Arms and influence: Southeast Asia’s missile powerplay with India

In 1946, a year before Indian independence, the vice president of the Viceroy’s executive council in India, Jawaharlal Nehru, said that India would play a “very great part in security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. India is the pivot around which these problems will have to be considered.” Nehru’s thinking was not a break from the past. It was a recognition of India’s fortuitous geographical inheritance in Asia. Indian soldiers had fought in Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, and Malaya in the Second World War. India and Southeast Asia were part of a geopolitical continuum.

In recent years, defence exports have become a tangible component of India’s strategy in Southeast Asia. In 2022, India exported BrahMos anti-ship missiles, made under an Indo-Russian joint venture, to the Philippines for $375 million. Vietnam and Indonesia have expressed interest in purchasing such missiles, while Malaysia and Thailand have also moved on similar lines. Potential contracts with Vietnam are valued at $700 million, those with Indonesia at approximately $450 million. Land- and sea-based BrahMos anti-ship missiles are crucial for Southeast Asian states in establishing deterrence in the South China Sea.

During his recent visit to New Delhi, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin emphasized joint defence industrial cooperation as a key element of his talks. India’s Scorpene-class submarine program also featured highly on Jakarta’s defence development list. In August 2025, President Marcos of the Philippines highlighted joint defense investment and research and development during his visit to India.

Not long ago, Russia was the leading arms exporter to Southeast Asia. However, the war in Ukraine left a gaping hole in its military diplomacy in Southeast Asia. India is cautiously filling some of this space, with an eye on China. To be sure, the United States and China remain the most significant arms exporters in the region, with France, Germany, and South Korea also potential players. Demand for Indian arms stems in part from the diversification impulse of many Southeast Asian states.

India’s incremental steps in its export-oriented defence industry have punctured history. State-run public companies largely controlled the Indian defence industry in the post-independence period. The government invoked the colonial experience to justify stifling the private sector. Admittedly, in the 1950s the government envisioned an ambitious start for the aircraft industry. The Percival Prentice T Mk3 basic trainer, the Vampire turbojet, and the Folland Gnat were three early aircraft to be assembled domestically. The state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited was also assigned the HF-24 Marut project to develop a Mach 2 combat aircraft. Yet, most defence projects soon ran aground.

Heavy reliance on imported parts, lackadaisical production schedules, bureaucratic red tape, and limited infrastructure capacity hobbled India’s nascent defence industry. Unrealistic expectations backfired. It was only in the early 1980s that the production of the Light Combat Aircraft again kick-started India’s indigenous defence industry. But that laudatory initiative floundered too, at the altar of government inefficiency and rising costs. At the same time, other Asian states, such as South Korea, initiated their aircraft production programs much later, in the 1990s. Close technical and economic cooperation with the United States facilitated success. Korean Aerospace Industries has since exported aircraft to Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, Thailand, Poland, and Malaysia. India still relies on imports for aircraft technology.

Indian diffidence in defence industrial matters also spilled into its relations with Southeast Asian states. In the mid-1960s, officialdom in New Delhi gave Southeast Asia step-motherly treatment. During much of the Cold War, India disdained American involvement in the region. A posting in Southeast Asia was widely regarded as a punishment by Indian officials. India’s attitude, however, did not deter local actors, who continued to seek Indian military involvement in Southeast Asia. Even after India’s debilitating drubbing by China in 1962, Singapore did not lose faith in India. In 1965 it sought Indian security cover and armaments against communist China and irredentist Malaysia. It was only after being rebuffed by India and other major powers that Singapore turned to Israel for security cooperation.

Returning to the post-Cold War era, Indian governments across the political spectrum have invested significant effort in resuscitating ties with Southeast Asia. In recent years, defence exporters have further solidified this partnership. An incipient defence start-up culture at home helps. In addition to established players such as the Tatas, Mahindra, Kalyani, and Bharat Forge, new entrants such as Digantara are entering the sector. While bumbling regulation persists, the increasing number of private players has enhanced the industry's competitive edge.

While New Delhi hopes to increase its defence ties in the region, regional capitals from Jakarta to Hanoi are also keen to dodge the daunting crevice of the US-China rivalry. Sourcing defence imports from trusted partners like India adds a layer of stability to their defence postures.