted crisis in Myanmar since the 2021 military coup.
Analysts have criticised ASEAN’s inability to respond to the Myanmar conflict, the Thailand–Cambodia border clashes, and the South China Sea disputes, faulting its lack of enforcement mechanisms and difficulty reaching consensus. A centralised ASEAN response system could improve coordination but may be too slow and constrained by consensus-based decision-making. As a result, ASEAN risks becoming operationally marginalised when crises arise. There have been proposals to expand the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) and Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT), but some participants expressed concern that doing so would risk politicisation.
Member states are unlikely to rely primarily on ASEAN mechanisms during a major crisis such as a Taiwan contingency. The ACTC has no consular section, and there are no local centres to represent ASEAN’s interests in host countries. Seven ASEAN states maintain trade representatives in Taiwan, but these provide no consular services and have no crisis response capacity. Expectations of ASEAN should therefore be managed; members are more likely to prioritise national over collective responses, negotiating bilaterally with Beijing or Taipei.
| ASEAN trade offices in Taipei | |
|---|---|
| Brunei | Trade and Tourism Office in Taipei |
| Indonesia | Economic and Trade Office to Taipei |
| Malaysia | Malaysian Friendship and Trade Centre, Taipei |
| Philippines | Manila Economic and Cultural Office |
| Singapore | Trade Office in Taipei |
| Thailand | Trade and Economic Office |
| Vietnam | Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei |
Existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) and the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) have limited crisis response capabilities, and ASEAN currently lacks robust mechanisms for coordinated evacuation operations. However, existing mechanisms could be adapted to respond to future crises.
Conceptualised in 1979 and subsequently formalised under Article 43 of the ASEAN Charter, the ACTC has established 56 distinct centres in host countries. These focus mainly on organising events such as ASEAN Day, rather than consular services. In 2023, ASEAN introduced crisis management guidelines covering preparedness, response, and recovery. AMRG and ERAT could support the implementation of these guidelines by providing consular services and engaging directly with host governments in third countries.
To be effective in times of crisis, ASEAN must speak with one voice. Participants observed that although ASEAN possesses the necessary institutional architecture and mechanisms, progress is frequently constrained by insufficient political momentum.
Four broad challenges constrain ASEAN’s crisis coordination capabilities. First, ASEAN has multiple mechanisms and operating guidelines, but coordination between these institutions is limited. The AHA Centre can play a coordinating role in disaster responses and negotiate safe passage for aid workers, but it lacks the mandate to direct operations. It also has limited financial resources and relies on external dialogue partners for supplemental funding. The centre’s mandate and organisational structure should be reviewed to ensure it is capable of responding to crises.
The ERAT has operational expertise but lacks the authority to make major decisions independently. The ASEAN consular agreement, which is used for coordination during crises (e.g., Covid-19 evacuations from South America and the evacuation of citizens from Libya in 2011), is voluntary rather than binding. Member states should review the ASEAN Charter and its provisions on the ACTC and consular services before a crisis exposes the institution’s state of unpreparedness.
A second challenge is that ASEAN has no means of imposing consequences to deter coercion. The South China Sea Code of Conduct — a set of norms that ASEAN has been negotiating with China since 2002 — is unlikely to be legally binding and will not settle competing claims. Nor could ASEAN deter either the United States or China from intervening directly in a maritime dispute. It also struggles to deepen cooperation between civilian coast guard agencies without further militarising the disputes. Given members’ differing threat perceptions, practical cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), is more feasible than collective defence.
Third, ASEAN remains heavily influenced by individual leaders and states. The current generation of leaders has been less active than its predecessors in mobilising members around collective concerns. Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, for instance, has focused more on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East than on pressing for a decisive ASEAN response to Myanmar or the Thailand–Cambodia border conflict. During Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim pushed Thai and Cambodian leaders to the negotiating table and secured a signed ceasefire at that year’s summit. But when fighting resumed the following month, with Malaysia’s chairmanship ending, he took no active diplomatic role.
Fourth, the ASEAN Secretary-General and Secretariat have limited capacity to respond to crises, and member states are reluctant to grant them stronger authority given concerns about sovereignty and non-interference. ASEAN centrality ultimately depends on sustained political will, effective consensus building, and convening power.
ASEAN member states look to external partners for support in various forms. Defence partnerships with the United States, China, Australia, Japan, India, and European countries often provide faster access to intelligence, logistics, and military assistance. Participants identified maritime agencies, including the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore, as important partners for cooperation and joint exercises. They also noted the value of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues in building trust and mutual understanding of one another’s interests and perceptions.
Australia has played an increasingly central role in regional defence networks, expanding security cooperation and senior official dialogues with a range of ASEAN partners, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. It has also helped build the maritime domain awareness capabilities of partners in the South China Sea, for instance by providing unmanned underwater vehicles to the Philippines. Australia is also a partner of Singapore’s IFC, where, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, it posts an international liaison officer to share information and coordinate responses to maritime threats.
Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 dialogues between Australia and ASEAN states are also expanding. Even so, participants suggested Australia could do more within existing mechanisms, particularly through forums such as the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Council.
India is an active ASEAN dialogue partner and co-chairs ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Experts’ Working Groups. It conducts training, capacity building, and multilateral field exercises with many ASEAN states, and has agreed BrahMos missile sales to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) also supports maritime domain awareness and early warning systems, and hosts liaison officers from Southeast Asian states including Singapore and Thailand.
Participants observed, however, that despite numerous agreements, sustained attention from New Delhi is lacking, and implementation is often weak. ASEAN and India held joint maritime exercises in 2023, for example, but none since. Southeast Asian practitioners and experts suggest India’s non-aligned position reinforces its reputation as a trustworthy partner, and there is growing demand for a more active Indian role. To sustain that goodwill, New Delhi must follow through on the initiatives it starts.
Japan is one of the region’s most trusted external partners and has expanded defence cooperation with several ASEAN member states through its 2023 Official Security Assistance program. In 2024, it signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Philippines, comparable to the visiting forces agreements Australia and the United States hold. Tokyo and Canberra have also supported Philippine contingency planning and exercises, and should continue coordinating regional security activities and institutional cooperation in partner countries such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.
ASEAN states have differing perspectives on the United States’ role in regional security assistance. For the Philippines, the US alliance is central to contingency planning. In a Taiwan crisis, Manila may need to evacuate as many as 150,000 Filipino nationals, making coordination with Washington critical. Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites could support evacuation and humanitarian corridors. Indonesia, by contrast, views greater US involvement as likely to escalate regional tensions rather than reduce them, though it has incrementally upgraded security cooperation with Washington in recent years, including a Major Defense Cooperation Partnership announced in April 2026.
ASEAN states are also concerned that expanding security cooperation with China will draw further pressure from Washington. Participants noted frustration with US tariffs and growing concern over the Trump administration’s willingness to link economic negotiations to security assistance. While several participants acknowledged they prefer US military equipment over China’s, they said the potential for coercion from both powers has put their countries in a difficult position, and worried they may be forced to choose sides.
Drawing on two days of closed-door discussions with workshop participants from across the Indo-Pacific, this report has argued that ASEAN’s main challenge is not a lack of institutions, but rather a lack of coordination among those institutions. ASEAN’s comparative advantage lies in pre-crisis dialogue, confidence building, and communication, as opposed to collective military responsiveness.
Better use, funding, and linking of existing mechanisms (AMRG, AHA Centre, CUES, ACTCs), rather than new institutions, would create the most meaningful changes. A strengthened ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General mandate are necessary but politically sensitive given ASEAN’s norms around sovereignty and non-interference.
ASEAN should not wait to coordinate contingency plans for future crises. Standing arrangements for non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian access, and consular coordination should be settled before a crisis, particularly regarding Taiwan. Tabletop and joint exercises require a whole-of-government approach, bringing in diplomatic and private-sector participation, not just military, as well as more complex and realistic scenarios. Australia, India, Japan, and other dialogue partners should support ASEAN-led efforts while aiming to avoid duplicating aid or undermining ASEAN centrality.
ASEAN already has an abundance of institutional mechanisms to respond to regional crises, including the AHA Centre, the Emergency Response and Assessment Team, and the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group. However, it lacks the coordination, trust, and political will among member states to respond effectively to current and emerging security challenges.
This report was made possible by support from the Australian Department of Defence’s Special Projects Grant Program (SPGP), which provided funding for a two-day workshop as well as a public event from which this report draws. The workshop was co-convened by Dr Abdul Rahman Yaacob and Dr Hunter Marston. The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of Lowy Institute staff members who helped organise this dialogue, including Elysa Graham, Rachel Stanley, and Emily Zatschler. The author would also like to thank Clare Caldwell, Mihai Sora, and Abdul Rahman Yaacob for feedback on earlier versions of this report, Ian Bruce for creating the images throughout the report, and Jack Sato for compiling notes and outlining the paper.
This report reflects the views of individual workshop participants and does not represent the views of their governments or host institutions. Because the workshop observed the Chatham House rule, this report does not include the names and affiliations of individual panellists or speakers who participated in the workshop.
About the author
Hunter Marston
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
