AUKUS, explained.
Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS Minnesota prepares to moor alongside submarine tender USS Emory S. Land during a scheduled port visit in Darwin, Northern Territory, in March (Ethan Lambert/US Navy)
Promises need to shift to performance, judged against a published timeline.
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AUKUS: Building confidence in Australia’s submarine pathwayAUKUS: Building confidence in Australia’s submarine pathway
At an estimated $368 billion cost, a Pentagon review underway and talk of the United States seeking a guaranteed commitment in the event of conflict, Australia’s push for nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS is never far from the headlines. But the idea that Canberra is hostage to American whim is off the mark and lacks self-awareness. Australia must consider how our AUKUS partners view us.
Are our actions instilling confidence in this critical deal? Our real test is proving we can hold up our end: expedite infrastructure, build confidence and show allies and voters alike that Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) will be ready in 2027, less than two years away.
Since the AUKUS announcement in September 2021, significant progress has been made. Within 18 months, the three partners agreed on an optimal pathway and concluded a binding treaty, no small feat. Training is well underway, with Australian submariners reportedly progressing through the US system, and Australian shipbuilders working at Pearl Harbor to build the skills needed to maintain and eventually construct nuclear-powered submarines at home. And perhaps most remarkably, despite persistent headlines of doubt, the latest Lowy Institute Poll shows more Australians support the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines than oppose it, a striking shift for a country long defined by its anti-nuclear stance.
Yet for all this progress, a looming infrastructure crunch threatens to derail momentum. The Australian government must now lean in, decisively, to ensure the foundations are in place to sustain what has been achieved.
Australia’s patchy performance on naval infrastructure, shipbuilding and sustainment has bred a reputation for delay and indecision.
Worries are growing in Canberra, and Washington, that upgrades at HMAS Stirling and the new Henderson defence precinct are drifting off-schedule. Addressing the Lowy Institute, CSIS president John Hamre warned that many in Washington feel “the Albanese government supports AUKUS but isn’t really leaning in”, a perception he said is “more widely felt … than people realise”. Days later, former US Navy secretary and current Austal chair Richard Spencer drove the point home highlighting that policy alone won’t build submarines: “it has to move from politics to military to construction,” Spencer said. “We need to start moving dirt”.
These worries are hard to verify because Canberra still hasn’t published a real schedule for HMAS Stirling or the new Henderson precinct. The December 2024 Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Plan and the March 2025 AUKUS Submarine Industry Strategy trumpet job numbers but stay silent on real infrastructure deliverables. Even the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, which examined the Stirling upgrade in June 2024, seems to only address the scope. Publicly available detail on Stirling timelines amounts to a single line: “major construction is expected to start in 2025”. With no dated milestones, assurances that we are “investing in both sites” look aspirational, and the perception gap widens.
With no published timelines, even loyal supporters are left wondering whether Canberra can meet its AUKUS obligations, first hosting SRF-West, then taking delivery of an Australian-flagged Virginia-class boat in 2032. Our credibility problem is hardly new: the public and industry still recall years of slipped schedules and blown budgets in naval shipbuilding and infrastructure.
US Navy and Royal Australian Navy sailors attached to the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land performing maintenance aboard Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS Hawaii at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, in August 2024 (Mario E. Reyes Villatoro/US Navy Photo)
The 2020 Force Structure Plan flagged the need for a second dry-dock in Western Australia, an urgency only amplified by AUKUS, yet five years and two governments later we still lack a start date. Dry-docks are neither cheap nor quick to build, but they are essential if we hope to maintain nuclear-powered submarines on home soil. Meanwhile the promised east-coast submarine base has vanished from the agenda. Although not critical to the AUKUS pathway, submarine access to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans is central to any credible Australian maritime strategy.
Shipbuilding and sustainment are hardly healthier. Both Australian Navy replenishment ships have been idle since 2024 with engine and shaft failures, and an ANAO audit says the landing helicopter docks suffer “ongoing deficiencies” and “critical failures” thanks to poor contract management. The first 1,640-tonne Arafura offshore-patrol vessel took three-and-a-half years to move from launch (December 2021) to commissioning (June 2025), an extraordinary pause for such a simple platform. Steel for the Hunter-class frigates was cut in 2024, yet the lead ship is not due until 2032 because Canberra will not expedite the program. Meanwhile the Collins-class submarine life-of-type extension looks increasingly unlikely to proceed as originally scoped, if it proceeds at all.
Every shortfall has its own back-story, too complex to detail in this space, but the record is clear: our patchy performance on naval infrastructure, shipbuilding and sustainment has bred a reputation for delay and indecision. Rather than continually seeking reassurance that Washington and London will meet their AUKUS commitments, Canberra should confront the tougher question: do we inspire confidence, or are we becoming the weak link in the trilateral partnership?
The government’s refusal to lift defence spending, insisting we are “doing enough” despite allied doubts, erodes the very confidence we need to build. Any military planner can see the ADF’s ambitions are kneecapped by a budget that falls well short of our stated strategy.
Much has been achieved since AUKUS was unveiled, but we are now on the critical path: without timely upgrades at HMAS Stirling and Henderson, the first phase stalls. From the outside it is impossible to judge progress, and partners are openly sceptical, hardly surprising given Australia’s patchy record on recent naval projects. Repeating that we are “doing enough” no longer cuts it. If Canberra wants to shore up confidence, it should publish a detailed schedule for the Stirling and Henderson works. Transparency, not talking points, will keep AUKUS on track.
About the author
Jennifer Parker
Jennifer Parker is a Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute and Adjunct Fellow in Naval Studies at the University of Western Australia.
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