Taiwan, explained.

Officials approach a Taiwanese government Boeing 737-800 on the tarmac

For Chinese pressure to force Taiwan’s president to cancel a trip is unprecedented (Taiwan Presidential Office/Flickr)

Beijing intensifies diplomatic isolation of Taiwan’s president

Denying airspace transit is a new tactic – and its effectiveness may encourage China to use it again.

Michael Cunningham

28 April 20264 min read

Last week, Beijing deployed a new tactic for diplomatically isolating Taiwan. On 21 April, President Lai Ching-te postponed a trip to Eswatini, Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in Africa, after three countries abruptly revoked permission for his plane to transit their airspace. The three countries – Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles – are believed to have acted at China’s request.

Beijing has long sought to interfere with the international travel of Taiwan’s president. Just last August, Lai cancelled a trip to Latin America after the United States denied him permission to transit through New York, apparently over fears the stopover could derail US-China trade negotiations. Beijing routinely pressures Washington to restrict such transits. In both 2006 and 2007, for example, the George W. Bush administration denied then-president Chen Shui-bian permission to stop in the continental US en route to Latin America. Chen’s trip went ahead, only his transit through the US was affected.

This latest incident, however, is unique in two ways. First, it was aimed primarily at obstructing a visit to a formal diplomatic partner, not preventing engagement with an unofficial partner like the United States. Second, it succeeded at blocking the visit altogether. The sudden denial of airspace by multiple countries left Taiwan with insufficient time to chart an alternative route and secure new permissions, forcing Lai to cancel the trip.

For Chinese pressure to force Taiwan’s president to cancel a trip is unprecedented. Lai’s cancelled trip to Latin America last year reportedly could have gone ahead with a lower-profile transit somewhere other than New York, but Lai cancelled it, citing domestic reasons. Even the last-minute withdrawal of permission for Chen Shui-bian to refuel in Lebanon in 2006 – after the US denied him permission to transit – didn’t derail his Latin America visit. He was able to refuel in the United Arab Emirates instead.

Whereas Tsai generally conducted a major overseas trip each year, Lai has cancelled two of the three trips he planned since taking office in 2024.

This latest episode raises a critical question: was the denial of airspace a one-off manoeuvre designed specifically to embarrass Lai, or does it represent a new tactic Beijing intends to deploy more regularly against Taiwan? The answer is likely somewhere in between.

There is no doubt that Beijing distrusts Lai and his formally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Undermining Lai’s credibility, including by preventing him from carrying out his diplomatic duties, is a clear objective of the Chinese government. While Beijing was less successful at obstructing the travel of Lai’s predecessor Tsai Ing-wen – also of the DPP – it persuaded ten countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan during her tenure, leaving Taipei with just 12 official partners.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te recording a video message for Eswatini on 26 April after he was forced to abandon a planned visit (Wang Yu Ching/Taiwan Presidential Office)

The latest incident occurred just days after Chinese leader Xi Jinping rolled out the red carpet for Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang (KMT). Coming on the heels of that meeting and Beijing’s subsequent announcement of economic incentives for Taiwan, the Chinese government appears to be sending a message to the island’s voters: a re-election of Lai in 2028 will result in continued pressure, while a return of the KMT could ease tensions. Indeed, the last time Taiwan had a KMT president (2008–16), Beijing refrained from poaching any of its diplomatic partners and even facilitated Taiwan’s role in some international organisations.

At the same time, the shocking effectiveness of this airspace-denial tactic may encourage Beijing to use it more in the future. But the more it uses this tactic, the less effective it is likely to be. Taipei will learn which countries are unwilling to bend to Beijing’s demands and will plan its flights accordingly. Washington may also step up pressure on countries not to comply. In recent years, the US Congress has worked actively to help Taiwan preserve its remaining diplomatic partners.

Regardless of the broader implications of this incident, Beijing’s effort to isolate Lai diplomatically is bearing fruit. Whereas Tsai generally conducted a major overseas trip each year, Lai has cancelled two of the three trips he planned since taking office in 2024. Only his trip to Pacific island partners in 2024 – which included transits through Hawaii and the US territory of Guam – went ahead as planned.

It is unclear when Lai will reschedule his trip to Eswatini and whether he will find a route that Beijing can’t obstruct. He is also unlikely to announce a date for his long-delayed visit to diplomatic partners in the Western Hemisphere until after US President Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi, currently scheduled for mid-May. Until then, Trump is unlikely to let Lai transit the US, and Lai might not see political utility in making such a trip without a high-profile stopover.

Lai’s inability to carry out diplomacy abroad adds further uncertainty amid Beijing’s efforts to peel away Taipei’s remaining diplomatic partners. Although these partners are generally poor and have limited global influence, they give Taiwan a measure of international legitimacy it badly needs. Those in the US who want to support Taiwan should focus more on ensuring it is able to engage in diplomacy with these countries. While both Congress and the White House are actively seeking to prevent Taipei’s remaining diplomatic partners from severing their ties, this will be challenging if Taiwan’s president can’t engage normally with these countries.

About the author

Michael Cunningham

Michael Cunningham is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for China Studies, National Taiwan University, where he focuses on China’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

Topics

Taiwan China Diplomacy United States Xi Jinping