Defence & security, explained.
Defence Minister Richard Marles delivering remarks at the National Press Club in Canberra, 16 April 2026 (David Gray/AFP via Getty Images)
Modest spending, welcome reforms, and a defence minister resistant to outside contributions.
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The 2026 National Defence Strategy delivers more of the sameThe 2026 National Defence Strategy delivers more of the same
Defence Minister Richard Marles has released the 2026 version of Australia’s National Defence Strategy (NDS). In a speech critical of previous governments, and which took a combative stance on the contributions of think tanks and defence commentators, Marles outlined a strategy that retained the overall trajectory of the 2024 National Defence Strategy, reinforced Australia’s alliance with America, and committed to expanded growth in defence spending.
One of the misnomers of the 2024 document was that it was a “defence” strategy. The reality is that it was a military strategy, largely devoid of the other elements that contribute to national defence, such as intelligence agencies. It also existed in isolation, given that Australian governments, on both sides of politics, have avoided issuing a National Security Strategy for almost two decades. The 2026 NDS addresses this shortcoming. It substantially broadens the National Defence concept to include new domains, particularly national civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. This reflects lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East and is a welcome development.
Despite the leaked headlines over the past few days, the spending increases contained in the National Defence Strategy and its accompanying Integrated Investment Program are relatively modest compared to the scale of the security challenges now faced by Australia. Spending in the maritime domain increases to more than 40% of the defence budget. Army gets a small increase in the overall percentage of defence spending with drones driving this increase. The Air Force remains relatively flat, as do cyber and space. It is unlikely that these changes will address the fundamental funding challenge that defence faces: paying for AUKUS and paying for the ADF is very difficult with a budget of less than 3% of GDP.
HMAS Stalwart replenishing HMAS Canberra off the coast of Australia in September 2025 (Susan Mossop/Defence Imagery)
The frequent references to the war in Ukraine demonstrate the government has finally – as the war stretches into its fifth year – started thinking about the lessons from the conflict. While it is never too late, it has been very slow. The key initiative to build more autonomous systems in Australia is welcome and will be a boost for Australian defence industry.
A culture that treats outside expertise as a nuisance rather than a resource is one that will repeat avoidable mistakes.
One of the most profound insights from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East has been the growth in AI-enabled cognitive warfare conducted across social media. Cognitive warfare was recently defined by military strategist Frank Hoffman as the “application of information and cognitive sciences to enhance or degrade the decision-making process and resulting behaviour of political and military leaders, and civilian society, in order to obtain a positional advantage in the information environment and designated political objectives”. By this definition, strategic communications – the NDS’s only gesture towards this domain – addresses only the margins of the challenge.
A final comment is necessary on the Defence Minister’s remarks at the National Press Club, where he dismissed the contributions of think tanks, retired officers, and former public servants as worthless. Whatever one thinks of individual contributors, this reflects a broader structural problem: Australian defence policy is developed within a narrow Canberra circle that is largely insulated from external scrutiny and operational experience. No other Western capital governs its defence establishment this way. The quality of strategy depends in part on the quality of challenge it receives. A culture that treats outside expertise as a nuisance rather than a resource is one that will repeat avoidable mistakes.
The 2026 NDS is best understood as a continuation of the 2024 version rather than a departure from it. With the exception of modest increases in spending on drones and missile defence, it retains the previous strategy’s trajectory. A key signal is the explicit acknowledgment that the global rules-based order is in transition, that the United States may be less available as a security guarantor, and that Australia must develop greater self-reliance – a shift in tone from 2024 that sits in some tension with Marles’ full-throated endorsement of the alliance.
Ultimately, the real test of any defence strategy is whether it prepares Australia to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, to defeat threats to the nation. The 2026 NDS provides only a partial answer to that question.
About the author
Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan is a Senior Fellow for Military Studies in the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program.
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