Philippines, explained.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Antonio G. Nafarrete (PFC Carmelotes PN/@TeamAFP/X)
Antonio Nafarrete inherits a Philippine military still learning to look outward – and Beijing isn’t making it easy.
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Between highlands and the high sea: What awaits the next Philippine military chief?Between highlands and the high sea: What awaits the next Philippine military chief?
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. last month appointed (Opens in new window) Lieutenant General Antonio Nafarrete as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Nafarrete, who previously commanded the Philippine Army after leading the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, now takes the helm of the country’s land, air and naval forces.
Replacing military chief Romeo Brawner Jr., whose tenure lasted for three years, Nafarrete assumes command at a pivotal moment, as the island nation navigates intensifying geopolitical tensions (Opens in new window) abroad and security demands at home. Nafarrete’s task will be to implement and operationalise the administration’s evolving defence policies of transforming to a truly archipelagic defence.
For decades, the Philippine military’s gaze was turned relentlessly inward, bogged down in protracted counter-insurgency (Opens in new window) against Maoist rebels across the country’s rural areas and separatists in the southern jungles of Mindanao. The campaign against communist rebels continues, but the insurgents are now firmly on the backfoot as the guerrillas struggle (Opens in new window) to replenish their ranks with new cadres and push back militarily. Meanwhile, the peace process between Manila and former rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) remains fragile but still intact (Opens in new window).
Nafarrete’s background as an experienced commander in the southern provinces of Lanao and Maguindanao, and his familiarity (Opens in new window) with the peace process (including ceasefire arrangements with the MILF), is, without doubt, a positive sign.
Nafarrete visited two injured Philippine Navy sailors at Camp Ricarte Station Hospital on 25 July 2026 and conferred the Wounded Personnel Medal after injuries they suffered during clashes with China at BRP Sierra Madre on 20 July (SSg Ambay PA/@TeamAFP/X)
The contested waters of the South China Sea (Opens in new window) also continue to be a concern. A recent violent clash (Opens in new window) at the Second Thomas Shoal resulted in the injury of a Philippine sailor and once again raised the risk of accidental escalation. Chinese coastguard vessels and maritime militias’ regular usage of high-powered water cannons, ramming tactics, acoustic weapons and occasionally even lasers have become a reality at sea.
People’s Liberation Army Navy ships are also coming closer to Manila’s shores, passing by key straits and swarming near Philippine outposts around the Spratly islands. Tensions around the South China Sea are further complicated by an expanding theatre of concern as Philippine defence planners are casting anxious glances toward the Bashi channel, the critical choke point separating the Philippines from Taiwan; Manila started to confront the reality that a cross-strait conflict around Taiwan will impact the archipelago one way or another.
To meet these new challenges, Marcos and Defence Secretary Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro have sought to chart a clearer strategic course for the Philippines. Central to this shift is the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept. Developed two years ago, this doctrine (Opens in new window) aims to formally prioritise the country’s vast maritime domain after decades of inward focus. Manila is also accelerating new acquisitions (Opens in new window) to expand the navy and air force footprint alongside traditional army ground forces. It also attempts to modernise force structures and develop critical capabilities like cyber defence.
Yet concerns persist. Historically hamstrung by lean budgets – defence spending in recent years amounted to less than 1.5% of GDP annually – and bureaucratic inertia, Philippine military procurement often struggles with execution which has caused modernisation delays (Opens in new window). Even an expanded budget falls short of the massive capital needed to secure high-end equipment such as advanced combat aircraft.
Nafarrete will need to safeguard the military’s neutrality and prevent it from becoming embroiled in partisan feuding, especially considering presidential elections in 2028.
Nafarrete’s assumption speech emphasised (Opens in new window) operational readiness across all domains, signalling that he would address the military’s historical “sea blindness (Opens in new window)”. As a former commander of the land forces, he is well-positioned to spearhead this military culture reset given the service’s prominence but also the urgency for the army to think beyond internal security.
Going further, as Crisis Group previously recommended (Opens in new window), specific priorities must take centre stage which the incoming chief of staff should embrace and push to further boost.
First, as Nafarrete recognised (Opens in new window) during his tenure as army chief, the armed forces should double down on developing asymmetric capabilities. Drones, for example, are far easier and cheaper to make and are a natural choice for the Philippines.
Second, the Philippine army remains a central player in defending the sea from land, which would require a heightened focus on coastal defence.
Third, the incoming commander must integrate various assets into a cohesive “joint force”. This would also require a stronger multi-domain command-and-control infrastructure beyond (Opens in new window) procuring hardware.
Fourth, Nafarrete will also inherit large-scale defence exercises such as the annual Balikatan alongside other drills and maritime patrols with US, Australian, and Japanese counterparts. To strengthen interoperability with allies and partners, but also between the different Philippine military branches, he needs to expand the scope of the drills. This could happen, for example, by conducting exercises around all Philippine maritime straits or simulating supply operations under critical conditions. These deterrence efforts must also be reinforced by diplomacy and open channels for crisis communication with Beijing.
Lastly, for all focus on external defence, domestic politics cannot be entirely ignored. Philippine civil-military relations were tested in recent months as retired military officials sympathetic (Opens in new window) to Vice President Sara Duterte-Carpio urged the armed forces’ leadership to withdraw support from the Marcos administration at a time when the Marcos-Duterte feud (Opens in new window) intensified. Nafarrete will need to safeguard the military’s neutrality and prevent it from becoming embroiled in partisan feuding, especially considering presidential elections in 2028.
About the author
Georgi Engelbrecht
Georgi Engelbrecht is a Senior Analyst with the International Crisis Group.
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