Philippines, explained.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. speaks during a press conference at Malacanang Palace on 25 March 2026 in Manila, Philippines (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
The Iran war has prompted US allies in Asia, like the Philippines, to reassess their military reliance on Washington
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Marcos’s overture to China masks anxiety about US reliabilityMarcos’s overture to China masks anxiety about US reliability
Much stock has been put in Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s expression of interest in restarting long-stalled negotiations with Beijing over disputed energy resources in the South China Sea. Upon closer examination, however, it’s clear that his statements, during an interview with Bloomberg Television, were more about diplomatic niceties than an actual major energy deal with a rival state.
The devil is in the details. The Malacañang Palace has not clarified the exact nature or location of any joint exploration deal: Is it going to be a service contract under Philippine sovereignty? Is it going to be a joint development agreement in the contested Reed Bank area under shared sovereign claims? Or a mere joint exploration deal closer to the proven sites near the Malampaya gas field, well within the country’s exclusive economic zone?
My personal hunch, which I expressed to Bloomberg TV, is that Marcos Jr., who became the first global leader to declare a national energy emergency over oil shortages, was signalling profound frustration with the economic fallout of America’s misguided war in the Middle East. In the words of a key ally, Senator Panfilo Lacson, “The Philippines is in crisis along with the rest of the world because [of[ President Trump’s brinkmanship … all because of the narcissistic arrogance of one ‘leader of the free world.’”
What’s not a tempest in a teacup, however, is the Filipino president’s claim that a “very serious restructuring” of relations with China is “certainly going to happen” across the region. From Singapore to Seoul and Tokyo to Taipei, frontline US allies in Asia are confronting difficult questions.
In particular, many in the region have been troubled by how seamlessly Iran targeted American bases across the Persian Gulf. This led to the US relocating advanced missile defence systems from Asia to the Middle East in face of Tehran’s relentless drone-and-missiles-driven saturation strategy.
Instead of serving as US “deputy sheriffs” in Asia, America’s frontline allies will hedge their bets.
Threatened by an expansionist Beijing, America’s regional allies are not about to genuflect to China anytime soon. But Washington’s “latticework” defence architecture in Asia could now be in jeopardy.
Top strategists in the Trump administration, most notably Pentagon’s policy chief Elbridge Colby, have previously rightly emphasised the primacy of Asia in Washington’s broader calculus. After all, the region is home to the world’s most dynamic economies and, crucially, a primary theatre of competition with a resurgent China.
Instead of building massive and expensive bases, Washington has opted for a more flexible “latticework” approach, most notably through rotational access to strategically located facilities and establishment of weapons depot across the Philippines. Moreover, the US has also pressed for the establishment of a “Great Wall of Missiles” across the Indo-Pacific through, inter alia, the deployment advanced missile systems across Guam, southern Japan, and northern Philippines. The aim is to reinforce America’s forward-deployment capacity with an eye on jointly deterring any Chinese kinetic action against Taiwan – or any of frontline allies, whether Japan or the Philippines.
But the war against Iran exposed the potential fragility of this approach. China, which has an even larger industrial base and mass-manufacturing capacity than Iran, could employ a similar saturation strategy against US military facilities across Asia in an event of war. Since Iran primarily relies on China’s BeiDou satellite system, Beijing has doubtlessly drawn real-time operational lessons about the vulnerabilities of even America’s most advanced missile defence systems. As a result, US allies in Asia have to seriously re-examine their defence posture and military vulnerabilities like never before.
Moreover, the Iran War will likely strengthen the voice of pro-China elements in key capitals. The head of Taiwan’s main opposition party has just visited China at the invitation of President Xi Jinping. Philippine Vice-President Sara Duterte is the clear frontrunner in all pre-elections surveys ahead of the 2028 presidential race. Meanwhile, South Korea’s government has been extremely critical of America’s unilateral decision to relocate high-grade interceptors to the Middle East, having earlier paid a heavy price, including Chinese economic sanctions, for deciding to host the THAAD missile system.
Whether in the name of strategic autonomy or pacifism, both Beijing-friendly forces as well as hardline nationalists across key Asian capitals would likely push for reassessing military reliance on a seemingly unpredictable America.
Far from jumping into Beijing’s embrace, however, America’s frontline allies in Asia will likely double down on their own indigenous defence industry, focusing on asymmetric warfare, and explore a more robust “middle power coalition”. Having finalised new defence deals with Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, France, the Philippines is set to host the largest-ever Balikatan exercises this year, which would see, for the first time, direct combat-related participation by Japanese Self-Defence Forces. Instead of serving as US “deputy sheriffs” in Asia, America’s frontline allies will hedge their bets by switching to minilateral cooperation with like-minded powers and greater defence self-reliance than placing their fate in America’s hands.
About the author
Richard Javad Heydarian
Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based columnist, academic, and author.
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