Japan’s quiet test of China diplomacy

On 15 May, Hitoshi Kikawada, Japan’s minister in charge of gender equality, visited Shanghai to attend the APEC ministerial meeting on Women and the Economy. It is the first visit to China by a Japanese cabinet minister since relations deteriorated after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks last November on a possible “Taiwan contingency”.

Since Takaichi’s remarks, Beijing’s response to Tokyo has gone beyond diplomatic protest. In January, China announced tighter export controls on dual-use items – including rare earths and magnets – bound for Japan, increasing supply-chain pressure on Japanese firms. In the first quarter of 2026, the number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan fell more than 60% year-on-year, creating clear headwinds for Japan’s tourism industry. At the same time, Japan’s own economic momentum remains fragile, with continued pressure on consumption and domestic demand.

Given this situation, both the Japanese government and business community have an interest in restoring high-level contact in order to preserve at least a minimal stabilising mechanism in relations with China.

On 2 May, Yasutoshi Nishimura, chair of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Election Strategy Committee, visited Beijing, where he inspected advanced technology companies in areas such as robotics and autonomous driving. Japan also plans to send Economy, Trade, and Industry Minister Ryosei Akazawa to Suzhou for the APEC trade ministers’ meeting from 20 May. A delegation from the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade is also expected to visit Beijing in June, seeking meetings with senior Chinese officials.

These moves amount to Japan’s gradual attempt at re-engagement. But Kikawada’s visit is different from Nishimura’s. Nishimura is a senior party figure, whereas Kikawada is a cabinet minister attending a multilateral meeting hosted by China. That means the level of contact between Tokyo and Beijing has, in fact, moved somewhat higher.

Why Kikawada, and why this forum?

Japan has not viewed the visit as pure symbolism. The decision to send Kikawada carries a policy message of its own. He currently serves as a Minister of State in the Cabinet Office, with responsibilities covering gender equality, women’s empowerment, an inclusive society, children’s policy, and regional revitalisation. Domestically, women’s participation in decision-making, labour-force adjustment, and demographic pressure are all long-term governance challenges for Japan. Using the APEC platform to show Japan’s progress on women’s leadership and social inclusion helps present Japan as a regional actor concerned not only with security, but also with institutional governance and social modernisation.

This is where the visit reaches beyond Sino-Japanese relations. Kikawada’s trip reflects a broader question: when China turns diplomatic disputes into economic pressure, how can other countries preserve necessary channels of communication without accepting Beijing’s narrative boundaries? From this perspective, Japan is attempting a more limited but also more realistic form of crisis management. APEC cannot resolve the Taiwan issue. But it can provide a minimal institutional buffer for strained relations. For Tokyo, that buffer has value precisely because it can prevent security disagreements from swallowing every economic and social issue.

In addition, Kikawada’s visit is an attempt by Japan to preserve diplomatic flexibility in a crisis. Hence, it has chosen the lowest-sensitivity entry point: women and the economy.

The agenda of APEC’s Women and the Economy Forum includes women’s appointment to executive positions, support for entrepreneurship, digital transformation, and the cultivation of women in science and technology fields. These are technical and social policy issues. For Japan, this kind of setting allows official contact to resume without giving Beijing an opportunity to portray Tokyo as retreating on security questions.

Kikawada himself has also been careful to limit the political spillover of the trip. Before departure, he stressed that the visit would focus on normal exchanges around APEC’s Women and the Economy agenda. No separate meetings with Chinese or other foreign ministers were scheduled. This arrangement shows that Tokyo does not want the visit to be over-interpreted as evidence that bilateral relations are warming. Still less does it want Beijing to package a multilateral meeting as a Japanese retreat on Taiwan issues.

What does Kikawada’s visit signal?

First, Japan still hopes to manage diplomatic friction with China through multilateral mechanisms rather than allowing bilateral relations to slide entirely into confrontation. APEC provides a relatively safe platform through which Japan can resume ministerial-level contact without making major political concessions.

Second, Japan is trying to pull the regional agenda back from a security crisis toward economic, social, and institutional cooperation. Women’s economic participation cannot solve the Taiwan issue, but it can preserve a less dangerous space for diplomatic dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing.

Third, Tokyo is showing that its China policy can be both principled and flexible. Japan will not abandon its regional security judgment because of Chinese pressure. But it will also not close every channel of communication because of security disagreements.

For Japan, even limited contact with China now tests whether diplomacy can still create opportunity rather than merely absorb pressure.