As Pacific Islands wire up, scammers squeezed out of Southeast Asia are taking note

Improving online access for Pacific Island communities has been a huge focus in recent years. In 2022, numerous (Opens in new window) Pacific nations had either no undersea cable connectivity, or just one cable connection. Since then, the Australian government has committed (Opens in new window) to ensuring that every country has at least one cable, while Palau (Opens in new window), Solomon Islands (Opens in new window) and Tonga (Opens in new window) are each being provided with a second cable through grant and loan arrangements, in some cases in partnership with other development partners. Google has also announced (Opens in new window) cable projects in the Pacific, and the Papua New Guinea government expects (Opens in new window) three more cables to be funded by Australia – and the entry of Starlink’s internet service to the Pacific region has extended the reach (Opens in new window) of internet access.

All of which is to be welcomed.

But online expansion also carries a risk – one that criminal syndicates have shown a willingness to exploit.

Scam centres have become a recognised problem (Opens in new window) in the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, targeting potential victims through telephone calls, mobile phone text messages, social media content, internet websites or other internet platforms. But such operations involve victims of forced labour and human trafficking.

As scam centres are driven out of Southeast Asia (Opens in new window), criminal syndicates will look for other jurisdictions to exploit. Digital infrastructure growth may enable expansion of scam centres into Pacific countries that lacked suitable infrastructure in the past.

Scam centres are rare in the Pacific, but not unheard of. In the most publicised crackdown on scammers in the Pacific, the repatriation of 77 Chinese nationals from Fiji in 2017 (Opens in new window), online lottery scammers were on the run from mainland China. The people involved in this operation in Fiji appear to have been willing actors. By contrast, in Palau there have been two raids on scam centres finding evidence of forced labour: over 200 workers were found in raids on New Year’s Eve 2019 (Opens in new window); and two dozen workers were found in early 2025. In the most recent case (Opens in new window), workers were detained in two different hotels, passports confiscated and movement restricted for more than two years.

Lessons from Asian countries, complemented by this thankfully small number of documented Pacific cases, provide early warning indicators to help Pacific authorities identify emerging scam centres. In Southeast Asia, scam centres commonly operated for extended periods under the guise of legitimate businesses (Opens in new window) before detection, including hotels to house their compounds, casinos as cover for gaming and gambling operations, and lawful online service companies to hide illegal operations.

Location choices are shaped by legal (Opens in new window) and institutional weaknesses. Criminals gravitate to jurisdictions where cybercrime legislation is incomplete, enforcement mandates are fragmented, or investigative and prosecutorial capacity are limited. Pacific Islands with outdated or incomplete cybercrime, human trafficking (Opens in new window), and asset-seizure frameworks may therefore be perceived by criminals as low-risk environments (Opens in new window). The appeal of weak regulatory oversight was stressed in a 2025 Threat Alert (Opens in new window) underscoring Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste as vulnerable to the establishment of scam centres.

The adaptability of criminal actors should not be underestimated. Beyond large-scale operations, scammers may also establish small, temporary facilities (Opens in new window) in hotel rooms or short-term rental properties to reduce detection risks. With a crackdown on large compounds in Cambodia and Myanmar (Opens in new window), criminals may decide scale itself attracts too much attention. International cooperation is essential, including drawing lessons from Southeast Asia.

Authorities (including police, immigration and labour agencies) should work together domestically to look out for unusually high concentrations of foreign workers linked to a small number of local sponsors, opaque labour subcontracting arrangements, frequent visa irregularities, and businesses with substantial staffing and connectivity needs, as well as monitoring whether consumption of food, electricity and water matches legitimate business needs. Pacific regulators, utilities and telecommunications providers should also monitor unusual patterns of power consumption and internet usage linked to hospitality venues or remote facilities – the latter potentially gaining appeal as digital connectivity grows.

The “workforce” in scam centres often consists of trafficking (Opens in new window) victims, rather than immigration or cybercrime offenders, as they have sometimes been treated in various countries. This can become complex (Opens in new window) for law enforcement and require substantial victim support. Scam centre “staff” can also include low-level criminals and other people whose status is somewhere between being victims and low-level criminals. Pacific authorities should be alert to signs of forced criminality, including restricted freedom of movement, abuse, confiscation of travel documents, unexplained debt, or total dependence on employers for accommodation, food and transport.

Crucially, scam centres often operate at the intersection (Opens in new window) of crime, business and politics, benefiting from high-level protection or facilitation. Involvement of local sponsors, investors or politically exposed persons in high-risk sectors should be treated as a serious warning sign rather than an isolated governance issue.