ASEAN minus X: the fix for a region that can’t agree

Southeast Asia faces a far more demanding security environment than the one ASEAN was designed to manage. Rivalry between major powers, tensions in the South China Sea, instability in post-coup Myanmar, transnational crime, cyber threats, disasters and internal conflicts now transcend national borders.

Yet despite being the region’s premier multilateral institution, ASEAN continues to struggle to respond effectively when crises emerge.

The problem is not a lack of mechanisms (Opens in new window). ASEAN has spent decades building institutions and frameworks to strengthen regional cooperation. The problem is that these mechanisms remain constrained by an institutional culture that prioritises consensus and sovereignty over speed and effectiveness.

The ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (Opens in new window) (AMRG) illustrates the challenge. Established in 2015 as the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (AMRG on HADR), it was intended to provide a rapidly deployable regional military capability to support disaster relief and humanitarian operations. In theory, it represented a genuine advance in preparedness, interoperability and collective action.

In practice, however, the AMRG remains more aspiration than capability. Member states remain wary of allowing foreign military personnel to operate on their territory, reflecting ASEAN’s enduring sensitivities over sovereignty and non-interference. Deployment can only occur at the request of the affected state, limiting ASEAN’s ability to act quickly during the critical early stages of a crisis.

The operational obstacles are just as acute. ASEAN militaries differ widely (Opens in new window) in doctrine, training, language, equipment and operational procedures. The AMRG lacks dedicated assets, a permanent command structure and independent deployment authority. Without these foundations, rapid and coordinated responses remain difficult. More than a decade after its creation, the AMRG cannot yet function as an effective regional response force.

The second issue is ASEAN’s decision-making model. Consensus decision-making (Opens in new window) has long been celebrated as the glue that holds together a diverse organisation. It has helped preserve unity and prevent open divisions among member states. But in times of crisis, consensus often becomes paralysis.

The requirement for unanimous agreement gives every member state an effective veto over collective action. Decisions are frequently delayed, diluted or abandoned altogether. This may be acceptable for routine diplomacy, but it is ill-suited to a security environment where speed, flexibility and coordination are essential.

Addressing these weaknesses does not require ASEAN to abandon its core principles. It requires ASEAN to apply them more pragmatically.

In the case of AMRG, it should be strengthened through a permanent coordinating structure, common operating procedures, harmonised rules of engagement and regular multinational exercises. Greater investment in shared logistics, communications and planning capabilities would also improve readiness and interoperability.

Above all, ASEAN should make greater use of flexible decision-making arrangements such as the “ASEAN minus X (Opens in new window)” mechanism as an alternative to the consensus decision-making model. Already applied in the economic domain (Opens in new window), this approach enables willing member states to proceed with agreed initiatives even when full consensus is out of reach. Rather than allowing the most reluctant member to determine the pace of regional action, ASEAN minus X enables those prepared to act to move forward while keeping the door open for others to join later.

There is historical precedent for such flexibility. When the Vietnamese military occupied Cambodia from 1978 to 1989, ASEAN members shared the objective of ending Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia but disagreed on how to achieve it.

My research (Opens in new window) shows that ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed in 1981 that military pressure could help encourage a Vietnamese withdrawal, yet consensus on implementation proved elusive. In response, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, later joined by the United States through CIA, took the lead. Operating out of a safe house in Bangkok and along the Thai–Cambodian border, senior intelligence and military officials from these three ASEAN countries and the CIA worked through a covert joint command, providing logistical and military support – including lethal aid – to Cambodian non-communist resistance forces.

While operating outside formal ASEAN structures, this coalition demonstrated that smaller groups of member states could act decisively when unanimity was impossible.

ASEAN’s credibility depends not merely on its ability to convene meetings or issue statements, but on its capacity to act when regional stability is threatened. Ultimately, ASEAN’s greatest challenge is not the absence of institutions but the reluctance to empower them. The region’s security environment is becoming more contested, unpredictable and interconnected. Mechanisms designed for a less demanding era are inadequate.

This article is part of a series on ASEAN’s crisis coordination and response mechanisms following a private workshop hosted by the Lowy Institute in June 2026. The project was jointly led by Abdul Rahman Yaacob and Hunter Marston, Director of the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Program, with the support of the Department of Defence’s Strategic Policy Grants Program.