Myanmar’s junta – next to fall?

The longevity of Iran’s theocracy is a topic of much current debate. Beyond immediate events, it has also prompted musings on some general principles on authoritarian rule. What are the conditions that keep such regimes in place, especially in circumstances where the popular will seems so obviously thwarted?

In a contribution to The Atlantic in January, Karim Sadjadpour and Jack Goldstone advance five conditions for a revolution, anywhere, to succeed: 1) A fiscal crisis; 2) Divided elites; 3) A diverse oppositional coalition; 4) A convincing narrative of resistance, and; 5) A favourable international environment.

In my view Sadjadpour and Goldstone are on to something, and they got me thinking about their schema and the case of Myanmar. Suffering under a military junta as incompetent as it is despotic, how does its situation measure up? Do these five criteria offer hope for revolutionary change?

My answer is that the current revolution by the Myanmar people against the junta fighting to maintain its rule will succeed, but the final item of the five conditions that might be decisive.

1. Fiscal crisis: Myanmar’s junta has been in a funding crisis since the outset of its coup in February 2021. With a collapsed taxation system, a dysfunctional bond market, and a vast stable of loss-making state-owned enterprises, the revenue side of Myanmar’s public finances is in a sorry state. New borrowing from China has added to Myanmar’s sovereign debt, but recourse to inflationary “printing money” via the central bank is the main way the junta funds itself. On the spending side there has been little restraint, with the junta spending freely on weaponry and munitions. Expenditure on health, education, and infrastructure has fallen dramatically across the last five years, but these reductions have been insufficient to stem a budget deficit now at record levels. On its fiscal condition, Myanmar’s junta seems set to fall.
2. Divided elites: In public, Myanmar’s elites – including the so-called “crony” business elite and senior civil servants – say very little about the junta. Motivated by fear and opportunism, in private such elites are near-universally excoriating of Myanmar’s current state. Fair weather friends of the junta, but unreliable allies for the opposition too. They could be a factor driving regime change, but only after obvious momentum in that direction. Elite division is a factor leaning towards the revolution, in short, but hesitatingly so.

1. A diverse oppositional coalition: The opposition to Myanmar’s military junta includes almost all of the country’s long persecuted ethnic minorities, as well as the Burman majority. Fissures remain, but with a few exceptions, I expect any such divisions to be subordinated to an understanding that only opposition unity can defeat the junta. Accordingly, and with the circumstances of former civilian leader (and 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate) Aung San Suu Kyi as a wildcard, the diversity and strength of the opposition could be a strong factor in the junta’s downfall.
2. A convincing narrative of resistance: Myanmar’s military pitches itself as the only entity capable of holding the country together. Traditionally, they also told stories of their valour in achieving Myanmar’s independence in 1948. They seem to have given up the latter mythology, however, swamped as it is by the scale and depravity of their wars against the Myanmar people since. Compared to the observed and tested credibility of the Myanmar people’s struggle for freedom, the narrative of legitimacy is a strong factor for revolutionary change.
3. A favourable international environment: While most of the world holds them in contempt, Myanmar’s junta enjoys the support of Russia, Belarus, Iran, North Korea and, above all, China. The latter was behind the recent sham election in Myanmar (December-January) that was designed to provide the junta with a fig leaf of legitimacy. In the short run China’s support has thrown the junta a lifeline that, apart from the election, incorporates the provision of military hardware, debt financing, and the promise of future investment in the form of large Chinese infrastructure projects. The latter include so-called “Belt and Road” (BRI) projects rejected by Myanmar’s previous civilian government, and fuels suspicions that sovereignty is being surrendered and that Myanmar is becoming a vassal state of China. China’s support for the junta – critical in keeping revolution at bay in the short run – in the longer run fans revolutionary anger.
   
   What of the West and ASEAN? The latter has proved to be divided and ineffectual on Myanmar, while the former is distracted by other crises and the absence of the traditional moral leadership of the United States. In my view Australia mostly does the right thing by the people of Myanmar, but its support is not a factor in revolutionary change.

So where are we? Most of Sadjadpour and Goldstone’s conditions for a revolution in Myanmar are satisfied, but some only hesitatingly so and there are clearly many contingencies. China’s support, however self-destructive in the long run, is holding upright Myanmar’s weak and discredited junta for the moment. Time for the international community to call them out for this. Time to allow the people of Myanmar the right to determine their own future.