Furthermore, the audit is not just about spending but assessment of allied intent and preparedness to bear risk and cost. The AUKUS review is not about punishing Australia. It is about seeing whether selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia weakens the military balance in Northeast Asia between China on the one hand and the United States on the other. Colby has argued: “A green asset is an ally. But there’s nothing like a blue asset. Blue means it’s ours.”
To be fair, it is highly unusual for any country to offer ironclad military commitments to an ally for hypothetical conflicts. But the US fear is that Australia is weakening its existing forces to fund Pillar 1 of AUKUS. Viewed together, all the US complaints paint a poor picture: inadequate defence spending, the slow pace at which Australia is developing joint assets on its territory, and lack of preparedness to confront China even when PLA Navy warships circumnavigate Australia and conduct live fire exercises. Is Australia an ally that is pulling its weight, meeting promises to contribute to a common deterrent effort against China, and therefore deserving of the right to buy some of the US’s most prized naval assets?
It is not about better diplomacy. If Albanese wants to strengthen the alliance vis-à-vis the Trump administration and increase enthusiasm for Pillar 1 of AUKUS, he needs credible answers to these questions, which only the redirection of national resources towards defence can offer.
Similarly, regarding trade, a good personal relationship with the President and pointing to Australia’s trade deficit with the US is less relevant than it was during Trump 1.0. In Trump 2.0, the highest priority when it comes to trade policy is to fast-track American reindustrialisation. This is behind the administration’s plans for tariffs that will incentivise the production of steel and aluminium in house. The necessary corollary of Trump’s reindustrialisation ambition is to counter Chinese over-production and to move supply chains out of China, the world’s leading manufacturer.
Trump’s trade advisers are aware Australian commodity exporters have done extremely well from a Chinese economic model hooked on fixed investment and over production. As one said to me recently, Albanese never criticises highly distortive Chinese industrial policies such as subsidies but is happy to put out a media release condemning Trump’s tariffs. This will be an awkward conversation for the Albanese government.
The point is that if the Albanese government wants to do well with the Trump administration on defence and trade issues, it is less about personality or diplomatic tactics and more about policy substance. Trump won back power promising fundamental changes in defence and trade which the Albanese government seems to have initially ignored, played down, or dismissed. The Labor government has subsequently been caught unprepared and not yet able to secure a face-to-face meeting with Trump as other more proactive world leaders have managed. Regardless of whether Albanese gets that meeting next week, the pressure on Albanese to spend more on defence and contribute more to the goal of American industrialisation increases.